T  '«     «     f 


I  W.  WI ■■LLiOLJ-GHSY 


. 


48* 


PRUSSIAN 
POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


PRUSSIAN 
POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ITS  PRINCIPLES  AND  IMPLICATIONS 


BY 
WESTEL  W.  WILLOUGHBY 

PROFESSOR  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  AT  THE 
JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY 


a  -    j    • 


D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 
NEW  YORK  LONDON 

1918 


119293 


Copyright,  1918,  by 
D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


*/> 


V  PREFACE 

In  addition  to  the  legal  obligations  which  attach 
to  citizenship  in  any  State,  whatever  its  form  of 
government,  there  are  moral  obligations  which  in- 
crease in  force  in  proportion  to  the  merits  of  that 
government  and  the  beneficence  of  its  rule.  But 
especially  great  are  the  moral  obligations  which  rest 
upon  the  citizen  when,  as  in  the  United  States,  he  is 
given  a  participating  voice  in  the  determination  ©f 
public  policies ;  for  the  welfare  of  the  eountry  is  thus 
vested,  not  in  the  hands  of  a  few  men,  but  in  the 
people  themselves.  Upon  their  intelligent  judgment 
the  decision  must  be  founded  whether  or  not  the  Na- 
tion shall  be  guided  by  the  highest  ideals  of  justice 
and  humanity,  and  the  actions  of  its  government 
wisely  conceived  and  efficiently  executed.  Citizen- 
ship in  a  free  State  thus  carries  with  it  greater  obli- 
gations than  are  implied  in  a  State  autocratically 
governed — a  higher  degree  of  popular  education  and 
general  intelligence,  a  keener  sense  of  moral  obli- 
gation to  one's  fellow  men,  and  a  correspondingly 
greater  willingness  to  make  the  personal  sacrifices 


PREFACE 

which  are  needed  if  the  experiment  of  republican 
rule  is  to  be  a  success. 

A  person  is,  however,  not  qualified  to  play  his  part 
as  a  citizen  of  a  free  State  unless  he  knows  and  is  in 
agreement  with  the  political  ideals  of  the  community 
of  which  he  is  a  member.  The  American  people,  in- 
dividually, and  as  a  body  politic,  are  committed  to 
certain  ideals  of  right  and  justice,  not  only  as  regards 
their  dealings  with  one  another  and  with  their  own 
government,  but  as  regards  their  obligations  to  the 
other  peoples  of  the  world.  At  the  present  time  they 
are  waging  a  war  with  their  entire  strength  against 
forces  which  are  antagonistic  to  these  ideals,  and 
which,  if  not  successfully  resisted,  will  render  impos- 
sible the  recognition  and  free  application  of  those 
principles  of  national  and  international  jurispru- 
dence which,  they  are  convinced,  must  be  upheld  if 
the  soul  of  the  world  is  to  be  saved.  If  then,  this 
great  struggle  is  to  be  carried  on  with  wide  open  eyes, 
it  is  essential  that  Americans  should  not  see  through  a 
glass  as  darkly,  but  face  to  face  with  the  true  signif- 
icance of  the  principles  of  public  conduct  against 
which  they  are  contending. 

The  nature  of  the  acts  which  these  opposing  polit- 
ical principles  have  been  made  to  justify  has  been 


PREFACE 

demonstrated  during  the  last  four  years  by  the  acta 
of  the  Prussian  State;  indeed  it  has  been  revealed 
throughout  the  history  of  that  Nation.  The  prin- 
ciples themselves  have  found  repeated  and  unquali- 
fied statement  in  the  speeches  and  writings  of  Prus- 
sia's statesmen,  publicists,  preachers,  poets,  and  uni- 
versity professors.  Many  of  these  statements  have 
been  made  available  in  English  translation  to  the 
American  people  in  the  volume  entitled  "Out  of 
Their  Own  Mouths,"  and  in  the  brochure  "Conquest 
and  Culture,"  compiled  by  Wallace  Notestein  and 
E.  E.  Stoll  and  issued  by  the  Committee  on  Public 
Information. 

Notwithstanding  the  candor  with  which  they  have 
been  avowed,  and  the  consistency  with  which  they 
have  been  applied,  so  atrocious  are  they  in  character, 
so  shocking  to  the  fundamental  ideas  of  justice,  truth 
and  humanity,  that  many  of  us  have  found  it  almost 
impossible  to  believe  that  any  intellectually  enlight- 
ened and  christianized  people  could  sincerely  hold 
them.  That  the  Prussian  people  do  accept  these  doc- 
trines is,  however,  certain,  and  the  purpose  of  the 
present  volume  is  to  explain  how  this  has  come  about. 
This  it  will  attempt  to  do  by  showing  how  these  sev- 
eral principles  are  related  to  one  another  and  are  logi- 

vii 


PREFACE 

cal  deductions  from  the  general  political  philosophy 
which  has  for  years  been  dominant  in  Prussia.  The 
means  whereby  it  has  been  possible  to  indoctrinate 
the  body  of  the  people  with  the  views  which  those 
in  control  of  the  Prussian  Government  have,  for  their 
own  purposes,  desired  to  have  accepted,  will  also  be 
explained. 

The  philosophy  which  is  dealt  with  has  found  ac- 
ceptance throughout  the  German  States,  but  is  here 
spoken  of  as  Prussian  because  it  has  been  peculiarly 
the  product  of  Prussian  thought  and  practice,  its 
extension  being  due  to  the  dominating  political  in- 
fluence which  Prussia  has  exercised.  As  Treitschke 
says  in  his  "Politics,"  quoting  a  remark  of  Emperor 
William  I  to  Bismarck,  "The  Empire  is  nothing  but 
an  expanded  Prussia." 

How  far  the  theories  described  in  this  volume  may 
properly  be  spoken  of  as  characteristic  of  Austrian- 
Hungarian  thought  it  is  not  necessary  to  consider. 
The  Dual  Kingdom  has  had  domestic  problems  and 
international  operations  which  explain  her  actions 
independently  of  a  political  philosophy  such  as  is 
needed  to  give  meaning  and  logical  coherence  to  the 
actions  and  utterances  of  Germany;  and  it  would 
seem  that  Germany  has  utilized  the  ambitions  of  her 

viii 


PREFACE 

Ally  to  obtain  her  cooperation  in  the  realization  of 
her  own  WeltpolitiJc.  Austria-Hungary  is  of  course 
predominantly  Roman  Catholic  and,  as  Rohrbach 
asserts,  there  is  a  natural  conflict  between  Catholi- 
cism and  the  national  idea  of  a  State  such  as  Prussia 
stands  for. 

In  order  that  a  proper  application  of  the  Prussian 
political  philosophy,  from  the  American  point  of  view, 
may  be  obtained,  it  has  been  deemed  desirable  to  open 
the  discussion  with  a  brief  statement  of  the  political 
ideals  which  Americans  consider  fundamental. 

The  chapter  entitled  "Tendencies  Towards  Re- 
sponsible Government  in  Germany"  is  by  Professor 
Walter  J.  Shepard,  which,  though  published  sev- 
eral years  ago  in  the  American  Political  Science  Re- 
view, has  needed  but  the  addition  of  a  few  paragraphs 
to  make  it  applicable  to  the  present  situation.  He  has 
kindly  given  his  consent  to  its  use  in  this  volume. 

Throughout  the  volume  the  author  has  not  hesi- 
tated to  make  liberal  use  of  articles  which  he  has  pub- 
lished in  the  American  Political  Science  Review  and 
the  American  Journal  of  International  Law.  He 
has  also  borrowed  from  a  chapter  contributed  by  him 
to  a  volume  entitled  "Problems  of  Readjustment 
After  the  War,"  published  in  1915. 

ix 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTEB 

I  American  Political  Ideals     .     . 
II  The  German  Weltanschauung    . 

III  The  Prussian  Theort  of  the  State 

IV  The  Prussian  Theory  of  Monarchy 
V  Prussian  Constitutional  Theory 

VI  Prussia's  Constitutional  System 
VII  Tendencies   Toward   Ministerial 

SPONSIBILITY  IN  GERMANY        .       . 

VIII  Propaganda 

IX  Conclusion     .  1  .     .     .  ;  .     •  T  • 1 
Appendix       .     .     ._._»_^«_^«  _  •  -1 • 


Re- 


PAOE 


29 


(S^ 


64 

94 

115 

129 
157 
186 
201 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  I 

AMEBICAN   POLITICAL    IDEALS 

The  present  great  struggle  now  being  waged  has 
been  justly  termed  a  World  War,  not  simply  because 
nations  in  the  four  quarters  of  the  globe  are  parties 
to  it,  but  because  it  is,  essentially  viewed,  a  contest 
between  doctrines  of  political  right  and  political  pur- 
pose which  vitally  concerns  all  the  peoples  of  the 
world.  These  opposing  systems  of  political  philos- 
ophy do  not  exhibit  merely  minor  differences,  but  are 
fundamentally  opposed  to  each  other.  Furthermore 
their  premises  and  conclusions  do  not  have  merely 
speculative  interest,  but  lead  to  widely  differing  con- 
stitutional doctrines  and  political  practices. 

It  may  be  assumed  that  the  premises  of  American 
political  life  are  known  to  those  who  accept  and  apply 

1 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

them.  The  statement  of  them  in  this  chapter  will 
therefore  be  as  brief  as  possible  and  is  made  only  for 
the  purpose  of  showing  the  contrasts  to  them  exhib- 
ited by  Prussian  political  theories  whose  premises 
and  logical  implications  are  not  perhaps  as  well 
known  to  us,  but  whose  atrocious  practical  applica- 
tions have  continued  to  appear  since  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  in  the  summer  of  1914. 

Not  every  person  can  be  said  to  be  a  philosopher, 
but  every  person  who  gives  any  thought  to  the  mean- 
ing of  human  existence,  necessarily  formulates  for 
himself  certain  standards  of  conduct  and  seeks  the 
realization  of  certain  ends  which  find  their  source  in 
a  philosophy  of  life  even  though  that  philosophy 
never  finds  complete  and  explicit  formulation  in  his 
own  mind. 

So  it  is,  also,  with  Nations.  If  the  search  be 
made,  it  will  be  found  that  their  policies  are  deter- 
mined by  certain  ends  which  they  are  seeking  to 
realize,  and  that  they  justify  these  ends  to  themselves, 
and  the  means  which  they  employ  in  attaining 
them,  by  fundamental  conceptions  regarding  the  na- 
ture of  political  authority,  coupled  sometimes  with  a 

2 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

belief  in  the  possession  by  themselves  of  special  vir- 
tues or  qualifications.  These  fundamental  concep- 
tions which  together  constitute  their  political  philos- 
ophy, supply  the  test  or  touchstone  for  determining 
not  simply  the  expediency  but  the  rightfulness  of  the 
acts  of  their  governments. 

In  this  chapter,  then,  the  attempt  will  be  made  to 
state  in  a  succinct  manner  the  political  ideals  for 
which  the  American  people  stand  to  the  end  that, 
by  contrast,  the  character  of  the  political  theories  and 
motives  of  the  Prussian  people  may  be  more  clearly 
seen. 

The  General  Welfare  of  the  Governed  the  Sole  End 
of  Government. — American  political  philosophy 
founds  itself  squarely  upon  the  proposition  that  the 
sole  end  for  which  political  rule  is  established  and 
maintained  is  the  welfare  of  the  governed.  The  Dec- 
laration of  Independence  declares  that  all  men  are  en- 
dowed by  their  creator  with  inalienable  rights  to  life, 
liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  and  that  to  se- 
cure them,  governments  are  instituted  among  men. 
The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  in  its  very 
forefront  declares  that  the  Union  is  formed  "to  es- 
tablish justice,  insure  domestic  tranquillity,  provide 
for  the  common  defense,  promote  the  general  welfare, 

3 


%>- 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

and  secure  the  blessing  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  our 
posterity."  And  the  same  purposes  support  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  individual  States  of  the  Union. 

It  is,  then,  fundamental  to  American  political 
thought  that  there  cannot  be  a  welfare  of  the  State, 
which  can  be  distinguished  from  the  welfare  of  the 
governed,  collectively  or  distributively  viewed.  Upon 
this  point  it  will  be  found  that  the  American  and 
Prussian  theories  stand  in  essential  opposition.  The 
Prussian  theory,  it  will  be  found,  holds  that  the  State 
is  a  corporate  entity  or  person,  whose  well-being  or 
even  prestige  should  be  sought  for  as  an  end  in  itself. 
The  American  doctrine  holds  that  the  individual 
should  render  patriotic  and  self-sacrificing  service 
to  his  State,  but  this  is  because,  by  so  doing,  the 
welfare  of  the  whole  body  of  citizens  will  be  ad- 
vanced and  the  true  moral  self  of  the  individual  him- 
self realized.  This  point  is  so  important  that  it  will 
be  well  worth  while  to  dwell  a  moment  upon  it. 
True  Basis  of  Patriotism. — By  all  ethical  thinkers, 
including  even  the  most  extreme  individualists,  it  is 
believed  that  men  cannot  realize  their  potentialities 
as  rational  and  moral  beings  except  in  more  or  less 
close  social  relationships  with  one  another.  And, 
except  by  the  out-and-out  anarchist,  it  is  believed 

4 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

that  this  necessary  social  life  cannot  be  effectively 
maintained  except  as  the  community  or  social  group 
gives  to  itself  a  political  organization;  that  is,  estab- 
lishes and  maintains  a  government  endowed  with  au- 
thority and  power  to  exercise  coercion  over  those 
persons  who  refuse  to  make  their  acts  conform  to  the 
established  rules  or  standards  of  life.  The  philosoph- 
ical justification  for  the  existence  of  coercive  political 
authority  need  not  be  here  stated,  for,  as  has  been 
already  said,  it  is  denied  only  by  a  very  few  ex- 
tremists, and,  at  any  rate,  is  not  at  issue  in  the  war 
that  is  now  being  waged.  Americans  and  their  Al- 
lies, as  strongly  as  do  the  Prussians,  uphold  the  ethi- 
cal right  of  the  State  to  existence,  and  the  moral  as 
well  as  the  legal  obligation  of  the  individual  to  ren- 
der service  to  it.  The  only  difference  is  as  to  ends 
or  purposes  to  be  realized,  through  collective  political 
effort,  and,  therefore,  the  demands  that  may  properly 
be  made  upon  the  individual  by  those  in  political  au- 
thority. 

It  is  admitted  by  all  that  regard  by  individuals 
for  the  welfare  of  others  furnishes  the  essential  basis 
of  morality.  Genetic  psychologists  are,  indeed,  in- 
clined to  accept  the  proposition  that  the  very  ideas 
of  right  and  wrong  are  a  social  product ;  that  is,  that 

5 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  individual  could  not  come  to  conceive  of  him- 
self as  a  being  with  moral  rights  and  obligations  if 
he  were  not  brought  into  association  with  others  of 
his  kind. 

It  results,  then,  if  we  start  from  the  proposition 
that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  individual  to  seek  to 
realise  those  ends  which  his  reason  tells  him  are 
spiritually  desirable,  that  that  best  good  must  be 
stated  in  social  terms — that  in  seeking  his  own 
ethical  self-realization,  the  individual  must  strive  for 
the  welfare  of  humanity,  regard  being  had  for  future 
as  well  as  present  generations.  But,  though  thus 
necessarily  given  a  social  content,  it  remains  true 
that  the  individual,  as  a  rational  and  ethically  obli- 
gated being,  must  ever  seek  what  he  conceives  to  be 
his  own  best  good.  He  feels  compelled  to  have  re- 
gard for  the  interests  of  others  because  his  reason 
tells  him  that  only  thus  can  he  perform  those  duties 
which  he  owes  to  himself.  And  these  other  than  im- 
mediately selfish  interests  have  this  claim  upon  him 
because  they  relate  to  persons  who,  like  himself,  are 
rational  and  moral  beings. 

This  conception,  then,  of  social  or  political  obli- 
gation, furnishes  no  logical  ground  for  a  claim  of 
service  or  self-sacrifice  upon  the  part  of  the  individ- 

6 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

ual  in  order  to  advance  the  welfare  of  the  social  or 
political  community  in  which  he  lives  except  in 
so  far  as  that  welfare  is  a  summation  of  the  interests 
of  its  individual  members,  or  an  essential  element  in 
the  welfare  of  humanity  as  a  whole.  Hence  it  fol- 
lows that  a  political  philosophy  which  teaches  that 
the  welfare  of  a  particular  State  is  to  be  sought  as 
an  end  in  itself  is  necessarily  false. 
Consent  of  the  Governed. — A  second  fundamental 
principle  of  American  political  philosophy  is  con- 
tained in  the  ethical  proposition,  stated  in  the  Dec- 
laration of  Independence,  that  governments  owe  their 
existence  and  derive  their  just  powers  from  the  con- 
sent of  the  governed,  and  that  therefore  "whenever 
any  form  of  government  becomes  destructive  of  these 
ends,  it  is  the  right  of  the  people  to  alter  or  to  abol- 
ish it,  and  to  institute  new  government,  laying  its 
foundation  on  such  principles  and  organizing  its  pow- 
ers in  such  form,  as  to  them  shall  seem  most  likely 
to  effect  their  safety  and  happiness." 

By  implication  the  doctrine  thus  declared  denies 
that  there  can  be  monarchs  or  other  rulers  who  have 
an  inherent  or  divinely  given  right  to  exercise  politi- 
cal authority.  The  doctrine  also  carries  with  it  the 
proposition  that  all  governments  should  be  so  organ- 

7 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ized  and  operated  that  legal  and  orderly  methods 
exist  for  ascertaining  whether  or  not  the  people  are 
satisfied  with  the  form  or  policies  or  methods  of  ad- 
ministration of  the  government  that  is  over  them,  as 
well  as  with  the  officials  by  whom  it  is  operated.  It 
goes  even  further,  and  asserts  that  when  these  means 
of  control  fail,  and  when  the  existing  government  is 
conceived  to  be  destructive  of  the  ends  for  which  it 
was  instituted,  the  people  have  an  extra-legal,  but 
none  the  less  ethical,  right  to  alter  or  abolish  it,  and 
to  institute  a  new  government  in  its  place.  Reason 
suggests,  however,  that  such  revolutionary  action 
should  not  be  taken  until  all  efforts  to  obtain  politi- 
cal reform  by  orderly  and  legal  means  have  failed. 
No  support  is  therefore  given  by  the  doctrine  of 
the  consent  of  the  governed  to  a  claim  of  ethical  right 
upon  the  part  of  individuals  or  groups  of  individuals 
to  refuse  obedience  to  a  de  facto  government  upon 
any  occasion  that  they  may  desire  to  do  so,  or  much 
less  to  seek  its  overthrow  by  force.  If  they  are  con- 
scientiously convinced  that  the  government  should 
be  changed  as  regards  its  form,  it  is  their  right  to 
seek  to  persuade  others  to  their  opinion  in  order  that 
this  change  may  be  secured  in  the  orderly  and  con- 
stitutional manner  in  which  existing  laws  provide. 

8 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

If  no  such  constitutional  means  exists,  or  if  for  any 
reason,  they  prove  ineffective,  and  those  who  desire 
the  change  have  reasonable  grounds  for  believing  that 
the  best  interests,  not  simply  of  themselves  but  of  the 
community  generally,  will  be  advanced  by  revolution- 
ary action — that  existing  conditions  are  no  longer 
tolerable  and  not  otherwise  remediable — then,  and 
only  then,  revolution  is  ethically  justifiable.  The 
American  doctrine  of  the  consent  of  the  governed 
thus  stands  opposed  to  the  doctrine  so  widely  held 
in  England  until  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century 
and  in  most  of  the  States  of  Europe  for  a  century 
later,  that,  under  all  circumstances,  oppressive  though 
the  conditions  be,  obedience,  passive  even  if  not  ac- 
tive, is  due  as  a  moral  and  religious  obligation  to  the 
political  authorities  that  happen  to  exist. 

As  a  general  proposition  it  is  thus  seen  that  the 
doctrine  of  the  consent  of  the  governed  does  not  sup- 
port a  right  of  secession  upon  the  part  of  the  people 
of  any  particular  section  of  a  State ;  but  it  does  imply 
that  the  will  of  all  territorial  groups  of  the  governed 
should  be  allowed  free  expression  and  be  given  its 
due  weight  in  determining  the  form  and  policies  of 
the  government. 

Dependencies. — The  doctrine  of  consent  of  the  gov- 

9 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

erned  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  political  control  and 
direction  of  one  people  by  a  superior  State,  and  the 
denial  to  that  people  of  a  full  participating  voice 
either  in  the  control  of  the  sovereign  State  or  of  their 
own  local  government,  if  it  plainly  appear  that  the 
people  thus  controlled  are  not  intellectually  or  moral- 
ly qualified  for  self-government.  The  American  doc- 
trine, however,  makes  it  morally  imperative  that  the 
rule  thus  exercised  should  sincerely  seek  the  welfare 
of  the  subject  population  and  endeavor  by  the  pro- 
motion of  education  or  otherwise  to  hasten  the  time 
when  full  rights  of  self-government  may  be  safely 
and  wisely  granted. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  foregoing  denial  of 
the  right  of  self-government  to  peoples  not  qualified 
to  exercise  it  wisely  for  their  own  good  is  in  fact 
justified  upon  the  same  grounds  that  the  rights  of 
active  citizenship,  that  is,  of  the  suffrage  and  eligi- 
bility to  office,  are  denied  to  those  members  of  the 
ruling  body  politic  who  are  deemed  not  qualified  to 
employ  them  with  intelligent  and  impartial  judg- 
ment. Here,  too,  the  obligation  is  upon  those  who 
possess  the  reins  of  government  not  only  to  have  due 
regard  for  the  interests  of  the  disfranchised  but  to 
take  every  possible  means  of  rendering  as  large  a 

10 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

portion  of  the  citizen  body  qualified  for  the  rights 
and  duties  of  active  citizenship  as  is  practically  pos- 
sible. 

The  People  the  Constitutional  Source  of  All  Political 
Authority. — The  doctrine  of  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned states  an  ethical  proposition.  Correlative  to 
it  is  the  legal  principle  upon  which  American  con- 
stitutional jurisprudence  rests  that  all  public  author- 
ity is  obtained  by  delegation  or  grant  from  the  body 
of  franchised  citizens.  This  of  course  means  that, 
where  there  is  no  written  instrument  of  government, 
as  in  England,  the  electorate  shall  have  the  legal 
means  to  determine,  in  the  last  resort,  what  public 
powers  shall  be  exercised ;  and,  where  there  is  a  writ- 
ten Constitution,  that,  viewed  as  a  legal  proposition, 
this  instrument  shall  owe  its  creation  and  mainte- 
nance to  the  expressed  will  of  the  electorate. 

From  this  fundamental  constitutional  principle  it 
follows  that  no  public  functionary,  high  or  low,  can 
rightfully  exercise  any  official  authority  save  that 
which  has  been  given  to  him  by  a  law  which  has 
received  the  sanction  of  the  people,  given  directly 
by  constitutional  grant,  or  in  the  enactments  of  their 
duly  chosen  representatives.  As  has  been  declared 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  the  most 

11 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

august  judicial  tribunal  in  the  world,  "no  man  in 

this  country  is  so  high  that  he  is  above  the  law.     All 

the  officers  of  the  government,  from  the  highest  to  the 

lowest,  are  creatures  of  that  law  and  are  bound  to 

obey  it."  a 

This  same  doctrine  is  applied  in  all  the  States 

of  the  Union.  As  illustrative  of  this  is  the  state- 
ment in  the  first  constitution  of  Massachusetts, 
adopted  in  1780,  and  retained  in  all  its  subsequent 
constitutions,  that  "all  power  residing  originally  in 
the  people,  and  being  derived  from  them,  the  several 
magistrates  and  officers  of  government,  vested  with 
authority,  whether  legislative,  executive  or  judicial, 
are  their  substitutes  and  agents,  and  are  at  all  times 
accountable  to  them."  In  the  famous  Bill  of  Rights, 
prefixed  to  the  Constitution  of  Virginia,  adopted  in 
1776,  the  doctrine  receives  still  more  emphatic  state- 
ment in  the  words :  "That  all  power  is  vested  in  and 
consequently  derived  from  the  people;  that  magis- 
trates are  thus  trustees  and  servants,  and  at  all  times 

1  This  doctrine  applies  in  England  as  well  as  in  the  United 
States,  the  only  possible  exception  being  with  regard  to  the 
King.  But,  as  is  well  known,  firmly  established  constitutional 
practice  prevents  the  latter  from  exercising  any  of  his  official 
powers,  even  those  included  within  his  so-called  "Prerogative," 
except  upon  the  advice  of  his  ministers,  who  thereby  take  upon 
themselves  the  full  responsibility  for  what  they  advise. 

12 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

amendable  to  them."  And,  as  is  well  known,  the 
preamble  of  the  Constitution  which  provides  for  the 
National  Union  declares — "that  the  People  of 
the  United  States  ...  do  ordain  and  establish  this 
Constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America," 
thus  vesting  it  upon  that  broad  foundation  which 
American  conviction  asserts  should  support  all  polit- 
ical authority. 

When  we  come  to  consider  Prussian  constitutional 
theory  we  shall  find  an  absolute  denial  of  this  con- 
stitutional doctrine;  and  of  the  corollaries  that  flow 
from  this  denial  we  shall  have  something  to  say. 
Representative   Government. — In  every   State  it  is 


necessary  that  the  actual  exercise  of  the  executive  as 
well  as  of  the  judicial  powers  of  government  shall 
be  vested  in  the  hands  of  a  comparatively  small  num- 
ber of  people.  And,  if  the  political  community  is 
of  any  considerable  size,  it  becomes  equally  impera- 
tive that  the  legislative  function  of  deciding  upon  the 
public  policies  to  be  adopted  and  the  laws  to  be  en- 
forced shall  be  surrendered  by  the  body  of  the  elec- 
torate into  the  hands  of  a  smaller  body  of  men  chosen 
by  themselves  to  represent  them"  and  speak  in  their 
behalf.  Thus  is  established  what  is  known  as  rep- 
resentative   as    distinguished    from    directly    demo- 

13 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

cratic  government.  Though  the  rights  of  the  people 
to  participate  actively  and  directly  in  their  own  gov- 
ernment are  thus  narrowed,  the  American  doctrine  of 
popular  sovereignty  is  not  infringed  if  no  one  is 
denied  the  right  to  vote  or  to  hold  office  upon  unrea- 
sonable or  arbitrary  grounds ;  if  the  electorate  is  given 
free  opportunity  to  select  those  whom  they  wish  to 
represent  them;  if  adequate  facilities  are  provided 
for  the  formulation  and  expression  of  a  public  opin- 
ion upon  all  matters  of  political  importance;  if  con- 
stitutional practice  is  such  that  the  representatives 
thus  chosen  can  make  their  discussions  controlling 
upon  those  in  executive  and  judicial  authority;  and 
finally,  if  means  are  provided  whereby,  through  pub- 
lished administrative  reports  or  legal  processes,  those 
who  exercise  executive  and  judicial  authority  may 
be  held  legally  and  politically  responsible  for  the 
manner  in  which  they  employ  the  public  powers  en- 
trusted to  them. 

The  conditions  which  have  just  been  stated  make 
it  plain  that  not  every  government  can  be  said  to  be 
truly  representative  in  character  which  possesses  a 
so-called  legislative  body  composed  in  whole,  or  in 
part,  of  representatives  elected  by  the  people.  When 
we  examine  political  and  constitutional  conditions  in 

14 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

Prussia  and  in  the  German  Empire  it  will  appear 
how  small  a  part  the  governed  play  in  the  control 
of  their  own  political  destinies,  even  though  the  mem- 
bers of  one  branch  of  the  legislature  are  elected  by 
the  people. 

Written  Constitutions. — Besides  demanding  that  the 
government  shall  be  one  for  the  people,  and,  directly 
or  indirectly  a  government  by  the  people,  a  further 
fundamental  principle  of  American  political  philos- 
ophy is  that  the  form  and  powers  of  their  govern- 
ments, Federal  and  State,  shall  find  enumeration  in 
written  instruments  of  government.  These  funda- 
mental documents  are  framed  and  put  into  force  by 
methods  which  secure  especially  mature  considera- 
tion of  their  principles,  and  care  is  taken  to  found 
them  upon  a  consent  of  the  people  obtained  in  a 
manner  more  solemn  than  is  the  case  with  ordinary 
laws.  It  is  also  provided  that  they  may  not  be  al- 
tered except  according  to  special  procedures  which 
they  themselves  prescribe.  Furthermore,  inasmuch 
as  these  written  Constitutions  furnish  the  legal  source 
and  fix  the  legal  limits  of  all  governmental  powers, 
legislative  as  well  as  judicial  and  executive,  it  is 
usual  to  speak  of  them  as  stating  a  higher  and  more 
fundamental  law  than  the  ordinary  legislative  body 

15 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

is  able  to  provide.  In  other  words,  not  only  is  every 
executive  act  inconsistent  with  their  provisions  ren- 
dered illegal,  but  the  legislature  itself  cannot  enact 
a  valid  measure  not  warranted  by  its  terms.  If  it 
attempts  to  do  so,  the  courts  which  are  the  final 
interpreters  of  the  Constitution,  will  refuse  to  rec- 
ognize the  legal  validity  of  the  enactment  when  its 
application  is  involved  in  cases  coming  before  them 
for   adjudication. 

This  fundamental  principle  of  American  consti- 
tutional law  has  received  uniform  acceptance  since 
it  was  stated  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  in  1803  in  the  case  of  Marbury  vs.  Madison. 
The  great  Chief  Justice,  John  Marshall,  in  the 
course  of  the  opinion  rendered  by  him  in  that  case, 
said:  "Certainly  all  those  who  have  framed  written 
constitutions  contemplate  them  as  forming  the  fun- 
damental and  paramount  law  of  the  Nation,  and 
consequently,  the  theory  of  every  such  government 
must  be  that  an  act  of  the  legislature  repugnant  to 
the  Constitution  is  void." 

As  thus  stated  in  universally  applicable  terms,  the 
proposition  is  too  broad,  for,  as  has  appeared  since 
Marshall's  time,  there  have  been  established  a  con- 
siderable number  of  written  constitutions,  which,  as 

16 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

interpreted  by  their  respective  courts,  have  not  op- 
erated to  render  invalid  legislative  acts  repugnant 
to  their  provisions.  The  result  is  that  these  constitu- 
tions are  amendable  by  simple  legislative  act.  In 
fact,  however,  this  has  not  been  a  very  frequent  oc- 
currence, their  fundamental  and  morally  binding 
force  being  sufficient  to  preserve  these  constitutions 
substantially  intact.  In  truth,  however,  the  ease 
with  which  a  written  constitution  may  be  amended 
is  a  matter  of  policy  and  not  a  question  pertaining 
to  the  fundamental  nature  of  the  instrument  itself. 
Whether  or  not  there  shall  be  a  written  constitution 
is  a  matter  of  expediency,  and  has  no  necessary  bear- 
ing upon  the  form  and  powers  of  the  government 
that  is  to  exist.  If,  however,  there  is  a  written  con- 
stitution, it  is  a  matter  of  fundamental  importance 
whether  it  be  conceived  of  as  deriving  its  force  from 
the  will  of  the  government,  or  as  owing  its  existence 
to  the  legislative  fiat  of  a  monarch. 
Powers  of  Government  Limited. — Closely  allied  to 
the  constitutional  principles  already  discussed  is  the 
doctrine,  emphasized  in  American  jurisprudence, 
that  the  legal  powers  of  government  should  not  be 
permitted  to  extend  to  all  matters  of  possible  public 
control,  but  that  from  their  operation  should  be  ex- 

17 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

cepted  certain  private  rights  of  the  individual  with 
reference  to  his  life,  liberty  and  the  possession  and  use 
of  his  property.  In  the  enjoyment  of  these  rights  the 
individual  is  thus  protected  by  the  government,  not 
only  against  possible  infringement  by  other  individ- 
uals, but  against  undue  infringement  by  the  govern- 
ment itself.     These  rights  are  thus  secured  to  the 

■  -  — — **^^ 

individual  not  only  by  the  rule  enforced  by  the  courts 
that  no  organ  of  government  may  exercise  a  power 
not  granted  to  it  by  the  Constitution  under  which  it 
operates,  but  by  the  fact  that  these  rights  are  specifi- 
cally enumerated  in  the  Constitution  and  expressly 
withdrawn  from  governmental  control.  It  is  true 
that  the  people  themselves,  if  they  should  see  fit, 
might  amend  their  written  constitutions  so  as  to 
bring  certain  or  all  of  these  rights  within  the 
control  of  laws  which  the  legislature  may  enact, 
but,  until  they  do  so,  these  rights  are  guaran- 
teed against  governmental  abridgment  or  abro- 
gation. Certain  of  these  rights  are,  however, 
universally  deemed  so  essential  to  individual  liberty 
and  welfare  that  there  is  little  likelihood  that  con- 
stitutional amendments  will  ever  curtail  or  destroy 
them.  As  regards  their  character  it  may  be  said  that 
they  include  not  only  matters  of  procedure  but  of 

18 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

substance  as  well.  Thus,  especially  in  the  field  of 
criminal  justice,  there  are  constitutional  provisions 
regarding  jury  trial,  confrontation  with  witnesses, 
immunity  from  self-incrimination,  double  jeopardy, 
etc.,  which  are  considered  necessary  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  accused  against  possible  arbitrary  and 
oppressive  action  on  the  part  of  those  to  whom  the 
enforcement  of  the  criminal  laws  is  entrusted.  Upon 
their  substantive  side,  it  is  provided  that  the  indi- 
vidual shall  not  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  prop- 
erty, no  matter  how  proper  the  procedure  followed, 
if  the  law  authorising  it  is  not  founded  in  equity  and 
good  conscience,  or  is  not  in  conformity  with  those 
principles  of  reason  and  justice  which,  through  hun- 
dreds of  years  of  judicial  selection,  have  become  em- 
bodied in  what  is  known  as  the  Common  Law  and 
which  furnishes  the  basis  for  the  private  law  which 
American  courts  apply.  That  these  principles  of 
justice  as  they  are  enumerated  in  our  national  and 
State  Constitutions  are  deemed  to  be  inherently  just 
is  shown  by  the  fact  that,  though  constitutionally  not 
obliged  to  do  so,  the  American  government  has  ex- 
tended their  application  to  the  peoples  of  the  De- 
pendencies of  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippine  Islands, 
In  the  instructions  which  were  given  by  the  Presi- 

19 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

dent  to  the  Philippine  Commission,  dated  April  7, 
1900,  the  following  paragraphs  serve  to  show  not 
only  the  principle  of  government  of  which  we  have 
been  speaking,  but  to  enumerate  the  more  important 
of  these  rights: 

"There  are  certain  great  principles  of  government  which 
have  been  made  the  basis  of  our  governmental  system, 
which  we  deem  essential  to  the  rule  of  law  and  the  main- 
tenance of  individual  freedom.  .  .  .  There  are  also  certain 
practical  rules  of  government  which  we  have  found  essen- 
tial to  the  preservation  of  these  great  principles  of  liberty 
and  law.  .  .  .  These  principles  and  these  rules  of  govern- 
ment must  be  established  and  maintained  in  [the]  islands 
for  the  sake  of  the  liberty  and  happiness  [of  the  people 
of  the  islands],  however  much  they  may  conflict  with  the 
customs  or  laws  of  procedure  with  which  they  are 
familiar.  .  .  .  Upon  every  division  and  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  Philippines,  therefore,  must  be  imposed 
these  inviolable  rules :  That  no  person  shall  be  deprived 
of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of  law; 
that  private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for  public  use 
without  just  compensation;  that  in  all  criminal  prosecu- 
tions the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a  speedy  and 
public  trial,  to  be  informed  of  the  nature  and  cause  of  the 
accusation,  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against 
him,  to  have  compulsory  process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in 
his  favor,  and  to  have  the  assistance  of  counsel  in  his  de- 
fense; that  excessive  bail  shall  not  be  required,  nor  exces- 
sive fines  imposed,  nor  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  in- 
flicted; that  no  person  shall  be  put  twice  in  jeopardy  for 
the  same  offense,  or  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to 

20 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

be  a  witness  against  himself;  that  the  right  to  be  secure 
against  unreasonable  searches  or  seizures  shall  not  be 
violated;  that  neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude 
shall  exist  except  as  a  punishment  for  crime;  that  no 
bill  of  attainder  or  ex  post  facto  law  shall  be  passed ;  that 
no  law  shall  be  passed  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech  or 
of  the  press  or  the  right  of  the  people  to  peaceably  as- 
semble and  petition  the  government  for  a  redress  of  griev- 
ances; that  no  law  shall  be  made  respecting  an  establish- 
ment of  religion  or  prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof, 
and  that  the  free  exercise  and  enjoyment  of  religious  pro- 
fession and  worship  without  discrimination  or  preference 
shall  forever  be  allowed." 

Legal  Equality. — A  further  fundamental  principle 
of  American  political  life  is  the  equality  of  all  in- 
dividuals before  the  law.  This  means  that  no  ar- 
bitrary  distinctions  are  drawn  between  individuals 
or  classes  of  individuals.  All  are  equally  entitled 
to  those  rights  which  the  law  recognizes  and  are  held 
equally  responsible  for  the  acts  which  they  commit. 
This  does  not  mean  that  laws  may  not  be  enacted 
which  apply  to  particular  classes  of  persons,  but  the 
classifications  thus  created  must,  under  American 
constitutional  law,  be  based  upon  actual  facts  which 
render  them  reasonable ;  they  may  not  be  made  to  de- 
pend upon  circumstances  which  have  no  actual  rela- 
tion to  the  legal  rights  or  obligations  which  the  law 
creates  or  imposes.     Here  again  we  may  quote  the 

21 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

authoritative  language  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  when  it  says  that  "in  all  cases  it  may 
not  only  be  seen  that  a  classification  has  been  made, 
but  also  that  it  is  one  based  upon  some  reasonable 
ground, — some  classification  which  bears  a  just  and 
proper  relation  to  the  attempted  classification, — and 
is  not  a  mere  arbitrary  selection."  Thus  under 
American  law  there  are  no  special  rights  or  obliga- 
tions attaching  to  race,  or  color,  or  wealth,  or  occu- 
pation, or*  education  or  religion  or  to  any  other  ar- 
bitrarily created  status. 

Federal  Form  of  Government. — A  final  constitu- 
tional feature  of  the  American  system  of  govern- 
ment is  that  it  provides  for  a  government  that  is 
federal  in  form.  For  many  years  there  was  con- 
fusion of  thought,  growing  out  of  this  fact  and  of 
the  historical  steps  leading  up  to  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Union,  as  to  nature  of  the  loyalty  and 
the  allegiance  owed  by  the  citizen  to  the  Central 
Government — a  confusion  for  the  dissipation  of 
which  a  civil  war  was  required.  Since  the  conclu- 
sion of  that  contest,  however,  there  has  been  no 
question  of  a  divided  loyalty.  The  primary  alle- 
giance of  the  citizen  is  to  the  United  States,  and  to 
this  allegiance  no  qualifications  attach  because  of  the 

22 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

existence  of  a  federal  form  of  government.  Who 
shall  be  admitted  into  the  country  and  who  shall  be- 
come its  citizens  are  wholly  and  exclusively  matters 
of  national  concern.  A  citizenship  attaching  to  the 
individual  States  of  the  Union  is  indeed  recognized, 
but  it  is  one  that  is  subordinate  to  national  citizen- 
ship. A  further  fact  which,  however,  is  not  peculiar 
to  the  United  States,  but  is  not  sufficiently  recog- 
nized, is  that  an  unnaturalized  alien,  domiciled  in 
this  country,  owes  an  allegiance  to  the  United  States, 
whose  protection  he  is  enjoying,  and  that  he  may  be 
held  for  treason  in  case  he  is  guilty  of  levying  war 
against  the  United  States  or  adhering  to  its  enemies 
or  giving  them  aid  or  comfort.  "The  law  on  this 
subject,"  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
has  declared,  "is  well  settled  and  universally  recog- 
nized." 

General  Observations. — Certain  general  observations  IS 
may  be  made  with  reference  to  American  political 
ideals  collectively  considered.  The  premises  upon 
which  they  are  founded  spring  from  what  is  con- 
ceived to  be  the  moral  nature  of  mankind.  The  doc- 
trines of  the  equal  right  to  consideration  of  all  citi- 
zens, in  private  as  well  as  public  law,  implies  an 
inherent  moral  worth  and  dignity  of  the  individual 

23 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

as  a  man,  and  not  as  a  member  of  a  particular  race, 
or  nation,  or  social  class.  The  same  rules  of  moral- 
ity which  govern  in  private  life  are  held  to  apply  in 
public  life  and  to  the  relations  of  States  to  one  an- 
other. It  is  true  that  Americans  believe  that  their 
political  ideals  are  to  be  preferred  to  those  that  dif- 
fer from  them.  They  would  not  be  ideals  if  there 
were  not  this  conviction.  But  no  claim  is  made  that 
other  peoples  should  not  be  left  free  to  form  for 
themselves  their  own  policies  and  standards  of  politi- 
cal conduct  so  long  as  those  policies  and  standards 
are  not  such  as  necessarily  threaten  American  free- 
dom. In  other  words,  no  special  world  mission  is 
claimed  for  the  American  people,  no  unique  title 
to  the  favor  of  Providence,  no  national  rights  as- 
serted that  stand  in  essential  and  irreconcilable  con- 
tradiction to  the  equal  rights  of  other  members  of 
the  family  of  nations.  ^^ 

In  confirmation  of  this  is  the  character  of  the 
aims  for  the  realization  of  which  the  United  States 
has  pledged  its  entire  manhood  and  material  re- 
sources. These  aims  have  found  statement  in  Pres- 
ident Wilson's  address  to  Congress  on  January  8, 
1918.  They  are  fourteen  in  number,  and  an  exam- 
ination of  them  shows  that  in  no  instance  is  a  de- 

24 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

mand  made  that  can  be  said  to  concern  the  special 
interests  of  the  United  States  as  distinguished  from 
those  of  the  other  Powers,  including  even  the  nations 
with  whom  the  United  States  is  at  war.  Govern- 
ing all  these  aims  there  are  certain  principles  of  hu- 
manity, of  international  equity,  and  of  economic  and 
political  freedom,  which,  it  is  believed,  must  be  rec- 
ognized and  applied  if  peaceful  and  cooperative  re- 
lations between  nations  are  to  be  maintained,  and 
civilization  maintained.  Nine  of  these  demands  are 
territorial  in  character,  and  relate  to  Russia,  Bel- 
gium, Alsace-Lorraine,  Italy,  Roumania,  Serbia, 
Montenegro,  Turkey,  Poland  and  the  Colonies.  In  no 
case  is  there  a  suggestion  that  the  political  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  United  States  be  widened  or  its  political 
influence  extended.  Nor  are  territorial  readjust- 
ments demanded  primarily  in  order  that  thus  the 
power  of  certain  Nations  may  be  increased,  and  of 
other  Nations  decreased.  Not  even  a  punitive  element 
is  present  The  territorial  changes  are  declared  to  be 
imperative  in  order  that  wrongs  may  be  righted,  that 
national  good  faith  may  be  vindicated,  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  nationality  may  have  its  proper  application, 
and  that  conditions  that  jeopardize  the  peace  of  the 
world  may  be  corrected.     It  is  demanded  that  Bel- 

25 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

gium  be  evacuated  and  made  whole  in  order  to  "re- 
store confidence  among  the  nations  in  the  laws  which 
they  have  themselves  set."  ''Without  this  healing 
act,"  says  President  Wilson,  "the  whole  structure  and 
validity  of  international  law  is  forever  impaired." 
The  restoration  to  France  of  Alsace-Lorraine  is  re- 
quired in  order  that  the  wrong  done  by  Prussia  in 
1871  be  righted  and  a  condition  corrected  that  for 
fifty  years  has  unsettled  the  peace  of  the  world.  A 
settlement  of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  is  de- 
manded upon  terms  which  will  secure  to  the  country 
"the  best  and  freest  cooperation  of  the  other  nations, 
of  the  world  in  obtaining  for  her  an  unhampered  and 
unembarrassed  opportunity  for  the  independent  de- 
termination of  her  own  political  development  and 
national  policy."  With  regard  to  the  other  coun- 
tries, the  territorial  demands,  in  every  case,  are  de- 
termined by  rights  springing  from  "historically  es- 
tablished lines  of  allegiance  and  nationality,"  and 
not  for  the  purpose  of  furnishing  spoils  of  war  to 
the  Entente  Powers,  or  for  the  mere  sake  of  increas- 
ing their  economic  or  military  power,  nor  in  order 
to  punish  Germany  and  her  associates  for  the  im- 
measurable wrong  they  have  done  to  the  world.  Even 

26 


AMERICAN  POLITICAL  IDEALS 

as  regards  colonial  claims,  the  demand  is  that  thev 
interests  of  the  populations  concerned  shall  receive 
due  consideration. 

As  regards  the  demands  not  primarily  territorial 
in  character,  it  is  seen  that  principles  of  democracy, 
economic  freedom,  and  international  equity  and 
peace  are  emphasized.  It  is  urged  that  secret  in- 
ternational understandings  be  abandoned,  and  that 
diplomacy  proceed  frankly  and  in  the  public  view; 
that  freedom  of  the  seas  in  war  as  well  as  peace  be 
as  far  as  possible  secured;  that  economic  barriers 
between  States  be  abolished ;  that  armaments  be  re- 
duced to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic 
safety;  and  that  "a  general  association  of  nations 
be  formed  under  specific  covenants  for  the  purpose 
of  affording  mutual  guarantees  of  political  indepen- 
dence and  territorial  integrity  to  great  and  small 
states  alike." 

Thus,  throughout  these  demands,  and  giving  unity 
to  them,  there  runs  a  liberal  and  humanitarian  spirit 
which  is  founded  upon  a  political  philosophy  which 
demands  that  a  nation  shall  abide  by  its  covenanted 
word;  that  the  rights  of  independent  States,  how- 
ever small,  be  respected;  that  "historic  lines  of  al- 

27 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

legiance  and  nationality"  be  regarded;  that  interna- 
tional comity  and  cooperation  be  encouraged;  that 
the  dictates  of  humanity  be  observed  even  in  time 
of  war ;  and  that  political  power  be  not  sought  as  an 
end  in  itself. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    GERMAN    WELTANSCHAUUNG 

Prussian  political  philosophy  does  not  exist  as  a 
system  of  thought  apart  from  the  general  speculative 
theories  of  the  Teutons,  but  constitutes  an  integral 
part  of  what,  to  use  a  favorite  word  of  theirs,  is  their 
"Weltanschauung,  that  is,  their  conception  of  the  na- 
ture  and  significance  to  men  of  the  cosmic  or  world 
processes.  The  predilection  of  the  Germans  for  ideal- 
istic interpretations  of  the  inner  meaning  of  human 
existence  may  be  said  to  be  a  national  characteristic 
which  they  have  manifested  since  the  middle  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  Almost  all  the  leading  meta- 
physicians since  Kant  have  not  been  satisfied  until 
they  have  applied  their  speculative  conclusions  to  an 
interpretation  of  the  nature  and  purposes  of  politi- 
cal life;  and,  as  is  well  known,  in  the  universities 
the  teaching  of  theology  and  law  has  been  kept  in 
the  closest  possible  relationship  to  abstract  specula- 
tive thought. 

29 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

This  mystical  or  metaphysical  Tendenz  upon  the 
part  of  the  German  peoples  is  pointed  to  with  pride 
by  their  own  writers.  In  a  recent  volume,  published 
since  the  war,  containing  a  series  of  essays  by  emi- 
nent university  professors,  in  which  the  attempt  is 
made  to  interpret  Teutonic  thought  to  the  scientific 
world,  is  a  chapter  entitled  "The  Spirit  of  German 
Kultur,"  by  Professor  Ernst  Troltsch  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Berlin.  In  this  chapter  the  author  says :  "The 
German  is  by  nature  a  metaphysician  who  ponders 
and  strives,  from  the  spiritual  inwardness  of  the  uni- 
verse, to  grasp  the  inner  meaning  of  the  world  and 
of  things,  of  man  and  of  destiny.  It  will  always  be 
idle  to  explain  the  origin  and  development  of  this  pre- 
dominant, though  by  no  means  universal,  charac- 
teristic. It  remains  the  final  German  life  secret." 
And  elsewhere  he  says  that  the  nature  of  political 
freedom  is  to  be  found  in  the  depths  of  the  German 
spirit  itself — State  and  spirit  belong  together.  "A 
similar  metaphysical  tendency,"  he  adds,  "though 
naturally  less  closely  connected  with  the  State,  holds 
sway  in  German  art."  * 

In  order,  then,  to  give  Prussian  political  philos- 

1  Deut schland  und  der  Krieg.    Translated  under  the  title 
Modern  Germany  in  Relation  to  the  Great  War. 

30 


THE  GERMAN   WELTANSCHAUUNG 

ophy  its  proper  setting,  and  especially  in  order  to 
understand  the  broad  philosophical  grounds  upon 
which  Germany,  under  the  direction  of  Prussia,  jus- 
tifies her  Weltpolitik,  it  is  necessary  to  say  a  few 
words  at  least  regarding  the  views  of  her  speculative 
writers  concerning  the  meaning  and  purpose  of  hu- 
man existence. 

Philosophy  is,  of  course,  but  the  application  of 
logic  to  the  phenomena  dealt  with;  and  a  belief  in 
the  possibility  of  obtaining  a  full  understanding  of 
the  inner  meaning  of  human  existence  is  necessarily 
predicated  upon  the  premise  that  there  is  a  rational- 
ity in  the  strivings  of  men  and  in  the  contests  of 
peoples.  If  it  were  not  believed  that  there  is  an 
end  towards  which  humanity  is  struggling,  or  being 
providentially  impelled,  the  events  of  history  would 
have  only  a  fortuitous  character  and  be  impossible 
of  combination  into  a  philosophical  whole.  For  it  is 
impossible  to  sum  up,  in  final  terms,  a  series  of  facts 
which  has  no  logical  ending. 

The  German  philosophy  of  life  starts,  then,  with 
the  proposition  that  there  is  a  meaning  to  human  his- 
tory— that  the  events  recorded  by  it  find  their  truest 
and  abiding  significance  in  the  parts  played  by  them 
in  a  rationally  ordered  world  process,  and  that  this 

31 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

human  destiny,  when  determined,  furnishes  not  only 
an  explanation  of,  but  provides  an^  ethical  justifi- 
cation for,  all  acts,  whether  of  men  or  of  nations, 
which  tend  to  advance  its  realization. 

In  Germany  since  the  time  of  Hegel  the  convic- 
tion has  been  held  that  human  history  as  thus  philo- 
sophically interpreted  demonstrates  that  particular 
ethnic  or  political  groups  have  been  and  still  are 
called  upon  to  make  specific  contributions  to  the 
working  out  of  the  world  idea  to  which  humanity  is 
committed.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  no  certain  and 
indubitable  evidence  exists  for  determining  just  what 
part  each  nation  is  providentially  called  upon  to 
play  in  this  cosmic  scheme,  each  nation  is  left  free 
to  make  the  decision  for  itself,  with  a  result,  psy- 
chologically not  surprising,  that  there  have  been  few 
if  any  peoples,  who  have  arrived  at  any  appreciable 
stage  of  self-consciousness,  who  have  not  sincerely 
believed  that  their  ideals  of  culture  were  worth  per- 
petuation and  territorial  expansion.  The  result  has 
been  international  competition.  But  this,  in  the 
eyes  of  the  Germans,  has  not  been  an  evil,  since  thus, 
they  assert,  the  true  test  of  superiority  of  culture, 
of  the  right  to  existence  or  even  to  world  power  is 
made  manifest.     Die  Weltgeschichte  ist  das  Welt- 

32 


THE  GERMAN  WELTANSCHAUUNG 

gericM  as  Hegel  said.  "God  will  know  his  own," 
as  was  declared  upon  the  occasion  of  the  Massacre 
of  St.  Bartholomew.  Out  of  the  international  com- 
petition thus  necessitated  those  nations  will  survive 
which  have  the  most  to  contribute  to  the  advance- 
ment of  humanity  towards  the  final  goal  of  human 
effort. 

To  such  a  philosophy  of  history  as  this,  though 
from  its  very  nature  not  capable  of  complete  dem- 
onstration, no  serious  objection  can  be  raised.  To 
the  rationalistic  fatalist  it  yields  an  optimistic  result. 
To  the  believer  in  a  divine  and  beneficent  providence 
it  is  a  corollary  of  his  creed.  It  assumes  a  malign 
character  towards  the  non-Teutonic  peoples  only 
when  it  is  coupled  with  two  other  postulates  of  Prus- 
sian philosophy,  each  of  which  lead  in  practice  to 
the  same  result. 

The  first  of  these  postulates  is  that,  in  the  struggle 
between  the  nations  for  existence,  physical,  material 
power,  interpreted  in  terms  of  military  strength,  is 
the  ultimate  criterion  to  be  relied  upon  as  testing 
the  right  to  survival.  The  second  postulate  is  that, 
by  reason  of  excellencies  inherent  in  them  as  a  race, 
the  Teutonic  peoples  are  so  incommensurably  su- 
perior to  all  other  peoples  that  all  means  are  justi- 

33 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

fied  that  will  in  any  wise  or  to  any  degree  advance 
their  national  interests. 

As  applied  to  men  individually  considered,  or  to 
groups  of  men  in  their  non-political  relations,  the 
Germans  hold  that  the  struggle  for  existence  is  upon 
a  plane  where  mere  force  and  cunning  are  not,  and 
should  not  be,  the  determining  factors.  They,  in 
agreement  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  do  not  deny 
that  men,  as  intelligent  and  morally  responsible  be- 
ings, can  take  thought  as  to  what  is  rationally  and 
morally  desirable;  can  control  to  a  considerable  ex- 
tent the  conditions  under  which  competition  shall  be 
carried  on,  or  whether  it  shall  be  carried  on  at  all; 
and  that  thus  it  can  be  brought  about  that  those  who 
survive  will  be  ethically,  and  not  merely  biologically, 
worthy  of  survival.  The  evolutionary  process  re- 
garded as  a  mere  biological  matter,  is  of  course  a 
wholly  non-moral  process.  The  changes  which  it 
produces  may  or  may  not  lead  to  what  is  termed 
progress  even  from  a  biological  standpoint,  for  the 
environment  may  be  such  that  the  creatures  with 
less  developed  structures  and  functions  are  the  fittest 
to  survive  and,  therefore,  do  survive.  Therefore,  as 
Huxley  pointed  out  in  his  famous  Romanes  Address, 
"Evolution  and  Ethics,"  the  essential  aim  of  civili- 

34 


THE  GERMAN   WELTANSCHAUUNG 

zation  among  men  is  to  substitute  ethical  and  spirit- 
ual criteria  of  fitness  for  survival  in  place  of  the  non- 
moral  and  physical  factors  which  determine  superior- 
ity among  the  individuals  of  mere  brute  creation.1 

It  is  true  that  German  writers  upon  Evolution 
have  not  taken  the  pains  that  English  and  Ameri- 
can writers  have  taken  to  point  out  the  essential  dis- 
tinction between  human  progress  as  defined  in  ethical 
terms,  and  biological  changes  produced  by  competi- 
tive processes,  but  they  have  not  been  ignorant  of  or 
denied  this  distinction.  It  is  only  when  they  come 
to  deal  with  competition  between  National  States 
that  they  accept  the  doctrine  that  physical  force,* 
military  strength,  may  and  must  be  relied  upon  to 
determine  the  Tightness  and  fitness  for  survival. 

Thus  we  find  war  accepted  and  even  praised  as  a 

providential  or  divine  agency  of  human  progress. 

German  philosophers,  historians,  and  scientists  unite 

with  military  men  in  its  laudation.     It  is  not  simply 

men  like  Nietzsche  who  declare  that  men  should  seek 

peace  only  as  a  means  to  new  wars^  but  eminent 

moral  philosophers  like  Lassen  who  preach  that  States 

are  by  nature  in  a  state  of  war  with  one  another, 

1The  author  here  ventures  to  refer  also  to  the  chapter  en- 
titled "Ethics  of  the  Competition  Process"  in  hia  volume  Social 
Justice. 

35 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

that  "conflict  must  be  regarded  as  the  essence  of 
their  relations  and  as  a  rule,  friendship  as  acciden- 
tal and  exceptional,"  and  that  "in  the  relations  be- 
tween States  this  right  of  the  stronger  may  be  said 
to  be  moral."  Historians  like  Treitschke  affirm  that 
"the  Living  God  will  take  care  that  war  shall  always 
return  as  a  terrible  medicine  for  the  human  race."  * 

When  we  come  to  the  military  writers  of  Germany 
there  is  a  consensus  of  opinion  from  Clausewitz  to 
Bernhardi,  Moltke  and  the  Crown  Prince.  War, 
says  Bernhardi,  gives  a  "biologically  just  decision"; 
it  is  "an  indispensable  factor  in  civilization";  with- 
out it,  "there  would  be  no  racial  or  cultural  prog- 
ress." "War  is  part  of  the  eternal  order  instituted 
by  God,"  declared  Moltke  in  1880  in  a  letter  to 
Bluntschli.  "War  is  the  noblest  and  holiest  ex- 
pression of  human  activity"  is  the  doctrine  declared 
in  the  official  organ  of  Jung  Deutschland.  "War  is 
a  holy  thing,  the  holiest  thing  on  earth,"  is  the  opin- 
ion of  the  eminent  economist,  Werner  Sombert. 

This  gloria  in  excelsis  being  sung  to  war,  the  con- 
clusion necessarily  follows  that  it  is  to  be  waged 
without  regard  to  moral  scruples  whether  based  upon 
general  dictates  of  humanity,  long  established  prec- 

1  Pontile. 

36 


THE  GERMAN  WELTANSCHAUUNG 

edents,  or  solemnly  plighted  word.  The  struggle 
for  survival  between  peoples  being  placed  upon  the 
wholly  non-moral  basis  of  physical  force,  this  is  but 
a  logical  corollary.  "The  will  to  war,"  says  Clause- 
witz,  "must  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  resolution  to 
act  on  the  offensive  without  any  scruples."  Military 
necessity  justifies  every  act.  The  procedure  of  war 
is  "completely  ruthless"  and  "States  cannot  permit 
themselves  to  be  guided  by  general  principles  of 
law,"  are  statements  taken  from  the  work  of  General 
von  Hartmann  on  "Military  Necessity  and  Human- 
ity" (Militarische  Notwendigkeit  und  Humanitat) 
published  in  1877.  In  the  official  war  book  issued 
by  the  German  General  Staff  it  is  declared  that  there 
has  been  a  modern  tendency  dominated  by  humani- 
tarian considerations  to  apply  usages  of  war  which 
are  an  essential  contradiction  to  the  nature  of  war, 
but  that  "by  steeping  himself  in  military  history  an 
officer  will  be  able  to  guard  himself  against  excessive 
humanitarian  notions."  "The  argument  of  war  per- 
mits every  belligerent  state  to  have  recourse  to  all 
means  which  enable  it  to  attain  the  object  of  the 
war."  "We  are  compelled  to  carry  on  this  war  with 
a  cruelty,  a  ruthlessness,  an  employment  of  every 
imaginable  device  unknown  in  any  previous  war,"  is 

37 

119293 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  declaration  of  Pastor  Baumgarten.  "The  power 
of  the  conqueror  becomes  the  supreme  moral  law  to 
which  the  vanquished  must  submit,"  declares  Lieut. 
Kuhn  in  his  Die  Wahren  Ursachen  des  Weltkrieges. 
"To  introduce  into  the  philosophy  of  war  itself 
any  principle  of  moderation  would  be  an  absurdity," 
says  Clausewitz.  And,  if  conformity  to  such  prin- 
ciples have  been  agreed  to,  the  agreements  may  right- 
fully be  disregarded.  "In  this  matter,"  says  another 
German  military  writer,  "States  cannot  permit  them- 
selves to  be  guided  by  general  principles  of  law." 
And  again,  "Utterances  of  approved  legal  authorities 
and  precedents  found  in  international  settlements 
can  hardly  claim  full  authority  in  the  law  of  war. 
.  .  .  Military  problems  .  .  .  can  recognize  no 
other  law  than  that  of  military  necessity."  * 

These  quotations  do  not  need  to  be  multiplied,  as 
they  might  be,  for,  if  the  proposition  be  accepted 
that  world  progress  is  secured  only  by  a  physical 
struggle  a  I'outrance  between  States  which  are  united 
by  no  reciprocal  moral  obligations,  but  stand  apart 
from  one  another  as,  by  very  nature,  mutually  antag- 
onistic, it  is  clear  that  no  international  understand- 

1  Gen.  Julius  von  Hartmann.  Militarische  Nottoendigkeit 
und  Humanitat,  in  the  Deutsche  Rundschau. 

38 


THE  GERMAN  WELTANSCHAUUNG 

ings  or  covenanted  agreements  can  be  given  a  mor- 
ally binding  force.  No  other  arbitrament  of  con- 
tending interests  is  possible  save  that  of  naked  force. 
How  it  has  come  about  that  the  worship  of  Power 
has  found  so  prominent  a  place  in  Prussian  political 
philosophy  is,  in  part,  explained  by  Prussia's  his- 
tory. The  position  which  Prussia  has  obtained 
among  the  nations  of  the  world  she  has  obtained  by 
war,  and  under  the  direction  of  leaders  who  have 
been  restrained  by  no  moral  scruples  as  to  the  occa- 
sions when  the  sword  should  be  resorted  to  or  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  it  should  be  employed  when  once 
drawn.  Frederick  the  Great  and  Bismarck  stand 
out  as  the  two  great  national  heroes  in  the  eyes  of 
the  Prussians,  and  no  two  political  leaders  have  ever 
lived  who  have  more  frankly  avowed  and  practiced 
the  doctrine  that  when  the  interests  of  the  State  are 
involved,  considerations  of  morality  find  no  legiti- 
mate application.  Having  no  glorious  episodes  in 
their  history,  save  those  of  military  conquest,  no  suc- 
cessful struggles  for  civil  and  political  liberty  such 
as  are  found  in  the  histories  of  England,  of  France, 
of  Italy,  of  the  United  States,  and,  in  fact  of  almost 
every  other  great  nation,  it  has  not  been  inexplicable 

39 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

that  the  Prussians  should  have  been  led  to  fall  down 
and  worship  the  God  of  Military  Power. 

This  doctrine  of  Power,  in  German  minds,  is,  how- 
ever, saved  from  absolute  and  unashamed  material- 
ism by  the  assertion  that  the  Teutons  so  excel  other 
peoples  in  their  civilization  that  they  may  regard 
themselves  as  the  saviors  of  the  world  bringing  ulti- 
mate blessings  even  upon  those  whom  they  overcome 
in  war.  And  this  brings  us  to  the  second  of  the 
postulates  mentioned  above. 

It  is  not  peculiar  to  the  Germans  that  they  should 
prefer  their  own  civilization  and  their  own  national 
ideals  to  those  of  other  peoples.  It  is  peculiar  to 
them,  however,  that  they  should  so  exalt  their  civili- 
zation above  all  others,  and  be  so  sure  of  this  su- 
perexcellence,  that  they  do  not  hesitate  to  claim  the 
right  to  enforce  it  upon  other  peoples  who  refuse 
to  accept  it.  Even  Fichte  had  said  that  "To  com- 
pel men  to  a  state  of  right,  to  put  them  under  the 
yoke  by  force,  is  not  only  the  right  but  the  sacred 
duty  of  every  man  who  has  the  knowledge  and  the 
power.  In  case  of  need,  one  single  man  has  the 
right  and  duty  to  compel  the  whole  of  mankind."  * 

1  Staatalehre,  Fichte's  Werke,  1845  i.  iv.  p.  430.  Quoted  in 
Conquest  unci  Kultur. 

40 


THE  GERMAN  WELTANSCHAUUNG 

This  right  of  coercion  the  Germans  now  claim  to 
have.  Their  demand  for  Weltmacht  they  found 
upon  this  moral  ground.  A  failure  willingly  to  ac- 
cept their  conceptions  of  Kultur  and  to  acquiesce  in 
the  extension  of  their  political  power,  they  regard 
as  ipso  facto  evidencing  a  moral  perversion  or  an 
intellectual  darkness  which  reason  and  persuasion 
is  unable  to  overcome.  As  regards  small  States  like 
Belgium  or  Luxemburg  or  Holland  or  Switzerland, 
their  claims  may  at  once  be  ruled  out  of  court,  for 
their  very  smallness,  it  is  declared,  makes  it  inher- 
ently impossible  for  them  to  develop  a  distinctive  na- 
tional civilization  that  is  worth  preservation.  "The 
element  of  the  ridiculous,"  says  Treitschke,  "attaches  I 
to  the  existence  of  small  States."  And,  in  another 
place,  "petty  States  have  no  place  among  nations  of 
ripened  culture." 

Especially  since  the  Franco-Prussian  war  and  the 
rise  of  Germany  to  the  status  of  a  Great  Power,  have 
its  rulers  and  writers  conducted  a  propaganda  to  con- 
vince their  people  that  they  are  chosen  of  God  to  lead 
in  civilization  and  political  power.  And  by  no  one 
has  this  doctrine  been  more  energetically  preached 
than  by  the  present  Kaiser.  In  1868  the  philosopher 
Lassen  had  boasted  that  "we  [the  Germans]  are  mor- 

41 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ally  and  intellectually  superior  to  all  men.  We  are 
peerless."  And  the  eminent  scientist,  William  Ost- 
wald,  since  the  beginning  of  the  present  war,  has  de- 
clared his  conviction  that  "Germany  has  reached  a 
higher  type  of  civilization  than  other  peoples,  and  the 
result  of  the  war  will  be  the  organization  of  Europe 
under  German  leadership."  And  Bernhardi,  speak- 
ing for  the  military  mind,  declares  that  "The  proud 
conviction  forces  itself  upon  us  with  irresistible 
power  that  a  high,  if  not  the  highest,  importance  for 
the  entire  development  of  the  human  race  is  ascrib- 
able  to  the  German  people." 

Statements  such  as  these  from  the  leading  men  of 
Germany  could  be  quoted  beyond  number,  but  would 
serve  no  useful  purpose  since  the  charge  that  they 
do  hold  this  exalted  estimate  of  themselves  as  a  peo- 
ple is  not  contested  by  any  of  Germany's  spokesmen, 
although  it  has  at  times  been  suggested  that  expe- 
dience would  dictate  that  the  claim  be  not  too  bla- 
tantly made. 

It  has  remained,  however,  for  the  present  Kaiser 
to  reiterate  the  doctrine  that  this  Teutonic  superex- 
cellence  is  the  result  of  a  gift  from  the  Christian  God 
who  has  laid  a  special  charge  upon  the  German  peo- 
ple, endowed  them  with  special  merits,  and  continues 

42 


THE  GERMAN  WELTANSCHAUUNG 

to  keep  special  watch  over  their  political  fortunes. 
Characteristic  among  the  many  utterances  of  the 
Kaiser  are  the  following:  "God  would  never  have 
taken  such  great  pains  with  our  German  Fatherland 
and  its  people,  if  he  had  not  heen  preparing  us  for 
something  greater.  We  are  the  salt  of  the  earth." 
(March  22,  1905.) 

"We  shall  conquer  everywhere,  even  though  we  he 
surrounded  by  enemies  on  all  sides ;  for  there  lives  a 
powerful  ally,  the  old  good  God  in  Heaven,  who 
.  .  .  has  always  been  on  our  side."  (March  28, 
1901.) 

Joined  with  this  ascription  of  a  divinely  chosen 
character  to  his  people,  is  the  conviction  of  the  Kaiser 
that  to  him  personally  has  been  divinely  given  the 
mission  of  ruling  over  the  Germans  and  leading 
them  forward  to  the  Weltmacht  which  it  is  their 
destiny  to  realize.  This  is  a  doctrine  which  we  shall 
consider  when  we  come  to  deal  with  the  Prussian 
conception  of  monarchy. 

With  reference  to  the  divine  mission  which  the 
Germans  thus  claim  to  have,  the  point  needs  em- 
phasis that  the  assertion  of  its  existence  necessarily 
makes  impossible  a  true  equality  of  rights  and  mu- 
tuality of  interests  among  nations.     It  becomes  an 

43 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

impiety  to  resist  the  expansion  of  German  influence 
and  power,  and  it  is  of  little  consequence  what  suf- 
ferings may  befall  other  peoples,  if,  as  a  result,  the 
slightest  advantage  accrues  to  Germany.  Cruelties 
too  terrible  to  be  described  receive  complete  justifica- 
tion if  they  are  dictated  by  this  aim.  The  end  being 
absolutely  desirable  a  measuring  of  means  for  its 
realization  has  no  longer  a  meaning.  And  thus, 
when  we  read  of  the  rapine  and  devastation  commit- 
ted by  the  German  armies  of  occupation  from  which, 
at  the  most,  only  slight  and  ultimate  advantage  could 
possibly  accrue  to  the  German  State,  one  is  reminded 
of  the  statement  of  Cardinal  Newman  in  his  Apol- 
ogia that  it  were  better  that  the  whole  world  should 
pass  away  and  all  the  living  beings  upon  it  perish 
in  unutterable  misery,  than  that  a  single  sin  against 
God  should  remain  unrepented  for  and  unforgiven. 
The  historical  origin  of  the  conception  of  the  Teu- 
tons as  a  chosen  people,  elect  of  God,  is,  so  far  as 
such  a  belief  can  be  given  a  specific  date  of  origin, 
to  be  found  in  Fichte's  Reden  an  der  deutschen  Na- 
tion, delivered  in  1807-1808  at  the  University  of 
Berlin.  Then  at  the  nadir  of  their  political  for- 
tunes, the  German  people  were  exhorted  to  seek  in 
the  realm  of  the  spirit  their  rightful  place  of  in- 

44 


THE  GERMAN  WELTANSCHAUUNG 

fluence  in  the  world.  "You  it  is,"  said  Fichte,  "to 
whom  among  all  modern  nations  the  seeds  of  hu- 
man perfection  have  been  entrusted,  and  to  whom  has 
been  given  the  first  place  in  developing  them.  If 
you  succumb,  humanity  succumbs  with  you,  and  all 
hope  of  any  future  restoration  will  be  lost." 

This  noble  appeal  met  with  a  cordial  response  at 
the  time  it  was  made,  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  ex- 
aggerate its  stimulating  influence  upon  a  people  so 
discouragingly  situated  as  the  German  people  then 
were.  In  so  far  as  it  pointed  out  the  way  by  which, 
through  education  and  the  promotion  of  scientific  re- 
search, the  strength  and  influence  of  the  nation  might 
be  recovered  and  continually  increased,  the  words  of 
Fichte  have  never  lost  their  inspiration.  In  so  far, 
however,  as  their  purpose  was  to  elevate  matters  of 
the  spirit  above  those  material  in  character,  they 
soon  lost  their  force.  The  beginnings  of  political 
liberalism  were  stamped  out  as  soon  as  the  several 
German  monarchs  found  themselves  freed  from  for- 
eign control  and  secure  upon  their  thrones. 

Both  Stein  and  Gneisenau  had  urged  that  Prus- 
sia's government  be  placed  upon  a  modern  consti- 
tutional basis,  and  the  King's  consent  to  this  had 
been  obtained.     But  as  an  intelligent  critic  of  Ger- 

45 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

many  1  has  said :  "For  Prussia  the  Leipzig  of  na- 
tional liberty  was  to  prove  the  Jena  of  political  lib- 
erty." Political  reaction  was  the  order  of  the  day. 
As  early  as  1813  the  eminent  theological  professorV 
Schleiermacher  was  dismissed  from  his  chair  in  Ber- 
lin for  publishing  a  mild  political  article.  Arndt 
lost  his  professorship  at  the  University  of  Bonn,  and 
in  1824  the  republication  of  Fichte's  Addresses  was 
officially  prohibited.2  Not  until  he  was  forced  to 
do  so  did  Frederick  William  IV  redeem  a  promise 
made  years  before  by  his  father,  to  give  his  people 
a  written  constitution ;  and,  when  given,  he  did  what 
he  could  to  make  it  a  failure,  and  when  he  died  he 
left  a  sealed  document  in  which  he  urged  that  at  the 
first  opportunity  his  successor  should  annul  the  in- 
strument that  had  been  forced  from  him.3  As  Dawson 
says :  "Frederick  William  IV  was  insane  in  his  later 
years,  but  his  apologists  have  never  claimed  that  he 
was  insane  when  he  penned  this  perfidious  docu- 

*W.  H.  Dawson,  <rWhat  is  Wrong  with  Germany,"  72. 

a  In  1913  the  customary  academic  Feier,  commemorating"  the 
centenary  of  the  death  of  Fichte  was  refused  by  the  University 
of  Berlin. 

3  This  document  was  not  destroyed  until  shortly  after  the 
accession  of  the  present  King  or  Kaiser. 

46 


THE  GERMAN  WELTANSCHAUUNG 

ment     On  the  contrary,  the  Junker  party  contends 
that  it  was  the  sanest  thing  he  ever  did."  x 

It  is  explainable  and  perhaps  was  justifiable  that 
Fichte  in  his  effort  to  arouse  his  countrymen  from 
the  apathy  into  which  they  had  fallen,  should  have 
exaggerated  the  intellectual  and  moral  qualities  of 
his  countrymen.  But  in  the  writings  of  Hegel  we 
find  doctrines  which  are  not  so  defensible.  Here 
we  find  a  deliberate  purpose,  not  simply  to  prove  that 
the  Germans  are  the  standard  bearers  of  civilization, 
but  the  development  of  a  system  of  political  thought 
which  culminates  in  a  practical  deification  of  the 
State  as  manifested  in  its  Prussian  form  of  monarch- 
ical organization.  Thus,  in  the  philosophy  of  Hegel, 
not  only  are  the  German  people  declared  to  have 
been  selected  by  Providence  as  the  one  people  destined 
to  lead  the  human  race  towards  the  goal  of  perfec- 
tion which  reason  points  out,  but  that  they  have, 
ready-made  in  their  national  State,  as  then  monarch- 
ically  organized,  an  exemplar  of  a  politically  per- 
fect form  of  state  organization,  and  an  instrument 
by  means  of  which  the  true  conceptions  of  right  and 
reason  may  be  spread,  by  force  if  necessary,  among 
other  peoples  who  may  be  so  intellectually  benighted, 

1  Op.  cit,  74. 

47 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

or  so  obstinately  minded  as  to  refuse  to  receive  them. 

The  influence  of  Hegel  upon  his  own  generation 
•was  tremendous.  Treitschke  refers  to  him  as  "the 
first  real  political  personality  among  the  German 
philosophers."  And  though  his  vast  and  abstruse 
metaphysical  or  deductive  logical  system  no  longer 
receives  the  acceptance  it  once  had,  his  laudation  of 
the  genius  of  the  German  people  and  his  apotheosis 
of  the  Prussian  State  have  never  lost  their  influence. 

This  conviction  of  the  Germans  of  their  national 
superexcellence,  and  as,  so  to  speak,  the  bearers  of 
the  holy  ark  of  civilization  became  more  certain  as 
the  Germans,  under  Prussian  leadership,  saw  their 
political  strength  rapidly  increase  and  their  social 
and  industrial  development  advance  by  leaps  and 
bounds.  At  the  same  time  that  their  confidence  in 
their  own  world  mission  grew  greater  and  greater, 
the  nature  of  that  mission  became  more  and  more 
materialized,  until  in  the  writings  of  Treitschke 
overwhelming  physical  power,  dominating  military 
strength,  was  declared  to  be  the  chief  garment  with 
which  the  Prussian  State  was  exhorted  to  clothe  itr 
self,  and  world  dominion  the  end  it  should  seek. 

Bismarck  gave  to  the  Teutons  the  principle  by 
which  they  should  be  guided,  when,  in  1862,  speak- 

48 


THE  GERMAN  WELTANSCHAUUNG 

ing  in  the  military  committee  of  the  Prussian  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies,  he  declared  that  the  "questions  of 
the  time"  were  to  be  decided  by  "iron  and  blood." 
"We  have,  indeed,  the  word  of  the  eminent  Friedrich 
Paulsen,  in  his  Zur  Ethik  und  Politxk,  that  "since  the 
sixties  of  the  last  century  a  new  faith  has  sprung 
up,  at  first  timidly  and  ashamed — belief  in  power 
and  the  will  to  power.  This  gave  to  the  close  of 
the  century  its  special  significance.  .  .  .  Political 
questions  are  questions  of  power." 

Among  contemporary  historians,  says  Paulsen  in 
this  same  work,  "Treitschke  has  exercised  the  great- 
est influence  upon  the  political  thought  of  the  rising 
generation."  And  every  one  knows  the  reiterated  em- 
phasis which  Treitschke  lays  upon  his  definition  of 
the  State  as  essentially  Power.  Numerous  statements 
to  this  effect  could  be  quoted  from  his  writings,  but 
the  following  single  one  will  sufficiently  show  his 
doctrine.  Pointing  out  the  fact  that  the  State  is  not 
amenable  to  the  rules  of  morality  which  apply  among 
private  individuals,  he  says:  "Since  the  State  is 
power,  the  relative  importance  of  duties  must  be 
quite  different  for  it  and  for  the  individual.  .  .  M 
For  the  State,  self-assertion  is  the  greatest  of  the  com- 

49 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

mandments ;  for  it,  this  is  absolutely  moral.  And  for 
this  reason  it  must  be  declared  that  of  all  political 
sins  the  most  abominable  and  the  most  contemptible 
is  weakness:  this  is,  in  politics,  the  sin  against  the 
Holy  Ghost." 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   PRUSSIAN   THEOEY   OF  THE   STATE 

The  preceding  chapter  has  prepared  the  way  for 
an  understanding  of  the  Prussian  conception  of  the 
State. 

The  term  "State"  is  here  used  as  connoting  some- 
thing distinct  from  what  is  designated  as  "Govern- 
ment." A  State  is  a  group  of  individuals  viewed  as 
a  politically  organized  unit,  as  an  entity  or  corpo- 
rate being  possessing  superior  authority  over  the 
individuals  constituting  its  body-politic.  A  govern- 
ment is  but  the  machinery  or  complexus  of  organs 
through  which  this  state-being  formulates,  expresses 
and  enforces  its  will.  All  States  are  thus  essentially 
alike.  They  are  distinguished  from  one  another  only 
by  the  forms  of  governments  which  their  several 
systems  of  constitutional  law  provide,  by  the  policies 
which  they  adopt,  and  by  the  standards  of  right  and 
wrong  which  they  apply  in  carrying  them  out.  Ques- 
tions concerning  the  Prussian  conception  of  govern- 
ment, which  will  necessarily  include  a  consideration 

51 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  fundamental  principles  of  Prussian  constitu- 
tional jurisprudence,  will  be  reserved  for  a  later 
chapter.  Here  we  shall  have  to  deal  only  with  the 
characteristic  Teutonic  conception  of  the  State  as  a 
political  entity. 

This  State  doctrine  stands  in  close  and  logical  re- 
lation to  the  philosophy  of  history  which  the  Ger- 
mans have  developed  and  especially  to  the  conviction 
which  they  have  come  to  hold  regarding  their  own 
special  mission  in  the  unfolding  of  what  Hegel  would 
call  the  World  Idea.  For  they  hold  that  their  dis- 
tinctively Teutonic  Kultur  not  only  owes  its  being 
in  large  measure  to  the  State,  but  can  obtain  its  legiti- 
mate influence  throughout  the  world  only  by  means 
of  the  compelling  might  of  its  military  power.  This 
distinctive  Kultur  in  which  they  take  so  much  pride, 
they  regard,  not  as  the  result  of  the  strivings  of  in- 
dividual men  to  attain  to  intellectual  and  spiritual 
enlightenment,  but  as  the  product  of  the  politically 
perfect  organization  to  whose  absolute  control  they 
have  surrendered  themselves. 

The  State  to  the  Prussian,  thus  has  more  than  a 
merely  political  significance.  It  exists  not  merely 
to  control,  but  to  create.  By  its  very  nature  its  in- 
fluence  is  regarded  as  rightfully  extending  not  only 

52 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  STATE 

over  material  matters,  but  to  spiritual  and  religious 
interests  as  well.  "We  regard  State  and  spirit  as  be- 
longing together,"  says  Professor  Troltsch  of  the 
University  of  Berlin:  "an  old  inherited  instinct 
makes  us  avoid  a  separation  in  the  interest  of  both, 
despite  the  difficulties  created  by  the  modern  spirit- 
ual cleavage." 

The  State  is  thus  looked  to  by  the  Germans  as  the 
indispensable  means  whereby  their  own  civilization 
in  all  its  forms  is  developed  and  is  to  operate  as  a 
healing  agency  throughout  the  world.  As  an  indis- 
pensable agency  for  the  realization  of  the  purpose 
of  Providence  the  State  acquires  more  than  mortal 
meaning.  It  is  regarded  as  an  entity  of  such  an 
exalted  superpersonal  and  mystical  character  as  to 
warrant  the  attribution  to  it  of  qualities  essentially 
divine.  In  result  then,  we  find  joined  to  the  provi- 
dential rights  of  the  Teutonic  peoples,  a  conception 
of  the  State  which  regards  it  as  a  divine  agency,  or 
at  least  as  a  being  with  mystical  qualities  that  ex- 
empts it  from  ordinary  rationalistic  examination. 

The  nearest  analogue  to  this  State  idea  is  that  of 
the  Anglicans  and  Roman  Catholics  of  the  Church 
as  an  entity  distinct  not  only  from  the  body  of  its 
adherents  but  from  its  own  outward  organization, 

53 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

and  as  the  depository  of  truth  and  with  the  divine 
mission  of  spreading  it.  This  conception  is  excel- 
lently set  forth  by  Morley  in  his  Life  of  Gladstone 
in  the  following  words: 

"To  the  high  Anglican  as  to  the  Roman  Catholic,  the 
Church  was  .  .  .  not  a  fabric  reared  by  man,  nor  in  truth 
any  mechanical  fabric  at  all,  but  a  mystically  appointed 
channel  of  salvation,  an  indispensable  element  in  the  rela- 
tions between  the  soul  of  man  and  his  Creator.  To  be  a 
member  of  it  was  not  to  join  an  external  association,  but 
to  become  an  inward  partaker  in  ineffable  and  mysterious 
graces  to  which  no  other  access  lay  open.  Such  was  the 
Church  Catholic  and  Apostolic  as  set  up  from  the  begin- 
ning, and  of  this  immense  mystery,  of  this  saving  agency, 
of  this  incommensurable  spiritual  force,  the  established 
Church  of  England  was  the  local  presence  and  the  organ." 

{MfajfoC  How  nearly  the  Prussian  conception  of  the  State 
within  its  distinctive  sphere  approximates  to  that  of 
the  Church  as  thus  viewed,  we  shall  see. 

At  all  times  since  first  men  began  to  speculate  re- 
garding the  nature  of  the  political  institutions  to 
whose  controlling  authority  they  have  found  them- 
selves subjected,  the  idea  of  divinity  has  played  an 
important  part.  Among  primitive  and  uncivilized 
peoples  all  rules  of  conduct,  whether  of  law  or  cus- 
tom, obedience  to  which  was  socially  demanded,  were 
regarded  as  divinely  decreed.    Among  many  Oriental 

54 


S£ 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  STATE 

nations  to  this  day  a  view  substantially  similar  pre- 
vails. And  among  not  only  these  peoples  but  those 
of  Europe  and  of  England  the  doctrine  was  for  long 
asserted  and  widely  held  until  comparatively  recent 
times  that  the  persons  who  held  the  reins  of  supreme 
political  power  were,  if  not  themselves  Gods,  at  least 
the  vicegerents  of  God.  And  in  the  political  phi- 
losophy of  Democracy,  also,  the  divine  element  has 
not  been  wholly  absent,  the  doctrine  being  frequently 
declared  that  the  voice  of  God  is  to  be  heard  speak- 
ing in  the  voice  of  the  people  when  authentically 
expressed — vox  populi,  vox  Dei. 

That,  however,  which  distinguishes  this  State  doc- 
trine of  German  political  philosophy  from  these  other 
now  discorded,  divine-right  theories  is  that  it  is  sup- 
ported by  abstract  and  metaphysical,  rather  than  by 
theological  or  dogmatic,  principles ;  and  that  the  di- 
vine or  superpersonal  characteristics  which  are  dealt 
with  are  ascribed,  not  to  the  government,  nor,  pri- 
marily at  least,  to  its  rulers,  but  to  that  abstract  and 
mystical  entity  which  is  termed  the  State,  which  is 
conceived  of  as  employing  the  government  and  its 
rulers  as  but  instrumentalities  for  carrying  out  its 
own  ends. 

In  juristic  philosophy  it  has  been  found  conve- 

55 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

nient  in  all  countries,  in  order  to  give  formal  and 
logical  consistency  to  their  systems  of  public  law, 
to  envisage  or  picture  the  State  as  a  political  person 
or  corporation  possessing  and  uttering  a  legally  su- 
preme will,  and  thus,  in  a  formal  and  purely  juristic 
sense,  as  the  ultimate  source  of  all  commands  that 
may,  in  technical  strictness,  be  termed  laws.  But 
this  conception,  which  is  nothing  more  than  a  con- 
venience of  thought,  and  which  serves  only  as  a  peg 
upon  which  to  hang  other  juristic  concepts,  or  as  a 
starting  point  from  which  to  attempt  a  logical  ar- 
rangement of  public-law  principles,  is  an  idea  wholly 
different  from  the  German  doctrine  which  postulates 
the  real,  albeit  mystical  and  insubstantial,  existence 
of  a  State  being  to  the  commands  of  which,  as  a  moral 
proposition,  implicit  obedience  is  due,  and  with  ends 
of  its  own  for  the  realization  of  which  any  and  every 
sacrifice  of  individual  well-being  may  rightfully  be 
required.1 

Professor  John  Dewey,  in  his  German  Philosophy 
and  Politics,  has  shown  in  a  convincing  manner  that 
the    formalistic    and    purely    abstract   character    of 

*For  an  analysis  of  the  purely  legal  idea  of  the  State,  see 
'the  author's  article,  "The  Juristic  Conception  of  the  State," 
in  the  American  Political  Science  Review,  May,  1918. 

56 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  STATE 

Kant's  doctrine  of  the  categorical  imperative  made 
easily  possible,  if  it  did  not  actually  encourage,  the 
filling  in  of  its  contents  by  the  apodictic  commands 
of  a  superpersonal  State,  and  the  justifying  of  any 
acts  which  were  deemed  to  advance  the  interests  or 
ends  of  this  mystical  being.  That  Kant  went  even 
further  than  this  and  himself  argued  the  existence 
and  mystical  character  of  the  State  as  a  being  raised 
above  the  plane  of  ordinary  human  existence  and 
above  the  realm  of  the  practical,  if  not  of  the  pure 
reason,  is  shown  by  his  statement  that  "the  origin 
of  the  supreme  [political]  powers,  from  the  prac- 
tical point  of  view,  is  inscrutable  by  the  people  who 
are  under  its  authority."  In  other  words,  he  con- 
tinues, "the  subject  should  not  reason  too  curiously 
as  to  its  origin,  as  if  the  right  of  obedience  due  to  it 
were  to  be  doubted."  1  Again,  of  the  will  of  this 
State  he  says: 

A  law  which  is  so  holy  and  inviolable  that  it  is  prac- 
tically a  crime  even  to  cast  doubt  upon  it,  or  to  sus- 
pend its  operation  even  for  a  moment,  is  represented  of 
itself  as  necessarily  derived  from  some  supreme,  unblam- 
able lawgiver.  And  this  is  the  meaning  of  the  maxim, 
"All  authority  is  from  God,"  which  proposition  does  not 
express  the  historical  foundation  of  the  civil  constitution, 

1  Philosophy  of  Law,  174,  Hastie  translation. 

57 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

but  an  ideal  of  the  practical  reason.  It  may  be  other- 
wise rendered  thus :  "It  is  a  duty  to  obey  the  law  of  the 
existing  legislative  power,  be  its  origin  what  it  may." 
Hence  it  follows  that  the  supreme  power  in  the  State  has 
only  rights  and  no  [compulsory]  duties  towards  the  sub- 
ject.1 

Elsewhere  Kant  goes  so  far  as  to  see  in  the  State 
a  unity  resulting  from  a  trinity  of  powers  which  is 
obviously  patterned  after  the  triune  character  of  the 
Christian  God.2 

In  the  philosophy  of  Hegel  also,  we  find  the  State 
appearing  as  a  transcendental  being,  essentially  di- 

________  I .  Ill      -      jnlUM  ■■       I      I     Tllini^,^.-  _  i  I  IMII     -  - -XI* ll_l— I — ~~ — — — — — 

vine  in  character.  "The  State,"  he  says,  "is  the 
march  of  God  in  the  world;  its  ground  or  cause  is 
the  power  of  reason  realizing  itself  as  will.  When 
thinking  of  the  idea  of  the  State  we  must  not  have 
in  our  mind  any  particular  state  or  particular  insti- 
tution, but  must  rather  contemplate  the  idea,  this 
actual  God,  by  itself.  .  .  .  The  Idea  of  the  State 
has  direct  actuality  in  the  individual  State." 

As  thus  conceived,  it  is  what  we  would  expect  when 
we  find  the  State  declared  by  Hegel  to  be  morally 
supreme  and  able  to  transmute  into  duties  to  itself 
whatever  rights  might  seem  to  belong  to  its  subjects 

1  Op.  cit.,  174. 

•Cf.  Duguit,  The  Law  and  the  State,  translation  46. 

58 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  STATE 

as  individual  human  beings.  "The  substantial  unity 
of  the  State,"  he  says,  "is  its  own  motive  and  ab- 
solute end.  In  this  end  freedom  reaches  its  highest 
right,  just  as  this  ultimate  end  has  a  superior  right 
over  the  individuals,  whose  first  duty  it  is  to  be  mem- 
bers of  the  State."  The  State  is  indeed  the  reality 
of  the  moral  idea — "Der  Stoat  ist  die  WirTclichheit 
der  sittlichen  Idee." 

The  extent  to  which  German  thought,  social  and 
political  as  well  as  metaphysical,  has  been  guided  by 
the  doctrines  of  Kant  and  Hegel  is  a  fact  which  is 
commonplace  in  the  history  of  thought.  It  would, 
therefore,  be  unnecessary,  even  could  space  be  spared, 
to  show  how,  throughout  German  literature  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  the  doctrines  which  have  been 
here  indicated  were  constantly  restated  and  reaf- 
firmed. Especially  since  the  outbreak  of  the  present 
war  have  they  been  put  forth  with  renewed  empha- 
sis and  ardor. 

We  may,  then,  take  it  as  a  proposition  regarding 
which  there  can  be  no  dispute  that  German  political 
philosophy,  as  academically  taught  and  as  popularly 
believed,  asserts  that  every  independent  politically 
organized  group  can,  and  should,  be  viewed  as  con- 
stituting the  material  and  phenomenal  body  of  a 

59 


IV 


(£> 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

mystical  and  inherently  divine  being  whose  will,  when 
authentically  expressed,  may  not  be  morally  or  legally 
questioned  by  those  over  whom  it  claims  authority. 
In  short,  the  old  doctrine  of  the  divine  right  of  the 
ruler  is  replaced  by  the  divine  right  of  the  State. 

The  next  step  in  the  German  political  philosophy 
is  to  draw  the  conclusions  which  logically  follow 
from  the  premise  of  the  Godhead  of  the  State.  Two 
corollaries  immediately  follow.  The  first  of  these  is 
the  one  already  indicted  that,  as  transcendentally  su- 
preme, no  limits  may  be  set  to  its  authority — no  re- 
sistance to  its  commands  in  reason,  justified.  This, 
it  is  to  be  again  emphasized,  is  not  the  ascription  to 
the  State  of  a  legal  supremacy  and  absoluteness  such 
as  is  predicated  by  the  analytical  jurist,  but  its  en- 
dowment with  a  will  whose  commands  may  not  be 
morally  questioned.  The  second  corollary  is  that 
the  State  is  a  being  that  has  interests  or  ends  of  its 
own  that  can  be  conceived  of  as  existing  apart  from 
and  as  distinct  from  those  of  its  subjects  whether 
collectively  or  distributively  viewed. 

As  regards  this  last  position,  it  will  be  remembered 
that  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  volume  it  was  pointed 
out  that,  though  morality  is  founded  upon  a  recog- 
nition by  individuals  that  the  interests  of  others  than 

60 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  STATE 

themselves  must  be  regarded,  and  that  thus  all  ethical 
rules  receive  a  social  content,  it  nevertheless  remains 
true  that  the  individual  is  morally  obligated  to  seek 
that  which  his  reason  tells  him  is  his  own  best  good. 
In  other  words  he  seeks  a  self-perfection,  but  the 
ideal  which  he  thus  sets  to  himself  involves  a  recog- 
nition of,  and  a  respect  for,  the  interests  of  other 
persons  who,  like  himself,  have  a  right  to  seek  their 
own  best  good. 

Upon  premises  such  as  these  the  moral  obligation 
of  social  service,  of  self-sacrifice  to  the  welfare  of 
the  social  group,  and  of  allegiance  and  obedience  to 
the  State  are  founded.  But  these  duties  are  wholly 
founded  upon  a  regard  for  the  welfare  of  the  individ- 
uals who  constitute  the  State,  or,  if  the  still  broader 
view  be  taken,  who  constitute  the  units  of  humanity. 
According  to  this  view  the  maintenance  of  the  State 
and  obedience  to  its  laws  are  looked  upon  merely  as 
the  means  whereby  the  true  welfare  of  its  citizens 
or  the  welfare  of  the  race  may  be  promoted.  Apart 
from  this  purpose  States  and  their  governments  have 
no  claim  upon  the  obedience  or  self-sacrifice  of  the 
individual.  In  German  political  philosophy,  how- 
ever, the  State  is  viewed  as  a  divine  or  mystical  per- 
son whose  welfare  is  to  be  sought  as  an  end  in  itself. 

61 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Even  when  the  German  political  philosopher  so 
far  descends  from  the  peaks  of  pure  reason  as  to  con- 
sider political  rule  as  a  means  of  promoting  human 
welfare,  he  takes  care  to  preserve  for  it  an  ahsolute 
character.  A  certain  form  of  it,  namely  as  a  National 
State,  is  declared  to  be  the  only  perfect  type,  and  as 
thus  manifested  to  men  it  is  affirmed  to  he  the  in- 
dispensable means,  the  only  rationally  conceivable 
means,  by  which  humanity  may  reach  the  ends  which 
reason  holds  out  as  desirable  of  attainment.  So 
strongly  is  this  absolute  doctrine  stated  that  we  find 
it  asserted  that  it  would  be  against  reason  and  right 
to  seek  to  substitute  a  World-State  in  place  of  a 
number  of  disparate  National  States.  Even  the  es- 
tablishment of  institutions  or  rules  that  would  place 
a  restraint  upon  the  freedom  of  action  of  these  inde- 
pendent state  persons  in  the  international  field,  it  is 
declared,  would  be  in  violation  of  their  intrinsic 
rights.  "The  establishment  of  an  international  court 
of  arbitration  as  a  permanent  institution,"  Treitschke 
declares,  "is  irreconcilable  with  the  nature  of  the 
State."  Not,  it  will  be  observed,  because  of  results 
to  which  it  might  lead,  but  because  it  is  irreconcil- 
able with  the  inherent  nature  of  the  independent  Na- 
tional State  as  he  conceives  it  to  be.    In  another  place 

62 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  STATE 

he  declares  that  it  is  only  when  the  State  is  given 

the  opportunity  to  contest  with  other  States  and  to 

impose  its  will  upon  theirs  that  the  opportunity  is 

offered,  the  milieu  provided,  for  the  realization  by 

the  State  of  the  destiny  which  its  inherent  nature 

points  out. 

We  thus  again  arrive,  as  from  a  new  angle,  at  the    ft     i 

proposition  that  no  moral  obligations  unite  States 

into  a  moral  whole.     Each  is  an  end  to  itself;  no 

««■        ■ ■  ■-,    ■——      f\ 

place  is  left  for  self-restraint  or  self-sacrifice  when 

its  interests  are  concerned ;  no  logical  possibility  pre- 
sented for  cultivating  abiding  friendship  and  coop- 
erative efforts  between  States.  International  laws 
can  find  no  moral  force  in  the  consciences  of  those 
whose  actions  they  would  regulate.  The  most 
solemnly  covenanted  word  remains  binding  upon  the 
State  only  so  long  as  expediency  seems  to  dictate.  No 
appeal  to  an  interest  higher  than  its  own  selfish  wel- 
fare is  held  legitimate.  Whether  dealing  with  other 
peoples  or  with  its  own  subjects,  the  final  word,  le- 
gally as  well  as  morally,  is  the  declaration  of  the 
State — sic  volo,  sic  jubeo,  sit  pro  ratione  voluntas. 


•fr 


fVdyf^ 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   PRUSSIAN    THEOBY   OF   MONARCHY 

At  the  beginning  of  the  preceding  chapter  it  was 
pointed  out  that  political  scientists  make  a  sharp 
distinction  between  the  terms  "State"  and  "Govern- 
ment," a  .State  designating  an  independent  political 
group  viewed  as  a  corporate  unit,  and  juristically 
spoken  of  as  a  person  expressing  its  will  in  the  form 
of  laws  or  commands  addressed  to  those  over  whom 
it  claims  legal  authority;  and  Government  being  the 
name  given  to  the  machinery  or  aggregate  of  instru- 
mentalities through  which  the  State  formulates,  ex- 
presses, and  enforces  its  will.  In  the  chapter  which 
has  gone  before  there  was  analyzed  the  mystical  con- 
ception of  the  State,  framed  by  the  Teutons,  as  a 
-  real,  though  mystical,  superpersonal  being  with  ends 
of  its  own  to  subserve. 

In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  deal  with  the  Prus- 
sian conception  of  Government  and  be  concerned  with 
questions  quite  different  from  those  which  we  have 
thus  far  discussed. 

64 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

The  fundamental  questions  of  political  philosophy 
in  their  relation  to  Government  are  these: 

1.  Is  there  any  one  form  of  government  which 
can  be  said  to  be  abstractly  or  inherently  preferable 
to  other  forms,  that  is,  when  divorced  from  special 
conditions  of  time,  place,  and  people ;  or  are  the  mer- 
its of  all  forms  of  political  rule  relative  to  the  con- 
ditions to  which  they  are  to  be  applied  ? 

2.  Upon  whose  judgment,  as  an  ethical  proposi- 
tion, should  the  decision  rest  as  to  the  form  of  gov- 
ernment that  shall  exist?  Since  all  governments 
are  of  human  creation  and  subject  to  human  control 
this  is  a  question  the  answering  of  which  cannot  be 
avoided. 

3.  Whence,  as  an  ethical  proposition,  do  those  who 
determine  and  execute  the  policies  of  a  government 
derive  their  right  to  rule?  And  closely  connected 
with  this  is  the  question: 

4.  From  what  source,  as  a  legal  proposition,  is  de- 
rived the  force  of  the  constitutional  laws  which  allot 
the  powers  of  government  among  its  several  organs 
or  officials?  This  last  question  falls  rather  within 
the  field  of  constitutional  jurisprudence  than  of  pure 
political  theory,  but,  of  so  fundamental  a  character 
is  it,  it  must  be  considered  if  an  understanding  is  to 

65 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

be  obtained  of  the  general  attitude  of  mind  of  a 
people  towards  the  government  which  rules  them. 

The  answers  which  Prussian  political  and  juristic 
thought  give  to  these  questions  will  be  considered  in 
the  order  as  above  stated.  First,  then  a3  to  whether 
Prussians  ascribe  to  the  monarchical  form  of  govern- 
ment an  inherent  or  absolute  character  that  raises  it, 
in  intrinsic  merit,  above  other  forms  of  government ; 
or  whether  they  regard  it  purely  from  the  practical 
or  pragmatic  point  of  view. 

As  long  as  theological  and  political  speculations 
remained  intermixed,  or,  as  long  as  it  was  held  that 
by  pure  reason,  apart  from  divinely  revealed  truth, 
rules  of  human  conduct  of  an  absolutely  binding  char- 
acter, semper  et  ubique  applicable,  might  be  deter- 
mined, it  was  possible  to  hold  that  there  is  one  form 
of  government  which  is  especially  favored  of  God 
or  intrinsically  better  than  all  others;  and  to  mon- 
archy, as  a  rule,  was  ascribed  this  perfection.  Texts 
of  Scripture  were  quoted  to  show  that  this  form  of 
rule  had  the  direct  sanction  of  God,  or,  relying  sim- 
ply upon  what  was  termed  "right  reason,"  it  was 
pointed  out  that  from  the  very  nature  of  things,  as 
well  as  by  analogy  with  the  Kingship  of  God  himself, 
and  the  fact  that  all  living  creatures  have  and  must 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

have  one  supreme  directing  head,  it  was  argued  that 
the  monarchical  form  of  government  is  foreordained 
as  the  only  justifiable  form  of  political  rule.  Writers 
like  Robert  Filmer  as  late  as  the  seventeenth  century 
argued  that  the  authority  of  Kings  is  rightfully  pos- 
sessed by  inheritance  from  the  powers  originally 
given  by  God  to  Adam.  And  that  his  Patriarcha 
was  not  a  mere  curiosity  of  thought  that  could  carry 
no  weight  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  Locke  thought 
it  necessary  to  devote  a  large  part  of  his  First  Treor 
tise  of  Government  to  its  refutation. 

But  the  deathblow  to  absolutist  or  theological  rea- 
soning in  the  field  of  politics  was  really  given  in  the 
writings  of  Machiavelli,  and  especially  in  his  Prince. 
However  much  one  may  disagree  with  the  proposi- 
tion of  the  Florentine  that  the  rules  of  morality  find 
no  proper  application  in  matters  of  State,  to  him 
must  be  given  the  credit  of  bringing  to  bear  upon 
politics  the  application  of  rationalistic  and  practi- 
cal principles.  If,  then,  there  still  exist  any  writers 
or  peoples  who  ascribe  an  abstract  and  absolute  ex- 
cellence to  monarchy,  apart  from  the  objective  condi- 
tions to  which  it  applies  or  the  practical  results  to 
which  its  maintenance  leads,  it  is  an  anachronism 
and  stands  outside  of  modern  scientific  thought. 

67 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

It  would  be  absurd  to  assert  that  German  publi- 
cists do  not  admit,  as  a  general  proposition,  that  spe- 
cial circumstances  should  determine  the  kind  of  gov- 
ernment that  a  people  should  possess.  We  do  cer- 
tainly find,  however,  the  statement  frequently  made, 
and  still  more  often  the  implication  conveyed,  that, 
for  the  Germans  at  least,  the  matter  is  absolutely 
determined  in  favor  of  a  strong  monarchy.  This,  as 
we  shall  later  see,  involves  the  proposition  that  there 
is  no  right  inherent  in  the  governed  to  decide  upon 
the  form  of  government  to  whose  commands  they  are 
to  yield  obedience.  It  is  also,  of  course,  indissol- 
ubly  connected  with  the  acceptance  of  the  claims  of 
the  Hohenzollerns  to  a  personal  right  to  the  Prussian 
throne.  And  there  is  also  present  the  conviction  that 
the  Teutons  are,  by  very  nature,  monarchically  mind- 
ed, and  furthermore,  that  only  by  means  of  mon- 
archy can  that  Kultur,  upon  which  they  pride  them- 
selves, be  maintained  and  spread  throughout  the 
world.  The  maintenance  of  monarchy  is  thus  re- 
garded as  involved  in  the  performance  of  the  world- 
civilizing  mission  of  the  Germans.  Finally,  there 
is  found  the  strong  conviction  that,  as  a  purely  prac- 
tical proposition,  the  problem  of  efficient  govern- 
ment is  one  that  under  most  circumstances  can  best 

68 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

be  solved  when  strong  monarchical  direction  and  con- 
trol is  provided,  and  that,  such  is  the  special  situa- 
tion of  the  German  States  with  reference  to  their 
neighbors,  it  is  for  them  indispensable. 

In  so  far  as  Germans  give  their  preference  to  mon- 
archical forms  of  government,  upon  these  last  men- 
tioned pragmatic  grounds,  no  logical  objection  can 
be  raised.  We  may  think  that  in  making  this  choice 
the  comparative  merits  and  defects  of  popular  and 
autocratic  rule  are  not  correctly  estimated.  But  the" 
method  of  reasoning  is  not  a  false  one.  Thus,  for 
example,  no  objection,  as  to  logical  method,  can  be 
made  to  the  argument  of  Professor  Troltsch  of  the 
University  of  Berlin  when  he  says: 

Only  under  monarchical  leadership  can  the  work  of  unity 
and  development  of  a  nation  encompassed  by  danger  be 
accomplished.  All  European  nations  have  achieved  their 
unity  by  means  of  monarchy.  The  exceptional  case  of  the 
United  States  proves  nothing  to  the  contrary,  since  in  this 
instance  the  question  was  one  of  development  without  the 
presence  of  neighboring  States.  The  French  Republic  is 
only  a  translation  into  republican  form  of  that  which  the 
Bourbon  and  Napoleonic  monarchies  had  created.1 

Prussian  publicists  are  not  content,  however,  to 
justify  the  maintenance  of  monarchy  solely  upon 
1  Modern  Germany  in  Relation  to  the  Great  War,  p.  70. 

69 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

these  purely  practical  grounds,  but,  as  has  been  al- 
ready suggested,  introduce  into  their  argument  pre- 
mises which  place  the  institution  upon  a  plane  where 
it  becomes  invested  with  an  absolute  value  and  sacro- 
sanctity  that  makes  it  an  impiety  to  question  its  right 
to  be.  This  becomes  evident  when  we  proceed  to 
examine  the  answers  given  to  the  questions:  From 
what  source  should  spring  the  decision  as  to  the  form 
of  government  which  a  people  is  to  possess?  And 
by  what  right  are  those  who  are  in  public  authority 
to  be  deemed  to  hold  their  offices?  To  the  first  of 
these  two  questions  we  now  turn. 

In  granting  that  monarchy  may  be  practically 
justified  as  an  institution  for  the  Prussians,  or  for 
the  German  States  generally,  we  are,  of  course,  not 
committed  to  the  acceptance  of  any  propositions 
which  the  Prussians  may  hold  regarding  the  location 
of  the  right  to  determine  its  existence  nor  as  to  the 
origin  of  the  right  of  particular  persons  or  families 
to  the  throne,  nor  as  to  the  autocratic  powers  that 
may  wisely  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  sovereign  ruler. 

American  political  philosophy  as  well  as  that  of 
her  Allies  in  the  present  war,  with  the  exception  of 
Japan,  is  committed  to  the  doctrine  stated  in  the 
opening  chapter  of  this  volume,  that  the  governed, 

70 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

acting  through  an  electorate  that  is  as  broad  as  is 
practicable,  should,  under  all  forms  of  government, 
be  conceded  the  right,  and  be  supplied  with  orderly 
constitutional  means,  to  determine  whether  they  wish 
to  maintain  the  existing  form  of  government;  or,  as 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  says:  "to  alter  or 
to  abolish  it,  and  to  institute  new  government,  lay- 
ing its  foundation  on  such  principles  and  organizing 
its  powers  in  such  form,  as  to  them  shall  seem  most 
likely  to  effect  their  safety  and  happiness." 

This  doctrine,  as  an  ethical  proposition,  Prussian 
political  philosophy  does  not  admit.  The  Prussians 
have  never  been  granted,  or  effectively  asserted,  the 
right  to  determine  the  form  of  government  to  whose 
commands  they  are  subjected.  It  is,  indeed,  note- 
worthy that  during  the  revolutionary  period  in  1848, 
and  in  the  debates  of  the  Frankfort  Convention  the 
aim  was  to  obtain  a  government  that  should  be  con- 
stitutionally limited,  and  to  secure  the  recognition 
of  civil  rights  of  person  and  property,  rather  than 
for  the  people  to  take  the  control  of  government  into 
their  own  hands  and  found  it,  ethically  as  well  as 
legally,  upon  the  consent  of  the  governed.  At  any 
rate,  whatever  assertions  of  popular  sovereignty  may 
then  have  been  made  proved  of  no  avail,  and  since 

71 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

that  time  have  played  no  appreciable  part  in  German 
political  thought  save  in  the  premises  of  the  Social 
Democrats. 

In  truth,  German  publicists  are  only  logical  when 
they  deny  that  the  wishes  of  the  governed  should  de- 
termine the  form  of  government  of  the  State,  for  if, 
as  they  assert,  the  State  does  not  exist  primarily  for 
the  welfare  of  the  governed,  why  should  their  con- 
sent be  sought  ?  Hegel  contemptuously  refers  to  the 
people  as  that  part  of  the  State  which  does  not  know 
what  it  wants.  Professor  Troltsch,  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Berlin,  in  a  paper  published  since  the  war 
began,  speaks  with  approval  of  the  fact  that  German 
writers  have  "opposed  the  democratic  fiction  that 
the  State  is  an  institution  created  by  the  individuals 
for  their  own  security  and  happiness."  l  And  in  the 
same  volume  of  essays  in  which  this  commentation 
is  made,  Professor  Otto  Hintze,  also  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Berlin,  speaking  of  the  Prussian  system 
of  rule,  says: 

It  is  a  form  of  government  which  does  not  seek  primarily 
the  comfort  and  happiness  of  the  individual,  but  rather 
the  power  and  greatness  of  the  State,  since  without  the 

1  "The  Spirit  of  German  Kultur,"  in  the  volume  entitled 
"Modern  Germany  in  Relation  to  the  Great  War,"  published 
in  1915. 

72 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

latter  general  prosperity  cannot  be  secure.  This  system, 
which  has  made  the  relatively  large  standing  army  the 
backbone  of  a  central  administration,  that  takes  cogni- 
zance of  every  man  and  every  penny,  that  teaches  self- 
denial,  order  and  conscientiousness  in  civil  as  -well  as 
military  life,  and  that  has  accustomed  its  citizens  rather 
to  fulfill  their  political  duties  than  to  aim  at  the  increase 
of  their  political  rights.  ...  It  opposes  a  transformation 
that  would  place  the  government  in  the  hands  of  changing 
majorities  and  subject  the  army  to  corrupt  parliamentary 
influences — a  statement  true  not  only  of  Prussia  but  of 
entire  Germany. 

The  paragraph  is  an  illuminating  one.  In  it  we 
obtain  an  accurate  view  of  the  dominant  Teutonic 
conviction  as  to  the  relation  that  exists  between  the 
welfare  of  the  State  and  the  welfare  of  its  people. 
"Seek  ye  first  the  Kingdom  of  the  Hohenzollerns," 
the  people  are  told,  and  take  it  as  a  matter  of  faith 
that,  despite  the  sacrifices  that  may  have  to  be  made, 
all  will  ultimately  be  for  your  best  good.  Do  not 
ask  for  a  participation  in  your  own  government,  be- 
cause that  will  weaken  the  executive  power  of  the 
State,  to  weaken  which,  as  Treitschke  has  said,  is 
the  crime  of  political  crimes,  the  sin  against  the 
Holy  Ghost. 

In  result,  then,  the  Prussian  people  are  taught, 
and  have  very  generally  come  to  believe,  that,  viewed 

73 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

metaphysically,  the  affairs  of  this  world  are  so  or- 
dered that  it  is  irrational  for  them  to  demand  the 
right  to  determine  for  themselves  the  form  of  gov- 
ernment to  whose  control  they  shall  submit,  or  to 
claim  a  participation  in  its  operation. 
The    German   Conception   of  Freedom. — Thus   the' 
German   people  have  come  to  feel  that  they  are 
free    so    long    as    they    have    the    liberty    to    exer- 
cise their  faculty  for  abstract  reasoning.     And,  by  a 
remarkable  intellectual  feat,  they  have  come  to  be- 
lieve that  this  reason  tells  them  that  they  do  not  need 
to  keep  their  institutions  of  learning  free  from  j>o»  ' 
litical  influence.     Thus,  though  they  reserve  to  them- 
selves what  they  call  inward  or  rational  freedom,  they 
surrender  control  of  the  school  and  universities  which 
tell  them  what  this  reason  teaches.     Their  writers\ 
sometimes  lay  stress  upon  the  point  that  private  citi-  / 
zens  participate  actively  in  local  governments,  but 
the  status  and  powers  of  these  governments  are  fixed 
by  the  central  government  in  which  they  are  taught 
to  believe  they  have  no  ethical  or  rational  right  to 
control.    "We  understand  ...  by  self  government,"! 
says  the  eminent  Professor  Gustav  von  Schmoller,' 
"the  administration  of  the  municipalities  and  other 
communal  units  by  citizens  themselves,  with  more 

74 


Co, 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

or  less  independence  as  regards  the  state  authorities 
and  officials."  x  But  this  independence,  even  if  more 
rather  than  less,  relates  to  matters  only  of  local  con- 
cern, that  is,  to  matters  of  business  methods  and  ad- 
ministration,  and  has  no  relation  to  the  general  po- 
litical policies_of  the  Stale  itself. 

Perhaps  this  conception  of  freedom  can  be  made 
plainer  if  we  say  that  the  Germans  have  come  to 
attach  such  a  high  value  to  order,  unity,  and. sys- 
tem, that  they  look  askance  at  the.  variety  and,  to 
them,  disorder,  that  results  where  freer  play  to  indi- 
vidual interests  and  desires  is  allowed.  In  other 
words,  the  typical  German  is  content  to  have  his  life 
minutely  regulated  if  he  can  feel  himself  secured 
from  the  interference  or  annoyance  of  the  unregu- 
lated actions  of  others. 

Let  me  again  quote  from  the  volume  of  essays, 

published  since  the  war  began,  in  which  some  of  the 

best  known  university  professors  attempted  in  a  sober 

and  scientific  manner  to  interpret  German  ideals  to 

the  rest  of  the  world.     In  his  essay  entitled  "The 

Spirit  of  German  Kultur,"  Professor  Troltsch  says : 

1  "The  Origin  and  Nature  of  German  Institutions,"  included 
in  the  collection  of  essays  published  in  1915  under  the  title 
Deutschland  und  der  Weltkrieg.  The  English  translation 
bears  the  title  Modern  Germany  in  Relation  to  the  Great  War. 

75 


->€, 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

It  accords  with  a  strong  monarchy,  such  as  we  require, 
that  its  hand  should  be  felt  everywhere,  both  in  great  and 
little  things.  Personal  freedom  and  human  dignity  do  not 
suffer  thereby  in  the  least.  While  public  servants  are 
placed  in  a  safer  and  more  independent  position,  owing  to 
the  rights  guaranteed  to  them  by  the  laws,  than  in  de- 
mocracies, the  average  citizen  experiences  absolutely  no 
repression  through  the  monarchy.  .  .  .  We  at  any  rate, 
consider  ourselves  in  many  respects  freer  and  more  inde- 
pendent than  the  citizens  of  great  democracies. 

And  several  pages  later  on,  he  continues: 

t  All  the  .things,  here  mentioned — monarchy,  army,  school, 
administration  and  economy — rest  upon  an  extraordinary 
instinct  for  order,  combined  .with  stern  discipline  and  an 
earnest  sense nf-duty.  .  .  .  Order  and  duty,  solidarity  and 
discipline,  are  the  watchwords  of  our  officialdom,  of  asso- 
ciations and  corporations,  of  large  and  small  business  con- 
cerns, of  our  labor  unions,  and  of  the  great  social  insur- 
ance undertakings.  Method  and  system  are  the  principles 
of  scientific  work  and  technical  arts,  of  education  and 
social  legislation. 

The  dominating  influence  of  regulation  and  order, 
Professor  Troltsch  says,  is  evident  even  in  aesthetic 
arts,  for  he  continues : 

Even  free  artistic  temperament  and  imagination  do  not 
move  only  in  the  sphere  of  inspiration  and  mood,  but  seek, 
precisely  in  the  case  of  our  greatest  men,  to  take  their 
place  in  the  general  psychic  development  in  the  cosmic 
conception  and  in  the  scheme  of  moral  achievement.     No 

76 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

examples  need  be  mentioned,  for  this  is  the  characteristic 
trait  of  the  German  which  strikes  straDgers  first  of  all 

Professor  Santayana,  of  Harvard  University,  has 
recently  described  this  German  conception  of  Free- 
dom in  the  following  manner: 

It  does  not  refer  to  any  possibility  of  choice  or  to  any 
private' initiative.     It  means  rather  that  senae^jQf,jrefidQjn   v 
which  we  acquire  when  we  do  gladly  and  well  what  we 
have  to  do  anyhow.  .  .  .   [It]  is  like  the  freedom  of  the. 
angels  in  Heaven  who  see  the  face  of  God  and  cannot  sim 
It  lies  in  such  a  deep  love  and  understanding  of  what  is 
actually  established  that  you  would  not  have  it  otherwise; 
you  appropriate  and  bless  it  all  and  feel  it  to  be  the  provi- 
dential expression  of  your  own  spirit.    You  are  enlarged 
by  sympathy  with  your  work,  your  country  and  the  uni- 
verse, until  you  are  no  longer  conscious  of  the  least  dis- 
tinction between   the   Creator,   the   State   and   yourself.      j£)jbX* 
Your  compulsory  service  then  becomes  perfect  freedom.1 

Having  ascribed  at  least  a  quasi-divinity_  to.  the  \ 

State,  and  with  such  a  philosoph.iciLL.eojiception  of 

freedom  as  this,  it  becomes  clear  how  a  people  who 

—  — —         -  ■•*    r  /  jfe-je. 

justly  pride  themselves  upon  an  intellectual  develop- 

"  '     — — — — ■ — — — — —  ^        \  £..'' 

ment  that  extends  throughout  the  whole  community,    \ 

could  yet  content  themselves  with  surrendering  con-     [    »!  bmduu 

trol  over  not  only  the  details  of  their  everyday  life, 

But  the  broad  oomestic  and  international  policies  of 

1  The  New  Republic,  August  28,  1915. 

77 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

their^  government  S£ep  .by  step,  the  argument  pro- 
ceeds: The  State  is  a  divine  being,  or,  if  meta- 
physical be  preferred  to  theological  terminology,  it 
is  a  mystical  entity. in  which  the  unity  of  a  people, 
as^  a  subjective  idea  of  Reason,  becomes  objectively 
Real.  In  either  case,  power  in  the  greatest  possible 
amount  is  of  the  essence  of  this  State  Being.  The 
exercise  of  thisjpower  is  vested  in  the  executive.  Re- 
straints upon  the  free  exercise  of  this  executive 
power  operate  to  lessen  its  effectiveness  and  therefore 
cannot  be  justified.  A  division  of  it  necessarily 
weakens  it,  and,  therefore,  a  strong  monarchy  is  the 
best  type  of  government.1 

_lllj IIIHHMMllllllHII      1 

We  reach  now  the  third  fundamental  question  to 
be  considered  when  analyzing  the  nature  of  any  given 
government,  namely,  as  to  source  of  the  right  whence 
is  derived  the  ethical  right  of  those  in  political  au- 
thority  to  hold  the  reins  of  power.  Granting  the 
right  of  monarchy  to  exist,  or  conceding  its  practical 
value  to  the  Prussians,  there  remains  to  bedeter- 

1  "Since  the  State  is  primarily  power,  that  State  which 
gathers  authority  most  completely  into  the  hand  of  one  and 
there  leaves  it  most  independent,  approaches  most  nearly  to 
the  ideal."    Treitschke,  Politics,  I.  13. 

78 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

mined  the  grounds  upon  which  the  King-claims  his 
ethical  right  to  possession  of  the  throne — a  right 
which,  since  1871,  has  carried  with  it,  ex  officio,  the 
title  and  office  of  German  Emperor. 

If  we  review  the  history  of  monarchical  theories 
we  find  that  rulers  have  regarded  their  thrones  as  be- 
longing to  them  upon  the  ioJLowiiig  grounds : 

1.  As  being  themselves,  if  not  actually  Gods,  at 
least  directly  endowed  with  divine  attributes. 

2.  As  being  the  absolute  owners  of  the  lands  and 
peoples  over  whom  they  rule. 

3.  As  being  the  agents  or  vicegerents  of  God,  and 
responsible  only  to  Him  for  the  manner  in  which 
they  exercise  their  powers. 

4.  As  being  but  one  of  the  organs  or  agencies  of  j 
the  government  and  deriving  political  authority  from  >  *■/ 
the  source  whence  that  government  itself  obtains  its  ) 
moral  or  legal  right  to  existence. 

According  to  any  one  of  the  first  three  theories, 
the  monarch  assumes  to  rule  by  an  original  right  per- 1 
sonally  inherent  in  himself.  According  to  the  fourth 
theory,  his  right  to  rule  is  derived  from  a  source 
outside  of  himself — he  acts  as  an  agent  and  not  aa  a 
principal. 

In  the  light  of  which  of  these  four  theories  of 

79 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

monarchy  does  the  present  King  of  Prussia  interpret 
his  status  and  powers  ? 

As  regards  his  Emperorship  there  is  no  question 
that  he  conceives  his  status  to  be  a  wholly  constitu- 
tional one,  the  origin  and  definition  of  his  imperial 
powers  being  in  the  constitution  to  which  the  govern- 
ments of  the  States  of  the  Empire  have  given  their 
consent  So  long,  however,  as  the  office  of  German 
Emperor  is  attached  to  that  of  the  Prussian  King,  the 
important  point  to  the  Empire,  as  well  as  to  the  peo- 
ple of  Prussia,  is  the  right  by  which  the  royal  power 
is  held. 

It  does  not  need  to  be  said  that  the  Prussian  King 
does  not  regard  himself  as  a  divine  being  in  the  sense 
in  which  oriental  potentates  have  been  wont  to  con- 
sider themselves,  or  as  was  involved  in  the  deification 
of  the  Roman  Cassars  during  the  later  imperial  pe- 
riod. No  statement  has  been  attributed  to  Wilhelm 
that  would  indicate  that  he  so  regards  himself,  and 
certainly  this  belief  has  no  currency  among  his 
people. 

Is  there  any  evidence  that  the  King  or  his  subjects 
accept  the  view  that  the  throne  is  held  in  fee  simple 
as  a  piece  of  private  property  ? 

During  the  sixteenth,  seventeenth,  and  eighteenth 

80 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

centuries,  when  absolute  monarchy  was  the  prevail- 
ing governmental  type  in  Europe,  the  principle  was 
very  generally  held  by  rulers,  and  acted  upon,  that 
the  people  of  a  State,  together  with  their  lands  and 
other  goods  and  chattels,  in  a  very  real  sense  be- 
longed to  the  King  and  constituted  his  patrimonium 
— they  were  his  personal  property  to  do  with  as  he 
might  see  fit. 

Thrones  were  bought  and  sold,  acquired  by  mar- 
riage or  inheritance,  and  disposed  of  by  last  will  and 
testament;  and  the  hapless  inhabitants  themselves 
were  disposed  of  and  even  sold  to  foreign  rulers  with 
no  regard  to  their  own  desires  or  welfare. 

In  his  Four  Georges,  Thackeray  tells  us  how  the 
Duke  of  Hanover  sold  to  the  seignory  of  Venice 
sixty-seven  hundred  of  his  subjects  of  whom  only 
fourteen  hundred  ever  saw  their  homes  again,  the 
proceeds  of  the  sale  being  devoted  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  royal  duke's  sensual  pleasures.  "Round  all 
that  royal  splendor,"  writes  Thackeray,  "lies  a  nation 
enslaved  and  ruined :  there  are  people  robbed  of  their 
rights — communities  laid  waste — faith,  justice,  com- 
merce trampled  upon,  and  well-nigh  destroyed — nay, 
in  the  very  center  of  royalty  itself,  what  horrible 
stains  of  meanness,  crime  and  shame!    It  is  but  to 

81 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

a  silly  harlot  that  some  of  the  noblest  gentlemen  and 
some  of  the  proudest  women  in  the  world  are  bowing 
down;  it  is  the  price  of  a  miserable  province  that 
the  King  ties  in  diamonds  round  his  mistress'  white 
neck.  In  the  first  half  of  the  last  [eighteenth]  cen- 
tury, I  say,  this  is  going  on  all  over  Europe." 

That  this  patrimonial  view  should  have  prevailed, 
is  historically  explainable.  The  entire  feudal  sys- 
tem, out  of  which  the  modern  monarchy  had  evolved, 
was  founded  upon  the  idea  that  the  ownership  of 
land  carried  with  it,  as  one  of  its  incidents,  the  right 
of  political  rulership.  When,  then,  by  a  process  of 
development,  the  king  had  obtained  a  supremacy  over 
his  feudal  lords,  when  his  "peace"  had  become  higher 
than  theirs,  and  had  extended  over  the  whole  coun- 
try, and  when  these  lords  and  those  who  in  turn 
held  of  them,  were  forced  to  concede  that  they  held 
their  lands  by  a  conditional  grant  from  the  king,  their 
liege  lord,  the  idea  that  the  Monarch  was  the  owner 
of  the  entire  realm  was  complete.  In  him  lay  the 
final  legal  title  to  all  land.  All  other  persons  had 
"tenures"  rather  than  rights  "of  ownership.  And,  as 
for  the  people  themselves,  the  idea  that  one  person 
might  be  another  person's  "man"  or  "woman"  was 
universal. 

82 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

Thus  the  entire  feudal  system  was  founded  upon 
doctrines  that  made  very  little  distinction  between 
public  and  private  law,  and  which  started  with  the 
proposition  that  ownership,  and  right  to  political 
jurisdiction,  are  complementary  ideas. 

It  is,  however,  to  be  observed,  that  the  application 
of  the  patrimonial  idea  to  political  rulership,  did  not 
necessarily  carry  with  it  the  doctrine  that  the  mon- 
arch, in  his  dealings  with  his  subjects,  was  outside  the 
realm  of  ordinary  morality,  that  is,  freed  from  the 
moral  restraints  which  humanity  and  sympathy  im- 
pose. The  theory,  however,  left  it  to  the  monarch 
himself  to  determine  in  specific  instances  what  these 
ethical  considerations  might  prescribe  or  whether 
they  should  be  heeded  at  all.  In  any  case  there  were 
no  legal  restraints,  and  the  moral  obligations  resting 
upon  the  ruler  to  seek  the  welfare  of  the  ruled  were 
those  of  generosity  and  charity,  rather  than  of  jus- 
tice implying  the  existence  of  rights  which  should  be 
regarded. 

Even  as  thus  qualified,  the  patrimonial  conception 
of  Kingship  now  seems  so  irrational  and  inhuman 
that  we  have  difficulty  in  persuading  ourselves  that 
it  was  once  so  widely  held.  And  yet,  when  we  re- 
gard the  matter  closely  it  will  be  seen  that,  after  all, 

83 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

it  is  not  essentially  dissimilar  to  that  held  at  the 
present  time  by  those  possessors  of  private  property 
who  regard  the  institution  of  private  property  as  de- 
void of  all  social  connotations,  and  look  upon  them- 
selves as  vested  with  rights  of  use  and  disposition 
the  free  exercise  of  which  should  not  be  interfered 
with.  Thus,  as  we  know,  there  are  at  the  present 
time  owners  of  large  fortunes  the  possession  of  which 
has  come  to  them  by  accident  of  inheritance,  by  the 
favoring  operation  of  law,  by  the  working  out  of 
economic  forces,  or  by  the  merest  chance,  involving 
little  if  any  desert  upon  their  own  part,  and  who 
yet  feel  themselves  free  to  use  their  wealth  as  they 
see  fit,  for  their  own  selfish  welfare  if  they  so  desire, 
and,  as  employers  of  labor,  consider  that  those  who 
work  for  them  have  no  moral  claim,  and  certainly  no 
legal  claim,  beyond  such  as  is  founded  upon  their  con- 
tracts of  employment — that  in  other  words,  anything 
beyond  this  that  they,  the  owners  and  employers,  may 
do  for  the  benefit  of  those  subject  to  their  economic 
rule,  is  an  act  of  charity  or  generosity  rather  than 
an  obligation  of  distributive  justice.  This  is  a  viewT 
happily  becoming  rapidly  less  often  held,  but  it  is 
still  sufficiently  in  evidence  to.  .make  ns  understand 
how,  before  the  Sclairdssement  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 

84 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

tury  and  the_ spread  of  democratic  ideas  in  the  field 
of  political  thought,  the  patrimonial  conception  of  V 
Kingship  could  have  found  so  general  acceptance  andj 
application.  . 

When^this  idea  disappeared  in  Germany  it  is  dif- 
ficult to  say,  hut  certainly  not  until  well  into  the 
.nineteenth  century.  We  know  that  serfdom,  and 
with  it  the  idea  that  one  person  might  belong  to 
another  person,  persisted  until  that  time,  and,  so 
long  as  this  was  so,  it  is  not  probable  that  the  tra- 
ditional patrimonial  conception  of  Kingship  was 
wholly  abandoned. 

Frederick  the  Great  gave  to  Prussia  its  first  de- 
cjsivejstart  towards  political-power.  That  he  dili- 
gently sought  to  increase  the  .prestige  and  .standing 
of  his  country  among  the  nations  of  Europe,  and  to 
this  end  was  willing  to  make  almost  any  personal 
sacrifice,  is  well  known.  He  it  was,  indeedjLwho  first 
described  himself  as  the  first  servant  of  the -State — 
Der  erste  Diener  des  Staates.  It  is  clear,  therefore, 
that  he  did  not  look  upon  his  people  as  mere  chattels 
to  be  used  for  his  own  selfish  purposes. 

And  yet  it  quite  plainly  appears  that  Frederick 
had  at  heartJ  not  so  much  the  real  happiness  and 
true  interests  of  his  people  as^  he  did  the  power  and 

85 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

prestige  of  Prussia  as  a  political  being.  That  the 
wars  which  he  waged  would  mean  suffering  and  loss 
of  life  to  his  own  subjects,  and  that  they,  individ- 
ually, would  derive  no  benefits  from  his  conquests  did 
not  deter  him  from  making  war.  Nowhere  in  his 
voluminous  writings,  nor  in  his  reported  utterances, 
have  we  evidence  that  even  the  suggestion  occurred 
to  him  that  his  people  had  any  right  to  determine 
what  their  political  destinies  should  be,  under  what 
form  of  government  they  should  live,  or  by  whom  they 
should  be  ruled. 

Frederick  lived  before  the  time  of  the  French 
Revolution,  and  not  yet  had  there  become  articulate 
these  demands  of  the  people.  Kings  regarded  their 
right  to  rule  as  something  that  needed  no  argument. 
If  we  can  conceive  of  Frederick  as  considering  thej 
matter  with  himself,  we  may  believe  that  he  hel 
himself  providentially  or  divinely  placed  upon  th 
throne.  As  is  more  likely,  however,  he  viewed  the 
question  as  having  no  religious  or  ethical  bearings. 
We  know  that  hejigldjhat  rules  of  morality,  have  no 
application  to  matters  of  State,  and  it  is  therefore 
but  reasonable  to  believe  that  he  regarded  the  fact 
that  he  was  King  as  its  own  justification,  or  rather 
as  needing^  no^  justification. 

86 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

The  successors  of  Frederick,  however,  were  no£\ 
all  such  rationalists  as  he;  and  we  know  that  some/ 
of  them,  including  Frederick  William  IV  and  Wil- 
liam I  took  pains  to  assert  that  they  derived  from 
God  their  right  to  rule. 

If,  however,  as  of  greater  present  interest,  we 
turn  to  the  theories  of  the  reigning  King  we  are  left 
in  little  doubt  as  to  the  view  he  takes  of  his  royal 
rights.  Their  divinely  derived  character  he  has,  upon 
almost  every  possible  occasion,  taken  care  to  assert. 

In  Berlin,  on  February  20,  1891,  he  said: 

"You  know  that  I  regard  my  whole  position  and  my 
mission  as  one  entrusted  to  me  by  God,  and  that  I  am 
called  upon  to  execute  the  mandates  of  a  Higher  Being  to 
whom  I  shall  hereafter  have  to  render  account. 

In  a  speach  delivered  August  25,  1910,  he  said: 

Here  [in  Konigsberg]  my  grandfather  again,  by  his 
own  right,  set  the  Prussian  crown  upon  his  head,  once 
more  distinctly  emphasizing  the  fact  that  it  was  accorded 
to  him  by  the  will  of  God  alone  .  .  .  and  that  he  looked 
upon  himself  as  the  chosen  instrument  of  heaven.  .  .  . 
Looking  upon  myself  as  the  instrument  of  the  Lord,  with- 
eut  regard  to  the  opinions  and  intentions  of  the  day,  I  go 
my  way. 

In  his  proclamation  to  the  Army  of  the  East,  im 
1914,  the  Kaiser  said: 

87 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

The  spirit  of  the  Lord  has  descended  upon  me  because 
I  am  the  Emperor  of  the  Germans.  I  am  the  instrument 
of  the  Almighty,  I  am  his  sword,  his  agent.  Woe  and 
death  to  those  who  shall  oppose  my  will.  Woe  and  death 
to  those  who  do  not  believe  in  my  mission.  Let  them 
perish,  all  the  enemies  of  the  German  people!  God  de- 
mands their  destruction,  God  who,  by  my  mouth,  bids  you 
to  do  His  will. 

The  divine  right  which  Wilhelm  thus  claims  he 
has  upon  several  occasions  taken  pains  to  defend  as 
belonging  to  him  as  the  head  of  the  Hohenzollern 
family.     In  Bremen,  on  April  21,  1890,  he  said: 

The  fact  that  we  have  been  able  to  achieve  what  has 
been  achieved  is  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  in  our 
House  the  tradition  prevails  that  we  regard  ourselves  as 
appointed  by  God,  to  reign  over  the  peoples  whom  we  have 
been  called  to  rule,  and  to  guide  them  in  accordance  with 
their  welfare  and  the  furtherance  of  their  material  and 
spiritual  interests. 

Upon  another  occasion  he  said: 

Each  of  the  Hohenzollern  princes  was  from  the  outset 
of  his  career  conscious  that  he  was  only  God's  vicegerent 
upon  earth,  that  he  would  have  to  render  an  account  of 
his  work  to  a  higher  King  and  Master,  and  that  he  must 
faithfully  perform  the  work  appointed  by  the  Almighty 
to  do. 

It  would  appear  from  these  and  other  utterances/ 
of  his  majesty,  that  he  believes  that  the  Ilohenzollerm^/ 

88 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

family  has  been  selected  from  among  the  other  mentf 
bers  ©f  the  human  race  as  instruments  of  divine 
providence  to  rule  the  Germans,  just  as  he  also  be 
lieves,  and  has  frequently  asserted,  that  the  £}ermansv 
have  been  selected  out  from  among  the  other  racesl 
of  mankind  to  spread  Kultur  and  political  salvation) 
to  the  remainder  of  the  world.  Thus  he,  Wilhelm, 
evidently  believes  that  he  gains  his  personal  indi- 
vidual right  to  rule  because  ho  is  a  Hohenzollern, 
and  the  heir  to  the  throne  of  his  ancestors,  as  marked 
out  by  the  rules  of  hereditary  descent  that  prevail 
in  his  family.  And  this,  of  course  means,  logically, 
that  this  particular  method  of  reckoning  descent  has 
direct  divine  approval.  For  the  marks  or  criteria 
which  apodictically  indicate  that  the  Hohenzollera 
family  have  this  divine  mission,  there  is  no  firmer 
foundation  advanced  than  the  fact  that  the  course 
of  history  has  so  indicated. 

The  fact  is,  however,  that  in  none  of  his-utter-  \ 
ances  does  there  appear  a  trace  of  the  olcj, patrimonial | 
idea  of  Kingship.     Wilhelm  regards,  himself  aa.  a 
trustee,  divmely^jmointed,  rather  than  as  an  owner 
of  Prussia  and  its  people. 

To  just  what  extent  the  divine  right  doctrine  of 

89 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  monarchy,  and  of  the  Hohenzollern  family  to  the 
throne  of  Prussia,  prevails  generally  in  Prussia  it  is 
difficult  to  say.  Certain  it  is  that  it  finds  no  em- 
phatic support  in  the  writings  of  the  present-day  Ger- 
man political  philosophers  and  constitutional  jurists ; 
and  yet,  upon  the  other  hand,  we  find  practically  no 
formal  adverse  criticisms  of  it.  This  remarkable  si- 
lence upon  this  point  would  possibly  indicate  that 
the  scientific  mind  is  not  able  to  accept  it,  but  that 
for  prudential  or  other  reasons  it  is  thought  best 
not  to  criticize  it. 

As  possibly  throwing  some  light  upon  this  profes- 
sional reticence  is  the  incident  referred  to  by  Mr. 
Dawson,  a  well-known  authority  on  conditions  in 
Germany. 

In  1902  [he  says]  the  Breslau  Professor  of  Jurispru- 
dence, Dr.  W.  Sehiicking,  in  the  course  of  a  lecture  on  the 
question  whether  the  succession  to  the  throne  could  be 
regulated  by  law,  remarked  that  he  would  "pass  orer  the 
doctrine  of  monarchy  by  God's  grace  as  being  a  non- 
juristic  question."  He  was  denounced  by  a  hearer — a 
fact  which  tells  its  own  tale — in  a  Berlin  conservative 
newspaper,  and  soon  after  received  a  warning  from  the 
Minister  of  Education  containing  the  reminder  that  "he 
might  teach  what  he  wished,  but  he  must  always  reckon 
with  the  possibility  of  his  services  being  no  longer  re- 
quired."   Later  interferences  with  his  liberty  led  this  inde- 

90 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

pendent-minded  teacher  to  leave  Prussia  for  one  of  the 
more  tolerant  German  States.1 

The  most  specific  discussion  that  I  have  found 
upon  the  Kaiser's  claim  to  divine  right  is  that  of 
Dr.  Otto  Hintze,  Professor  of  History  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Berlin.  Writing  since  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  he  denies  that  the  German  people  now  ac- 
cept such  exalted  conceptions  as  those,  for  example, 
of  Frederick  William  IV.  In  criticizing  the  utter- 
ances of  the  present  Kaiser,  he  says  that  they  are 
without  significance  from  the  standpoint  of  consti- 
tutional law — which  no  one  that  I  know  has  ever  as- 
serted— and  then  gives  the  following  interpretation 
of  what  is  believed  upon  this  point.  "Our  rulers," 
Professor  Hintze  says,  "declare  themselves  to  be 
such  'by  the  Grace  of  God.'  The  meaning  of  this 
characterization  from  the  viewpoint  of  political  law 
is  simply  that  the  royal  power  was  not  granted  by 
the  people,  but  that  it  exists  upon  ancient,  historical 
right  that  has  grown  and  refined  coincident  with  our 
history,  thus  proceeding  from  a  combination  of  fac- 
tors which  piety  may  be  inclined  to  ascribe  to  a 

higher  dispensation."  2 

1  Dawson,  "What  Is  Wrong  with  Germany?"  p.  64. 
'Treitschke,  in  his  Politics   (I,  58)    Bays:     "The  claim  to 
rule  *by  the  grace  of  God'  is  no  more  than  a  devout  aspiration 

91 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

If  this  be  a  fair  statement  of  the  scientific  posi- 
tion, as  held  in  the  higher  institutions  of  learning, 
we  may  have  little  doubt  that  when  we  descend  to 
popular  opinion  the  opinion  is  general,  except  of 
course  among  the  Social  Democrats — a  very  con- 
siderable, but  as  yet  politically  uncontrolling  ex- 
ception— that  the  King  does  rule  by  a  divine  delega- 
tion of  authority. 

One  thing  is  clear.     The  claim  by  the  King  that) 
/   the  right  to  rule  comes  to  him  as  from  God,  and  with\. 
responsibility  for  its  exercise  only  to  Him,  neces- \ 

which  does  not  attempt  to  formulate  a  mystical  and  spiritual 
right  to  power,  but  simply  to  assert  that  the  insorutable  will 
of  Providence  has  decreed  the  elevation  of  a  particular  family 
above  its  rivals.  Piety  is  a  fundamental  requirement  in  a 
monarch,  since  the  notion  that  he  stands  immeasurably  above 
all  other  men  may  actually  unsettle  his  reason,  if  it  be  not 
balanced  by  personal  humility  which  compels  him  to  acknowl- 
edge himself  God's  instrument.  AH  this  does  not  abrogate  the 
axiom  that  it  is  the  nature  and  aim  of  monarchy  to  be  of  this 
world.  Genuine  monarchy  does  not  aspire  to  partnership 
with  the  Almighty.  On  the  other  hand,  monarchy  stands  op- 
posed to  republicanism.  In  a  republic  authority  is  founded 
upon  the  will  of  the  governed,  while  in  a  monarchy  it  is  de- 
rived from  the  historical  claim  of  a  particular  family,  and 
concentrated  in  the  will  of  one  man  who  wears  the  crown,  and 
who,  though  surrounded  by  more  or  less  responsible  advisers, 
ultimately  decides  every  question  himself." 

The  recognition  by  Treitschke  of  the  Providential  element  of 
course  gives  to  monarchy  and  to  the  reigning  family  a  supra- 
rational  or  transcendental  basis  of  right. 

92 


THE  PRUSSIAN  THEORY  OF  MONARCHY 

sarily  carries  with  it  a  denial  that  his  people  have 
an  inherent,  or  natural,  or  ethical  right  to  determine 
either  the  form  of  government  under  which  they  are 
to  live  or  who  shall  be  in  supreme  direction  of  it. 
As  a  matter  of  logic  it  ..also  jfollows  that,  they  have 
no  right  of  their  own  to  dictate  to  their  monarch 
thojDolicies  he  shall  adopt,  or  the  manner  in  which 
or  the  forms- tli rnngh  which  they  shqll  be  executed. 
Th_exe_J^_JiQt__excluded7  however,  the  idea._that  he 
may,  as  a  matter  of  personal  grace,  movedjihereto  by 
dictates  of  expediency,  grant  to  the,  governed  the 
privilege  of  making  known  through  their  elected  rep- 
resentatives their  opinion  as  to  what  action  upon  his 
part  their  own  welfare  demands.  But  that  they 
should  be  permitted  to  issue  a  mandat  imperatif  to 
him  is  made  logically  impossible. 


CHAPTER  V 

PBUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

In  republics  the  principle  is  fundamental  that  all 
powers  of  the  government  are  derived  by  grant  from 
the  people.  This  principle,  though  not  essential  to, 
'is  nevertheless  not  inconsistent  with,  the  maintenance 
of  monarchical  rule.     It  is  inconsistent  only  with  the 

Si 

doctrine  that  the  King  rules  by  reason  of  an  original 
personal  right,  and  that  he  possesses  other  than  dele- 
gated powers. 

That  all  public  authority  is  derived  from  the  peo- 
ple is  accepted  in  the  constitutional  system  of  Bel- 
gium, its  constitution,  dating  from  1831,  declaring 
that  "all  powers  emanate  from  the  people,"  and  are 
to  "be  exercised  in  the  manner  established  by  the 
constitution."  Care  is  also  taken  to  provide  that  the 
executive  powers  vested  in  the  King  shall  be  "sub- 
ject to  the  regulations  of  the  constitution." 

In  Great  Britain,  if  we  have  regard  only  to  legal 
theory  as  distinct  from  actual  practice,  the  Crown 
is  viewed  as  the  organ  of  government  in  which  sover- 

94 


PRUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

eignty  inheres.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  term 
"Crown"  is  here  used  as  the  name  of  an  office  or 
organ  of  the  government  and  not  the  term  "King"j 
or  "Monarch";  for,  since/1688,  the  constitutional 
principle  has  been  established  that  the  people  through  . 
their  representatives  in  Parliament  may  determine 
who  shall  be  entitled  to  occupy  the  throne.  Thus 
King  George  of  England  lays  no  claim  to  other  than 
a  parliamentary  title.  And,  furthermore,  it  is  rec- 
ognized as  a  matter  of  constitutional  practice  that 
the  representatives  of  the  people  may  withdraw  from 
the  Crown  any  of  the  independent  or  so-called  prerog- 
ative rights  which  it  still  has,  and  that,  even  as  to 
the  rights  still  retained,  they  must  in  every  case,  in 
practice,  be  exercised  at  the  direction  of  the  King's  / 
Ministers,  who  are  held  politically  responsible  to 
Parliament  for  the  directions  which  they  may  givey 

JlLslfect Jthen,  so  far  as  the  substance  is  concerned,\ 
thejrovernment  of  Great  Britain  is  as  subject  to  the 
popular  will  as  are  the  governments  of  the  republics 
of  Prance  and  the  United  States.  There  are,  indeed, 
not  a  few  who  assert  that  t^o4igh^lhe_Qpfiration  of 
her  system  of  cabinet  control  the  British  government 
is  more  responsive  to  the  will  of  the  people  than  is  the 
government  of  the  United  States. 

95 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

In  Italy  also  the  parliamentary  system  has  devel- 
oped which  brings  the  control  of  the  acts  of  the  King 
under  the  control  of  his  Ministers,  who  are  responsi- 
ble to  the  elected  representatives  of  the  people, 
f  In  sharp  contrast,  as  regards  both  constitutional 
theory  and  constitutional  practice,  stands  the  mon- 
archical systems  of  the  States  of  Germany,1  and  es- 
pecially that  of  Prussia.  In  accordance  with  the 
conceptions  which  have  been  discussed  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter,  these  systems  of  constitutional  juris- 

.  prudence  have  been  built  up.     The  JPrussiaji..gov- 

i 

\  ernment  is  a  constitutional  government  in  the  sense 
!  that  the  jurisdiction  of  its  various  organs  and  officials, 
)  including  the  King,  are  legally  defined  and  the  in- 
\  dividualjprotected  against  official  acts  for  which  no 
I  legal  warrant  exi_sts.     Upon  this  score  no  reproach 
lies  against  the  Prussian  monarchy.    It  may  indeed 
be  true  that  the  control  exercised  by  the  government 
over  the  lives  of  its  subjects  is  a  rigorous  and  pater- 
nalistic one,  and  that  there  is  no  sphere  of  individual 
liberty  constitutionally  secured  against  governmental 
invasion,  such  as  exists  in  the  United  States,  but 
ultra  vires  or  otherwise  illegal  or  purely  arbitrary 

1  Excepting  of  course  the  "free  cities"  of  Liibeck,  Bremen  and 
Hamburg. 

96 


PRUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

acts  upon  the  part  of  public  officiate  is  as  little  and 
perhaps  less  known  in  Prussia  than  in  our  own  coun- 
try. Prussia's  government  is  one  of  law  and  not  of 
unregulated  individual  caprice. 

The  Prussian  King^  then,  governs  in  accordance 
with  methods  prescribe.dJ>Xth£-Constitution,  and  this 
means  that  he  may  promulgate  as  laws  only  those 
measures  which  Jhave  received  the  approval  of  his 
legislature,  one  branch  of  which  is  selected  by  a  more 
or  less  numerous  electorate  to  represent  the  wishes 
and  interests  of  the  people.  Nenejhe  less,  as_a  con- 
stitutional principle,  in  accordance  with  his  claim 
of  personal  right  to  the  throne,  he  is  regarded  as  the 
sole  fountain  and  source  of  all  law  and  political  au- 
thority, and  the  sole  bearer  and  exerciser  of  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  State,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
he  may,  by  the  grant  of  a  written  constitution,  have 
posited  for  himself  certain  forms  in  conformity  with 
which  his  powers  are  to  be  exercised,  and  agreed  that 
in  the  determination  of  certain  policies  he  will  take 
no  action  without  the  approval  of  a  majority  of  rep- 
resentatives who  are  elected  by  the  people,  or  at  least, 
by  a  certain  fairly  large  part  of  them.  The  written 
constitution  of  Prussia  in  which  this  undertaking  is 
embodied,  may  have  been,  as  a  matter  of  practical 

97 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

f  fact,  extorted  from  the  King  by  popular  pressure ; 
\  but,  legally  viewed,  it  is  an  emanation  from  his  sov- 
ereign will.  It  is  granted  or  "octroyed"  by_him,  and 
not  established  by  the  people;  and  this  is  shown  by 
its  phraseology,  the  preamble  beginning  with  the 
words,  "We,  Frederick  "William,  by  the  Grace  of 
God,  King  of  Prussia,  etc.,  hereby  declare  and  make 
known,  etc." 
/  That  since,  as  welLas  Jbefore,  th£ugranting  of  the 
)eonstitution,  the_  King__remains-  the  embodiment-of 
'  sovereign  power,  is  the  consensus  of  German  jur- 
ists. "He  possesses  the  whole  and  undivided  power 
of  the  State  in  all  its  plenitude,"  says  Schulze  in 
his  Preussisches  Staatsrecht  "It  would  therefore  be 
contrary  to  the  nature  of  the  monarchical  constitu- 
tional law  of  Germany,"  he  continues,  "to  enumerate 
all  individual  powers  of  the  King,  or  to  speak  of 
royal  prerogative.  .  .  .  His  sovereign  right  em- 
braces, on  the  contrary,  all  branches  of  the  govern- 
ment. Everything  which  is  decided  or  carried  out 
in  the  State  takes  place  in  the  name  of  the  King. 
\*^        He  is  the  personified  power  of  the  State." 


To  the  same  effect  is  the  statement  of  von  Ronne 
in  his  standard  treatise  on  Preussisches  Staatsrecht. 
"As  in  constitutional  monarchies  in  general,"  he  says, 

98 


PRUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

"so  in  the  Prussian  State,  the  right  of  the  supreme 
direction  of  the  State  belongs  exclusively  to  the  King 
as  its  head,  and  no  act  of  government  may  be  per- 
formed without  his  assent  or  against  his  will.  All 
the  prerogatives  of  the  State  are  united  in  his  person, 
and  his  will  is  supreme,  the  officials  being  only  or- 
gans through  which  he  acts.  The  constitution,  it  is 
true,  does  not  expressly  set  forth  these  principles, 
but  they  have  been  already  legally  formulated  in 
the  Prussian  law,  and  are,  moreover,  A-Hficassary^ 
consequence  resulting  from  the  very  nature  of  mon-/ 

archy"  ' 

Especially  significant  also,  is  the  statement  of  the\ 

Constitution  itself  (Article  108)  that  "a.aweaxingjn  /  ap^u 
of  the  army  upon  the  Constitution  does  not  take   " 
ulace."    The  army's  allegiance,  in  other  words,  is  di-  j 
rectly  to  the  King.    And  even  in  the  Constitution  of 
the  Empire,  it  is  provided  that  "soldiers  shall  ren- 
der unconditional  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  Em- 
peror."    (Article  64.) 
It  will  be  noted  that  both  Schulze  and  von  Ronne 

"These  two  passages  are  quoted  by  Professor  Harvey  L. 
Robinson  in  the  historical  and  analytical  note  prefixed  to  his 
translation  of  the  Prussian  Constitution,  published  as  a  sup- 
plement to  the  September,  1894,  issue  of  the  Annals  of  tKa 
American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science. 

99 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

/  say  that  a  limitation  of  the  sovereign^owers  jpf  the 
)  King  would  be  contrary  to  the  very  idea  of  monarchy 
(_as  it  is  held  in  Germany.  This  is  in  agreement  with 
the  doctrine  of  Kant  metaphysically  arrived  at.  In 
his  "Philosophy  of  Law,"  he  declares  that  the  very 
nature  of  government  is  such  that  the  executive  func- 
tion of  the  supreme  ruler  should  be  regarded  as  irre- 
sistible. He  denies  that  resistance  to  royal  oppres- 
sion is  ever  justified.  "If,"  he  says,  "the  ruler  or 
regent  as  the  organ  of  the  supreme  power  proceeds 
in  violation  of  the  laws  .  .  .  the  subject  can  inter- 
pose complaints  and  objections  to  this  injustice,  but 
not  active  resistance"  (p.  175).  And  a  little  later 
on  he  says:  "There  cannot  even  be  an  article  con- 
tained in  the  political  constitution  that  would  make 
it  possible  for  a  power  in  that  State,  in  case  of  trans- 
gression of  the  constitutional  laws  by  the  supreme 
authority,  to  resist  or  even  to  restrict  it  in  any  way." 
Thus  we  find  it  stated  not  merely  as  an  advisable 
principle  of  constitutional  law  that  the  King  should 
j  be  above  the  law,  but  as  metaphysically  involved  in 
'^e  very  idea  of  political  rule. 

In  truth,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  a  written  con- 
stitution has  not  in  German  public  law  that  su- 
premacy over  ordinary  statute  law  which  is  ascribed 

100 


PRUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

to  it  by  American  constitutional  jurists,  and  in  this 
respect  the  German  theory  has  tended  during  the 
last  fifty  years  to  become  increasingly  pronounced. 
The  leading  commentator  upon  German  constitu- 
tional law  is  undoubtedly  Dr.  Paul  Laband.  In  his 
Staatsrecht  des  deutschen  Reichs,  he  writes  as  fol- 
lows: 

"There  is  no  will  in  the  state  superior  to_  that  of 
the  sovereign,  and  it  is  from  this  will  that  both  the 
constitution  an^Iaws  jiraw their  binding  force.  The  \  ;/o  /< 
constitution  is  not  a  mystical  power  hovering  above 
the  state;  but,  like  every  other  law,  it  is  an  act  of  its 
will,  subject,  accordingly,  to  the  consequences  of 
changes  in  the  latter.  A  document  may,  it  is  true, 
prescribe  that  the  constitution  may  not  be  altered  in- 
directly (that  is  to  say,  by  laws  affecting  its  content), 
that  it  may  be  altered  only  directly  by  laws  modify- 
ing the  text  itself.  But  when  such  a  restriction  is 
not  established  by  positive  rule,  it  cannot  be  derived 
by  implication  from  the  legal  character  of  the  con- 
stitution and  from  an  essential  difference  between  the 
constitution  and  ordinary  laws.  The  doctrine  that 
individual  laws  ought  always  to  be  in  harmony  with 

the  constitution,  and  that  they  must  not  be  incom- 

■- —     i  - 
patible  with  it,  is  simply  a  postulate  ofjlegislative 

101 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

/"practice.  It  is  not  a  legal  axiom.  Although  it  ap- 
pears desirable  that  the  system  of  public  and  private 
laws  established  by  statute  shall  not  be  in  contradic- 
tionjvsdth  the  text  of  the  constitution,  the  existence 
of  such  a  contradiction  is  possible  in  fact  and  admis- 
sible in  law,  as  a  divergence  between  the  penal,  com- 
mercial, or  civil  code  and  a  subsequent  special  law 
is  possible."  x 

If  one  wishes  to  see  how  far  apart  our  own  consti- 
tutional  theory  is  from  that  of  the  Germans,  one  may 
compare  with  these  views  of  Laband  the  words  of 
Chief  Justice  Marshall  delivered  in  the  famous  case 
of  Marbury  v.  Madison,  in  1803,  in  which  he  fixed 
once_f or  all  in  our  jurisprudence  the  doctrine  that  no 
measure  enacted  even  by  Congress  itself  will  receive 
judicial  recognition  or  enforcement  if  its  substance 
cannot  be  harmonized  with  the  provisions  of  our  na- 
tional constitution. 

It  follows  from  the  Prussian  constitutional_con- 
ception  that  the  part  played  by  the  elected  representa- 
tives of  the  people  in  the  enactment  of  laws  and  in 
the  adoption  of  public  policies  is  one  quite  different 
f  rom  thaTwhich  is  played  incountries  whose  consti- 

*  Quoted  by  Borgeaud — Adoption  and  Amendment  of  Consti- 
tutions (Eng.  trans.),  68. 

102 


PRUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

tutional  systems  are  founded  upon  a  democratic  basis. 
According  to  the  doctrine  almost,  if  not  quite,  unani- 
mously held  by  German  jurists,  the  people  through 
their  representatives  participate,  not  in  the  creation 
of  law,  but  in  the  determination  of  the  contents  of 
a  proposition  which  is  to  be  submitted  to  the  sover- 
eignjor  the  exercise  of  his  supreme  legislative  will. 
And  not  until  that  will  has  been  approvingly  exer- 
cised does  the  measure  become  legally  executory 
(Gesetzbefehl) .  Essentially  speaking,  then,  the  situ- 
ation ^s.  this :  The  ruler,  as  a  matter  of  grace  and  ex- 
pediency, is  pleased  to  learn  the  wishes  of  his  people 
regarding  a  proposition  of  law  or  the  adoption  of  a 
public  policy  and  to  obtain  such  information  regard- 
ing its  wisdom  as  a  representative  chamber  is  able  to 
provide;  and  these  wishes  and  this  information  he 
necessarily  takes  into  consideration  in  determining 
the  exercise  of  his  own  sovereign  will.  But  never 
does  he  regard  these  factors  as  controlling  in  any  af- 
firmative sense.  So  long  as  the  constitution  which 
he  has  promulgated  exists,  he  agrees  not  to  act  con- 
trary to  its  provisions  with  regard  to  the  matters 
which  are  therein  specified.  But  not  for  a  moment 
does  the  German  ruler  admit  himself  to  be  under  a 
legal  or  even  a  moral  obligation  to  give  effect  to  an 

103 


\ 


tfv  i 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

expression  of  the  will  of  the  representatives  of  the 
people  of  which  he  disapproves. 

It  is  this  relationship  in  which  the  King  stands 
to  his  popularly  elected  legislative  chambers  which 
interprets  many  features  of  German  public  life 
which  seem  strange  to  English  and  American  ob- 

.  ^servers.  It  explains,  in  the  first  place,  the  fact  that 
it  is  considered  a  moral  and  wholly  justifiable  prac- 
tice for  the  King  and  his  personal  advisers — "the 
Government"  as  they  are  called — to  control,  so  far 
as  they  are  able,  not  only  the  elections  of  members 

\  to  the  representative  body,  but  Jby  rewards  and,  other 

/  forms  of  political  pressure_lo  influence  Ibejzatea  of 
the  representatives  after  their  election.  It  explains 
furthermore  the  policy  of  the  "Government"  in  play- 
ing off  one  party  or  faction  against  another  and  thus 
through  the  bloc  system  of  obtaining  a  majority  vote 
in  favor  of  action  which  the  Government  desires.  It 
explains  also  the  fact  that  scarcely  the  first  steps 
have  been  taken  in  Germany  in  the  development  of 
responsible  parliamentary  government  whether  of 
/the  English  or  theJFrench  type.     It  is  indeed  jficpg- 

1  nized  by  all  of  their  publicists  thatMsueh  a  system  is 

absolutely  incompatible  with,  the  German  conception 

,of  monarchical  power.     It  is  true  that  irritation  at 

104 


PRUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

times  intense  in  character,  has  been  felt  and  ex- 
pressed against  the  assumption  by  the  Emperor  of 
the  right  to  direct  and  control  foreign  affairs  by 
his  own  personal  acts  and  words;  but  this  has  been, 
not  because  this  has  been  in  derogation  of  the  power 
of  the  representatives  of  the  people  or  of  a  ministry 
which  they  support,  but  because,  as  has  been  earlier 
said,  under  the  imperial  constitution,  he  is  required 
to  act  through  his  Chancellor,  who  in  turn  is  sup- 
posed to  exercise  his  power  in  and  through  the  Bun- 
desrath,  which  body  in  turn  represents  the  "Govern- 
ments" of  the  several  States  of  the  Empire.  Since 
the  downfall  of  Bismarck,  and  especially  since  the 
retirement  of  his  successor  Caprivi,  the  Emperor  has 
selected  as  his  Chancellor  and  President  of  the  Prus- 
sian Ministerium  men  who  have  been  willing  in  very 
large  measure  to  subordinate  their  own  wills  and 
judgments  to  that  of  their  imperial  master,  and  thus, 
in  fact,  the  influence  of  the  Emperor  has  been  very 
great,  especially  in  foreign  affairs. 

The  monarchical  conception  in  Germany  explains, 
still  further,  the  right  which  is  freely  exercised  by 
the  "Government,"  of  dissolving  the  elected  chamber 
when  other  methods  of  obtaining  its  support  for  a 
government  measure  have  failed ;  and,  it  may  be  said, 

105 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ao  powerful  is  the  official  influence  exerted  in  the 
ensuing  election,  that  in  all  cases  the  result  has  been 
that  the  newly  chosen  chamber  was  of  the  desired 
political  complexion. 
^     Von  Biilow,  in  his  Imperial  Germany,  complains 
that  the  Germans  lack  political-ability,  by  which,  as 
he  explains,  they  show  a  disposition  to  form  ^multi- 
tude of  minQiL_Pjarties  based,  not  .jm-hroaiL  public 
principles  but  UjioiiJaarrQw^particularistic,  and  per- 
son pi  interests.     It  would  seem,  however,  that  thi3 
failure  of  two  or  more,  strong  political  parties  to 
develop  has  been  due  in  no  small  measure  to  the  .at- 
titude which   tjie^^overnment"    assumes  towards 
all  political  parties.  JThejme  strong  political  party — 
the_SociaL_Democrats — which  has  been  formed  in 
German    imperial   politics,    is_^ron^_in_jQujnbers 
rather  than  in  influence,  and,  moreover,  occupies  a 
very  particular  position,  for,  as  Von  Biilow  frankly 
says,  it  has,  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  "Government," 
no  right  to  exist    He  ,flatly-stigmatizes_iis.  jnembers 
as_enemiea l  of_  the  J^erman  State — enemies  for  the 
overthrow  of  whom  any  means,  including  force  when 
necessary,  may  rightfully  be  employed.1     As  to  the 

1  These  statements  are  discreetly  omitted  by  the  former 
Chancellor  from  the  second  edition  of  his  work,  issued  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war. 

106 


PRUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

reasons  why  the  Social  Democrats  are  held  in  snch 
peculiar  detestation  by  the  "Government,"  shortly 
stated,  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  not  so  much  their 
legislative  program  which  is  disapproved  of  as  it  is 
that  their  fundamental  political  doctrines  are  in  con- 
flict with  the  monarchical  conception  of  the  Empire 
and  of  Prussia.  This  is  made  abundantly  clear  by 
reading  between  the  lines  of  Von  Biilow's  book. 

Finally,  it  may  be  said  that  the  monarchical  con- 
ception in  Germany  explains  the  open  and  avowed 
measures  which  are  taken  by  the  ruling  authorities 
to  control  the  formation  and  expression  of  a  popular 
opinion  with  regard  to  matters  of  public  policy.  Not 
only  is  there  kept  a  strict  control  over  unofficial  ex- 
pressions in  the  press,  as  the  numerous  prosecutions 
for  lese-majeste  testify,  but,  and  more  especially*  gov- 
ernmentally  inspired  articles  are  constantly  published 
in  the  leading  newspapers  in  order  that  the  people 
shall  be  led  to  take  a  favorable  view  regarding  pub- 
lic policies  which  are  approved  by  the  "Government" 

In  order  to  make  this  point  clear  we  may  quote 
the  words  of  Dr.  Hasbach  taken  from  an  essay  en- 
titled "The  Essence  of  Democracy,"  *  in  which  he 

*  Published  in  the  American  Political  Science  Review,  Feb- 
ruary, 1915.  This  article  was  called  out  by  a  review  of  his 
volume  Die  Mod-erne  Democratic,  published  in  1912. 

107 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

r  discussed  the  function  which  public  opinion  should 
play    in   the   modern    constitutional    State.      "Who 
forms  public  opinion?"  he  asks.     "In  a  democracy 
and  a  parliamentary  monarchy   (such  as  exists  in 
England),  it  is  created  exclusively  by  parties;  in  a 
constitutional  monarchy  (as  known  in  the  German 
States)   on  the  other  hand,  by  parties  and  govern- 
\ment.     For  a  full  understanding  of  this  important 
/  difference  we  first  must  clearly  distinguish  between 
parliamentary  and  constitutional  monarchy.    In  par- 
liamentary monarchy  the  influence  of  the  monarch  is 
as  a  matter  of  fact  so  far  suppressed  that  here  too  the 
stronger  party  opinion  determines  the  destiny  of  the 
/^country,  while  in _the  constitutional  monarchy  the 
\  prince  as  joint  possessor  of  the  legislative  power,  and 
j  as  the  possessor  of  the  executive,  exercises  a  con- 
"N  siderable  influence  upon  the  formation  of  publicapin- 
/  ion.    The  ministers  nominated  by  him  introduce  bills 
into  parliament;  they  defend  them  against  the  criti- 
cism of  representatives  whom  they  are  compelled  to 
face;  the  prince  addresses  messages  to  parliament; 
he  can  dissolve  it  and  thereby  take  a  position  on 
definite  questions;  official  newspapers  defend  the  at- 
titude of  the  government;  party  organs  which  ap- 
prove the  policy  of  the  government  support  it  or  open 

108 


PRUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

their  columns  to  it;   the  government  seeks  to  in- 
fluence representatives,  etc." 

"There  are  methods,"  Dr.  Hasbach  continues, 
"some  of  which  are  also  understood  in  America;  in 
America  the  President  addresses  messages  to  Con- 
gress; presidents  and  governors  attempt  to  influence 
the  legislative  power;  there  are  also  newspapers 
which  support  the  President  and  governors  against 
the  legislative  assemblies  if  they  consider  the  former's 
policies  advantageous."  This,  it  may  be  answered, 
is  true,  but  the  important  fact  to  be  observed  is  that 
in  America  the  President  and  the  governors  of  the 
States  are  themselves  the  leaders  of  their  parties  and 
are  representatives  of  the  people.  The  stronger  pub- 
lic opinion  which  thus  finds  expression  in  state  ac- 
tion is  therefore  a  popular  opinion  and  is  not  one 
which  is  largely  determined  by  the  judgment  of  per- 
sons who  are  not  responsible  to  the  people  and  who 
only  in  a  purely  fictitious  sense  can  be  said  to  rep- 
resent them. 

In  summary  then,  we  may  ask,  what  is  conceived 
to  be  the  part  which  the  elected  representatives  of 
the  German  people  are  called  upon  to  play  in  the^ 
operation  of  the  government?  Their  function  is  a 
four-fold  one:    (1)    They  constitute  an   avenue   of 

T69™ 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

information  through  which  the  "Government" — the 
King  and  his  advisers — may  learn  regarding  the 
economic  and  social  conditions  of  the  people,  and 
their  desires;  (2)  they  constitute  an  organ  of  ad- 
vice, — that  is, (the  representatives,  individually,  or 
through  their  collective  wisdom,  give  what  amounts 
to  advice  to  those  in  authority)  (3)  they  criticize  the 
acts  of  the  government,  bring  its  acts,  or  many  of 
them  at  least,  to  the  bar  of  public  opinion;  (4)  they 
have  a  veto  power  over  the  matters  enumerated  in 
the  constitution.  This_y^toJtheyJ.jcan  exercise  by 
refusing,  by  a  majority  vote,  to  approve  legislative 
propositions  laid  before  them  by  the  King.  But, 
even  in  this  negative  sense,  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
they  cannot  prevent  the  execution  of  any  laws  al- 
ready enacted  by  refusing  to  approve  the  necessary 
appropriations. 

This  last  constitutional  doctrine  needs  some  ex- 
planation. 

It  is  true  that  the  Prussian  constitution  declares 
that  all  income  and  expenditure  must  be  estimated 
in  advance  and  included  in  a  budget  that  must  be 
annually  adopted  by  a  statute  (Art.  99)  ;  and  that 
"taxes  and  requisitions  for  the  State's  treasury  may 
only  be  raised  so  far  as  they  are  included  in  the 

110 


PRUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

State's  budget  or  provided  for  by  special  statute" 
(Art.  100) ;  and  that  a  substantially  similar  pro- 
vision is  contained  in  the  Imperial  Constitution  (Art. 
69).  But,  as  is  well  known,  during  the  four  years 
from  1862  to  1866  the  Prussian  Government  was 
carried  on  in  defiance  of  the  legislature  which  had 
refused  to  vote  the  necessary  appropriations,  and 
this  was  defended  as  constitutionally  permissible  by 
the  eminent  jurist,  Rudolf  von  Gneist,  whose  views 
have  since  been  accepted  by  most  of  the  later  public 
law  writers  of  Germany.  This  constitutional  jus- 
tification, as  is  pointed  out  by  Professor  W.  J.  Shep- 
ard,  in  an  able  article,1  is  founded  upon  two  distinc- 
tions  which  German  jurists  consider  fundamental,/ 
namely,  that  between  "law"  and  "ordinance,"  anc 
that  between  "material"  and  "formal^  acts  of  ^gov- 
ernment.  "Material"  refers  to  the  contents  of  a 
measure;  and  "formal"  refers  to  its  external  or  out- 
ward form.  "A  material  law  is  an  act  of  government 
which  embodies  some  general  norm  or  rule  of  con- 
duct; a  material  ordinance  is  one  which  applies  a 
general  rule  in  a  particular  case,  or  provides  the  ma- 
chinery for  the  application  of  the  general  norm.    The 

*"The  German  Doctrine  of  the  Budget,"  in  the  American 
Political  Science  Review,  February,  1910  (vol.  IV,  p.  52). 

Ill 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

formulation  of  material  law  is  legislation;  that  of 
ordinances  is  administration." 

Applying^  these  ^i^tmc^nms^jto  the  matter  of  ap- 
propriations, it  is  held  that  the  budget  is_§_]aw_2nly 
in  a  formal  _sense ;  materially,  that  is,  essentially, 
it  is  an  ordinance.  This  is  significant  since  it  is  held 
that  ajnerely  formal  law  cannot  repeal  or  render  of 
no  effect  a  material  law.  The  refusal,  therefore,  to 
pass  a  budget  cannot  operate  to  render _  inoperative 
such  material  laws  jas  _are_  already  uponjthe.  .statute 
books.  These  can  be  repealed  only  by  the  joint  ac- 
\  tion  of  all  the  organs  of  government  by  which  they 
\  were  enacted,  that  is,  by  the  two  legislative  cham- 
bers and  the  king.  An  attempt,  therefore,  upon  the 
part  of  one  or  even  of  both  of  the  legislative  chambers 
to  use  its  refusal  to  pass  the  budget  in  order  to  force 
certain  policies  upon  the  executive  is  not  only  a  vain 
but  a  culpable  act.  If  then,  they  do  make  the  at- 
tempt, as  in  fact  they  did  during  the  years  1862-1866, 
it  is  morally  obligatory  upon  those  in  executive  power 
to  carry  on  the  government,  to  continue  to  enforce  the 
existing  revenue  laws,  and  to  make  the  expenditures 
required  for  enforcing  all  other  laws. 

All  of  this  reasoning  is,  of  course,  dependent  upon 
the  fundamental  assumption,  earlier  mentioned,  that 

112 


PRUSSIAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY 

the  legislative  body  is  not  possessed  of  the  decisive) 
power  in  the  State,  but  that  this  authority  is  vestedi 
in  the_King.     It  is  true  that  the  Prussian  "Govern-^ 
ment"  later  obtained  from  the  legislature  an  act  of  in- 
demnity for  its  acts  during  the  period  1862-1866; 
but  by  the  "Government"  this  has  been  interpreted 
as  a  concession  upon  the  part  of  the  legislature  that 
the  Government's  acts  had  been  justified,  and  not 
as  an  admission  upon  the  part  of  the  King  and  his 
ministers  that  they  had  done  acts  which  needed  to 
be  retrospectively  legalized.     At  any  rate,  the  re- 
sult is  that,  as  a  constitutional  as  well  as  a  political 
doctrine,  it  is  held  in  Germany  that  the  control  of 
the  legislature  over  the  public  purse  is  a  qualified 
and  not  an  absolute  one. 

The  function  which  the  chambers  perform  in  the 
creation  of  law  is  thus  limited  to  the  vetoing  of  prop- 
ositions of  new  law  of  which  they  disapprove.  And 
even  as  to  the  new  law  which  is  approved  by  them, 
the  constitutional  theory  is  that  the  part  played  by 
the  chambers  in  its  establishment  is  limited  to  a 
participation  in  the  determination  of  the  substance  or 
material  content  of  the  law.  That  which  gives  legal 
life  and  force  to  this  substance  is  the  wlil  of  the  King 

113 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

as  manifested  by  his  promulgation  of  the  project  in 
his  name  as  law.  And  it  does  not  need  to  be  said 
that  the  King  is  at  all  times  free  to  refuse  to  promul- 
gate propositions  which  have  received  the  assent  of 
the  chambers. 


CHAPTER  VI 


Prussia's  constitutional  system 


In  the  preceding  chapter  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples upon  which  the  Prussian  constitutional  sys- 
tem rests  were  discussed.  In  the  present  chapter 
the  purpose  is  to  outline  the  character  of  the  gov- 
ernment established  by  the  constitution  with  especial 
reference  to  the  extent  to  which  the  principle  of  pop- 
ular representation  and  control  finds  recognition. 

An  inspection  of  the  constitution  shows  that  for- 
mally the  powers  of  the  King  are  very  broad.  Dr. 
Ogg,  in  his  Governments  of  Europe,  says  that  "it  is 
perhaps  not  too  much  to  say  that  they  exceed  those 
exercised  by  any  other  European  sovereign.  The 
King  is  the  head  of  the  army  and  the  navy,  and  of 
the  Church,  and  in  him  are  vested,  directly  or  in- 
directly, all  functions  of  an  executive  or  administra- 
tive character.  All  appointments  to  offices  of  State 
are  made  by  him  immediately  or  under  his  authority. 
The  upper  legislative  chamber  is  recruited  almost 
exclusively  by  royal  nomination.     And  all  measures, 

115 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

before  they  become  law,  require  the  King's  consent, 
though,  by  reason  of  the  sovereign's  absolute  control 
of  the  upper  chamber,  no  measure  of  which  he  dis- 
approves can  ever  be  enacted  by  that  body,  so  that 
there  is  never  an  occasion  for  the  exercise  of  the  for- 
mal veto."  And,  in  addition,  it  is  to  be  rememberea 
that  the  fundamental  theory  regarding  the  nature  j 

i 

and  source  of  the  constitution  is  such  that  the  prin- 
ciple  is  necessarily  accepted  that  the  King  is  the  V 
residual  claimant  to  all  authority  not  vested  in  some   / 
other  organ  of  government,  and,  therefore,  that  where 
his  powers  are  not  expressly  limited,  they  are  abso-    \ 
lute  in  character.  _~— ^ 

After  all,  however,  the  important  point  is  asjto  the 
political  responsibility  under  which  the  King  exer- 
cises his  constitutional  powers.  /If,  as  in  England, 
practice  has  firmly  fixed  the  docVrine  that  they  may 
be  employed  only  at  the  direction  of  ministers  who 
thereby  assume  both  legal  and  political  responsibility 
over  them,  and  if  these  ministers  can,  as  a  practical 
proposition,  remain  in  office  only  so  long  as  they  are 
able  to  obtain  the  support  of  a  majority  of  the  mem- 
bers  of  a  legislative  body,  the  members  of  which  are 
freely  elected  by  the  people,  then,  from  the  stand- 
point of  popular  government,  it  is  proper  and  ex- 

116 


PRUSSIA'S  CONSTITUTIONAL  SYSTEM 

pedient  that  the  powers  of  the   Crown   should  be 
great,  j  But  if  there  does  not  exist  this  expectation 
that  tne  King  will  be  guided  by  the  judgment  of  his 
ministers  in  the  exercise  of  his  constitutional  pow- 
ers, if  there  is  not  this  parliamentary  responsibility 
on  the  part  of  these  ministers,  or  if.  in  fact,  the  KingX 
is  nJble  to  exercise  a  considerable  predominant  influ-  / 
encfi_in_detei,mining  the  membership  of  thejiegis-  \ 
lative  chambers,  it  be^mes-v^r^significantJnat  the  [ 
royal  powers  should  be  as  extensive  as  thoserecog-  \ 

nized  in  the  Prussian  constitution And,  in  fact,  I 

this  is  the  situation  in  Prussia. 

The  composition  of  the  upper  chamber  of  the 
Prussian  legislature  is  fixed  by  a  royal  ordinance 
issued  in  pursuance  of  a  legislative  act  of  1853, 
which  act,  in  turn,  was  authorized  by  the  constitu- 
tional provision  that  "the  first  chamber  shall  be 
formed  by  royal  ordinance  which  can  only  be  al- 
tered by  a  law  to  be  issued  with  the  approval  of 
the  chambers."     (Article  68.) 

Without  going  into  detail,  it  may  be  said  that 
the  Herrenhaus,  as  it  is  styled,  is  composed  of  princes 
of  the  royal  family,  members  of  families  of  Prussia 
that  once  were_  royal,  and  various  other  persons  ap- 
pointed by  the  King.     That  body,  therefore,  is  abso- 

117 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

lutely  controlled  by  him.  Even  should,  by  some  curi- 
ous chance,  this  body  seek  to  act  contrary  to  his  will, 
he  can  overcome  its  opposition  by  exercising  the  right 
given  him  to  appoint  for  life  an  indefinite  number 
of  new  members,  subject  only  to  the  restriction  that 
the  appointees  be  thirty  years  of  age. 

The  members  of  the  lower  house  (Abgeordneterir 
haus),  are  elected  by  the  people  but  in  a  manner  that 
is  far  from  democratic  in  character,  and  which,  in 
fact,  is  so  arranged  and  intended  as  to  give  dominat- 
ing  control  to  the  wealthier  classes. 

In  the  first  place,  though  manhood  suffrage  pre- 
vails,1 the  ballots  are  publicly  cast,  with  the  result 
that  there  is  full  opportunity,  which  is  never  missed, 
to  exert  pressure  upon  the  voter  from  above,  that  is, 
by  his  employer,  or  by  agents  of  the  government. 

In  the  second  place,  the  voting  districts  are  so 
-y  arranged  that  those  districts  in  which  the  Social 
Democrats  are  most  numerous,  are  grossly  underrep- 
resented. 

In  the  third  place,  the  King  has  the  power  to  dia- 

y  solve  the  House  whenever  he  sees  fit — a  power  which 

he  has  frequently  exercised — and  thus  necessitate  a 

new  election.     He  also  may  order  an  adjournment 

1  The  voter  must  be  at  least  twenty -fire  yeara  of  age. 

118 


PRUSSIA'S  CONSTITUTIONAL  SYSTEM 

but  not  for  more  than  thirty  days,  and  not  more 
than  once  during  the  same  session. 

Finally,  and  fourthly,  the  elections  are  not  direct, 
but  indirect,  and  according  to  a  three  class  system 
based  upon  wealth.  This  system,  shortly  stated,  is 
as  follows: 

The  members  of  the  House  are  elected  by  "col- 
leges" in  each  of  the  constituencies,  which,  by  a  ma- 
jority vote,  elect  the  one,  two  or  three  members  to 
which  the  constituency  is  entitled.  These  "colleges" 
are  elected  by  the  voters  as  grouped  into  three  classes, 
each  class  electing  one-third  of  the  members  of  the 
electoral  college  of  their  respective  constituency. 
The  electorate  districts  are  subdivided  into  a  large 
number  of  small  precincts  in  each  of  which  one  elec- 
tor is  chosen  for  each  two  hundred  and  fifty  persons. 
In  these  precincts  the  voters  are  grouped  into  the 
three  classes  which  have  been  mentioned  according 
to  the  amounts  of  taxes  paid  by  them.  The  firs 
class  is  composed  of  those  voters  who  individually 
pay  the  most  taxes  and  who  together  pay  one-thirc 
of  the  total  amount  of  taxes  paid  in  the  precinct. 
The  second  class  is  composed  of  those  voters  who,  in3 
dividually,  pay  the  next  largest  taxes  and  togethej? 
pay  a  third  of  the  total  taxes.     The  third  class  i£  "S 

119  * 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

^composed  of  the  remaining  voters.  Each  of  these 
classes,  voting  separately,  elects  one-third  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  electoral  college  to  which  the  precinct  js 
entitjed. 

The  inevitable  and  intended  reault  ofjthis  arrange- 
ment  of  course  is  that  the  first  two  classes,  composed 
of  very  few  voters,  and  all  persons  of  comparative 
wealth,  elect  two-thirds  of  the  members  of  the  col- 
leges  which  are  to  elect  the  people's  representatives 
V  in  the  Lower  House.  In  more  than  two  thousand 
of  the  districts  the  first  class  of  the  voters  is  composed 
of  a  single  individual;  and  in  some  nineteen  hun- 
dred other  districts  of  only  two  individuals.  It  has, 
indeed,  been  estimated  that  twelve  or  thirteen  per 
cent  of  the  population  elect  two-thirds  of  the  rep- 
resentatives, thus  having  twice  the  voting  power  of 
the  remaining  eighty-seven  or  eighty-eight  per  cent 
/  of  the  people.  In_result,  then,  even_should  the„prm- 
(  ciple  °f  parliamentary  respon^ility_be_,applied  to 
j  the_Kmg^s_^inisters,  it  would  still  leave  the  control- 
ling power  in  the  hands  of  the  wealthy  classes,  whose 
interests  and  inclinations  incline. ihem_ to— support 
conservative  as  opposed  to  radical  or  social  demo- 
cratic policies.  In  fact,  however,  no  provisioji  jlor 
cabinet  government  of  the  responsible  type  has  been 

120 


PRUSSIA'S  CONSTITUTIONAL  SYSTEM 

made.  The-Kiugfa  ministers^  appointed  by  him,  are/ 
as  Lowell  says,  "the-servants^-not  of  the-Chambers, 
but  of  the  Qrown,  a  fact  that  finds  its  outward  ex- 
pression in  the  frequency  with  which  they  refer  to 
the  personal  opinions  of  the  King.  Nor  are  they 
subject  to  an  effective  control  of  any  kind  on  the 
part  of  the  legislature,  for  although  the  constitution 
provides  that  they  can  be  prosecuted  for  bribery,  trea- 
son, or  violation  of  the  constitution,  upon  a  resolution 
passed  by  either  House,  there  is  no  statute  prescrib- 
ing any  penalties,  and  hence  the  provision  is  a  dead 
letter."  * 

The  ministers  do  not  even  act  as  a  unit.     There 
is  a  so-called  Minister-President,  but  he  has  no  real 
political  control  over  his  colleagues.     Each  minister   / 
is  thus  directly  responsible  to  the  King  who  appoints  ( 
him,  and  who  can  at  any  time  remove  him  from  of- / 
fice.     "He  selects  them,"  says  Lowell,  "for  their  ad- 
ministrative qualities  rather  than  their  political  opin-  \ 
ions,  and  requires  of  them  administrative  capacity 
and  obedience  to  himself."  2 

Aware  of  its  lack  of  controlling  power,  the  Prus- 
sian Landtag  is  content,  for  the  most  part,  to  concern 

1  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe,  vol.  I, 
p.  289. 
1  Op.  tit.,  vol.  I,  p.  291. 

121 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

itself  with  measures  which  are  prepared  and  sub- 
mitted to  it  by  the  King's  ministers.  And,  as  re- 
gards the  administration  of  the  laws  that  are  enacted, 
its  control  is  very  slight.  "It  can  appoint  commis- 
sions to  make  investigations,  but  the  Government  can 
forbid  the  officials  to  give  them  any  information,  and 
in  fact  the  ministers  have  insisted  that  such  com- 
missions, like  all  the  committees  of  the  Landtag, 
shall  hold  no  direct  communications  with  any  officers 
but  themselves.  It  can  require  the  presence  of  the 
ministers  and  ask  them  questions,  but  they  may  an- 
swer or  not  as  they  please.  It  can  address  inter- 
pellations to  the  Government,  but  as  the  parliament- 
ary system  does  not  exist  in  Prussia,  these  have  not 
the  same  importance  as  in  France  and  Italy.  Each 
chamber  can  also  present  addresses  to  the  King,  who 
may  pay  attention  to  them  or  not,  as  he  thinks  best. 
Inshort,  the  influence  J>^the  JLandtag_over  the  ad- 
ministration is  confined  to  expressing  an  opinion 
which  is  not  likely  to  have  any  great  effect."  * 
Prussia's  Place  in  the  Empire. — Even  at  the  risk 
of  becoming  still  more  deeply  involved  in  consti- 
tutional law  as  distinguished  from  political  theory,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  say  a  word  regarding  the  dom- 
1  Lowell.     Op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  299. 

122 


PRUSSIA'S  CONSTITUTIONAL  SYSTEM 

inant  influence  which  Prussia  has  in  the  Empire,  V 
for  it  is  this  which  gives  greatly  increased  signifi-     \ 
cance  to  the  constitutional  theory  and  practice  of  the 
Prussian  Kingdom.  ' 

Of  primary  importance  with  respect  to  Prussia's  \ 
hegemony  is  the  historical  fact,  fully  appreciated  hy  / 
all  Germans,  that  German^ _unity  and  German^ na-  ^>   I 
tional  strength  have  heen  reali^e^injvery_larg©  meas-  j 
ure    through    Prussian    effort.     Prussia    not    only 
formed  the  purpose  and  supplied  the  leadership,  but 
furnished  the  material  means  for  bringing  these  re- 
sults about.     It  is  ljut  natural  then  that  the  German 
people  should  continue  to  look  to  Prussia  for  political 
directionand  political  instruction. 

Added  to  this  historical  circumstance  ofleader- 
ship  is  the  fact  that  Prussia  has  excelled  the  other 
German  States  in  its  industrial  and  commercial  de- 
velopment, in  the  efficiency  of  its  administrative  or- 
ganization and  operation,  in  the  growth  of  .its  insti- 
tutions of  learning,  and  their  productivity  in  the 
fields  of  natural  science  and  its  practical  applica- 
tions, and  in  its  elaborate  social  legislation  for  the 
betterment  of  the  living  and  working  conditions  of 
the  laboring  classes.  All  these  materialistic,  or,  as 
the  Germans  would  say,  realistic,  results  have  had 

123 


/ 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

their  influence  in  exalting  Prussian  influence 
throughout  the  German  Empire.  The  fact  that  dur- 
ing recent  years  Prussia  has  lost  her  prestige  in  pure 
philosophy,  and  has  never  been  distinguished  in  the 
aesthetic  arts,  has  been  overborne  by  her  more  ma- 
terial successes. 

Still  further,  as  explaining  the  dominance  of 
Prussia,  is  of  course  her  territorial  size  and  num- 
ber  of  population,  which  in  both  respects  is  greater 
than  all  the  other  States  of  the  Empire  combined. 
Out  of  a  total  area  of  slightly  more  than  two  hundred 
thousand  square  miles  included  within  the  Empire, 
approximately  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  thousand 
are  enclosed  within  the  Prussian  borders.  And  out 
of  a  total  imperial  population  of,  say,  seventy  mil- 
lions, considerably  more  than  forty  millions  are 
Prussian  subjects. 

Special  Prussian  Rights  Provided  by  the  Imperial 
Constitution. — Even  did  the  German  Empire  re- 
semble the  American  Union  by  making  no  distinc- 
tion between  the  constituent  States  as  regards  their 
right  to  participate  in  the  control  of  the  Imperial 
or  Eederal  Government,  the  facts  which  have  been 
mentioned  would  have  been  abundantly   sufficient 

to  give  the  leadership  to  Prussia^ But  the  supe- 

124 


PRUSSIA'S  CONSTITUTIONAL  SYSTEM 

riority  thus  made  certain  has  been  further  increased 
by  the  following  special  provisions  of  the  Imperial 
Constitution. 

1.  Prussia's  King  is  ex  officio  the  German  Em- 
peror. 

2.  Prussia's  vote  in  the  Bundesrath  is  sufficient 
to  prevent  the  adoption  of  any  proposed  amendment 
to  the  Imperial  Constitution. 

3.  No  army,  navy,  or  revenue  measure  may  be 
enacted  by  the  Imperial  Parliament  without  the  ap- 
proval of  the  Prussian  Government,  if  it  operates  to 
change  the  status  quo  ante. 

4.  To  Prussia  is  given  the  presidency  of  all  the 
committees  in  the  Imperial  Bundesrath  with  the  ex- 
ception of  one,  that  on  foreign  relations,  which  is 
given  to  Bavaria.  This  committee,  however,  has 
never  been  an  important  one,  its  function  extending 
little  beyond  listening  to  communications  made  to 
it  by  the  Chancellor. 

5.  Though  not  a  constitutional  discrimination  in 
favor  of  Prussia,  but  as  resulting  from  her  size  and 
population,  is  the  fact  that  Prussia  possesses  or  con- 
trols 21  votes  *  in  the  Bundesrath  out  of  a  total  of 

1  Including  her  control  of  the  one  vote  of  Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin,  and  the  three  votes  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

125 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

61;  and  sends  235  representatives  to  the  Reichstag 
out  of  a  total  of  397. 

Except  in  time  of  war,  the  constitutional  powers 
of  the  Emperor  are  not  great — many  of  the  powers 
normally  possessed  by  a  constitutional  monarch  be- 
ing vested  not  in  him,  but  in  the  Bundesrath,  which 
acts  as  the  collective  organ  of  the  "Governments"  of 
the  federated  States  of  the  Empire.  For  reasons 
which  need  not  here  be  given  the  Bundesrath,  which 
sits  in  secret,  continuous  session,  and  whose  members 
are  constitutionally  obligated  to  vote  according  to 
instructions  given  them  by  their  respective  Gov- 
ernments, is  the  dominant  organ,  in  times  of  peace 
at  least,  in  the  German  Imperial  system.  But  inas- 
much as  the  voice  of  the  Prussian  delegation  is,  in 
practice,  controlling  in  the  Bundesrath,  and  this 
delegation  is  sent  and  controlled  by  the  instructions 
of  a  Government  which  is  under  the  effective  control 
of  the  Prussian  King  and  his  advisers,  it  necessarily 
follows  that  the  Emperor,  exercising  his  powers  as 
Prussian  King,  is  able  to  exert  a  powerful  influence 
in  the  Imperial  Government.  It  is  true  that  there 
has  been  dissatisfaction  in  Germany,  which  at  times 
has  been  intense,  because  of  utterances  and  activities 
of  the  present  Kaiser;  but  this  has  been  because  he 

126 


PRUSSIA'S  CONSTITUTIONAL  SYSTEM 

has  acted  outside  the  channels  constitutionally  pro- 
vided. Instead  of  using  his  influence  to  control  the 
Bundesrath  either  indirectly  or  through  the  Prus- 
sian delegation,  he  has,  in  appearance  at  least,  given 
utterance  to  personal  opinions  on  matters  of  the 
gravest  public  importance  without  first  subjecting 
them  to  the  sobering  consideration  of  his  constitu- 
tional advisers,  and  giving  at  least  an  opportunity  to 

the  members  of  the  Bundesrath  to  discuss  them.1 

1  The  qualifying  phrase,  "in  appearance  at  least,"  is  ad- 
visedly used  since  there  is  considerable  ground  for  belieying 
that  in  some  of  the  instances,  in  which  the  Kaiser  appeared 
to  speak  or  write  wholly  upon  his  own  initiative,  or  even  im- 
pulsively, it  was  with  the  approval  of  his  constitutional  ad- 
viser, the  Chancellor,  and  that  purely  political  reasons  made  it 
desirable  that  the  Kaiser,  rather  than  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment, should  appear  as  the  author  of  the  statements  made. 
For  example,  the  responsibility  for  the  famous  Kruger  tele- 
gram of  January  3,  1896,  in  which  the  Kaiser  congratulated 
the  President  of  the  Transvaal  in  repelling  the  Jameson  raid, 
was  placed  wholly  upon  the  shoulders  of  the  Kaiser,  the  truth 
not  appearing  until  thirteen  years  later  when,  in  March,  1909, 
speaking  to  the  Reichstag,  Chancellor  von  Biilow  said:  "It 
has  been  asked,  was  this  telegram  an  act  of  personal  initiative 
or  an  act  of  State?  In  this  regard  let  me  refer  you  to  your 
own  proceedings.  You  will  remember  that  the  responsibility 
for  this  telegram  was  never  repudiated  by  the  directors  of  our 
political  business  at  the  time.  The  telegram  was  an  act  of 
State,  the  result  of  official  consultations,  it  was  in  no  wise  an 
act  of  personal  initiative  on  the  part  of  His  Majesty,  the 
Kaiser.  Whoever  asserts  that  it  was,  is  ignorant  of  what  pre- 
ceded it,  and  does  His  Majesty  completely  wrong."  Shaw — 
William  of  Germany,  p.  154. 

127 


1 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

.  * 

In  the  Empire  the  po^lajdy^elesied-Beichstag 
has  not  much  more  influence  in  determining  the  pol- 
icies of  the  Government  or  the  manner  of  executing 
them  than  has  the  Abgeordnetenhaus  in  Prussia. 
Its  members  are  indeed  directly  elected  upon  a  prac- 
tically manhood  suffrage,  and  by  secret  ballot.  But 
the  arrangement  of  constituencies  is  such  that  the 
districts  in  which  the  Social  Democrats  are  strong 
are  grossly  under-represented,  and  no  constitutional 
means  are  provided  whereby  its  majority  will  can 
determine  who  the  Chancellor  shall  be.  We  say  the 
Chancellor,  rather  than  the  Ministry,  because  in 
fact  there  is  no  imperial  cabinet  or  ministry  in  the 
English  or  Erench  sense.  The  Chancellor  is  at  the 
head  of  the  government  and  the  ministers  who  assist 
him  are  his  subordinates  or  servants  and  not  his  col- 
leagues. 

What  likelihood  there  is  that  a  system  of  respon- 
sible parliamentary  government  will  develop  in  the 
Empire,  and  the  changes  in  distribution  of  powers 
that  such  a  system  would  involve,  is  a  subject  to 
which  the  next  chapter  is  devoted. 


CHAPTER  VII 

TENDENCIES     TOWARD     MINISTERIAL     RESPONSIBILITY 

IN    GERMANY 

When  asked,  "How  far  do  you  regard  the  present 
constitutional  system  of  the  Empire  final?"  Bis- 
marck is  said  to  have  replied,  "Final  it  is  not. 
Doubtless  we  shall  pass  through  the  stages  which 
you  in  England  have  passed  through.  But  it  will  be 
a  slow,  gradual  process,  and  we  cannot  foresee  the 
direction  which  development  will  take."  That  judg- 
ment expresses  a  strong  belief  in  the  evolution  of  con- 
stitutional government — an  evolution,  moreover, 
which  in  general  must  follow  the  course  of  English 
political  development,  but  which  will  doubtless  un- 
fold very  slowly  and  reflect  in  its  details  the  in- 
fluences of  special  circumstances  and  local  tendencies. 
To  the  general  propositions  which  the  Iron  Chancel- 
lor stated,  the  student  of  comparative  political  insti- 
tutions must  give  assent.  Ever  more  clearly  are 
we  coming  to  see  that  the  changes  in  the  forms  and 

129 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

organization  of  governments  follow  an  orderly,  de- 
velopmental sequence. 

'The  belated  evolution  of  parliamentary  govern- 
ment in  Germany  is  entirely  explicable  from  the  pe- 
)cuiiar  centrifugal  forces  which  prevented  absolutism, 
in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  from 
i  accomplishing  its  great  mission  of  national  unity. 
That  work  was  left  to  the  nineteenth  century.  The 
results  of  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  era 
were:£firs]$  the  widespread  acceptance  of  jthe  most 
advanced    doctrines    of    constitutionalism    and    the 


adoption,  in  most  of  the  smaller  states  of  Germany, 
of  constitutions  more  or  less  closely  modeled  on  the 
French  Charte ;  and,  second^,  the  dissemination  of 
the  idea  of  German  national  unity  as  the  only  secure 
protection  against  foreign  aggression. 

Though  urged  together  as_concomitant_principles 
of  the  Liberal  cause,  these  two  dynamic  ideas  were 
\    •<      essentially  incompatible.     The  n^ture__£L_constitu- 
tionalism,  culminating  as  it  does  in  democracy,  is 
/  dispersive,    centrifugal,    disintegrative.     Unification 
l^  /  could  only  be  accomplished  by  the  absolutistagencies 
\  of  iron  and  blood.     The  prior  ity  bet  ween  these  two 
movements  belonged  logically  to  that  for  national 
unity.     The  constitutional  propaganda  undoubtedly 

130 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

interfered  with,  and  probably  somewhat  delayed, 
the  achievement  of  a  united  Germany ;  but  the  domi- 
nant note  throughout  the  period  from  Jena  to  Sedan 
was  national  unity.  This  movement  ha3  left  a  heri^ 
tage  of  crass  materialism,  a  worship  of  force,  which  j  -^ 
constitutes  one  of  the  striking  characteristics  of  pres- , 
ent-day  Germany.  The  remarkable  transformation 
in  the  nation's  Weltanschauung,  in  the  Zeitgeist, 
since  Kant  and  Fichte,  Goethe  and  Schiller  expressed 
the  lofty  idealism  of  the  Germany  of  a  century  ago, 
must  be  reckoned  with  in  any  attempt  to  gauge  the 
strength  of  liberal  tendencies  to-day.  This. j»pirit\ 
of  ^aggressive  materialism,  personified  in  its  com- 
pletest  sense  in  Bismarck,  has  dominated  external 
and  internaLjolitics,  as  it__has  all  commercial  and 
indus^iadactivity,  and  has^gone  far  toward.Ctuahing 
out  the  HPTit.imPTita^^YfJiberty  ar\A  frpprimn,  of  self- 
government  and  popular  rights,  which,  for  the  very 
reason  that  they  were  in  large  measure  ^foctrmair^, 
flourished  in  the  philosophic  atmosphere  of  t}ie  early 
nineteenth  century.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the/6uU 
^f"f orces  conduces  to  the  strengthening  of  the  mon- 
archical principle. 

The  constitutional  movement  of  the  first  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  on  the  other  hand,  has  very 

131 


u 


s 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

much  of  a  fictitious  character.  It  is  essentially  pre- 
mature; it  represents  the  efforts  of  the  advanced 
Liberal  section  of  opinion  to  force  the  nation  into 
a  phase  of  constitutional  evolution  for  which  it  was 
/not  yet  ready.  The  formal  copying  of  the  institu- 
tions of  England  and  France  had  the  effect  me/ely 
of  setting  in  motion  powerful  forces  of  reaction.  All 
the  fundamental  laws  which  date  from  this  epoch 
contain  definite  articles  on  ministerial  responsibility, 
impeachment,  countersignature  and  interpellations. 
They  afford  ample  basis,  so  far  as  constitutional 
prescription  goes,  for  the  establishment  of  responsible 
government.  They  satisfied  the  demands  of  radical 
publicists  like  Rotteck,  Welcker  and  Robert  von 
Mohl,  whose  works  on  constitutional  government  were 
one  of  the  principal  agencies  for  the  spread  of  French 
and  English  ideas.  And  yet  up  to  the  present  mo- 
ment in  no  state  of  Germany,  and  much  less  in  the 
Empire,  have  ministers  recognized  a  real  or  effec- 
tive responsibility  to  any  one  but  the  monarch. 
/  The  work  of  national  unity  and  the  reactionary 
l*  tendencies  incited  by  the  jDremature  adoption  ofjthe 
outward  forms  of  parliamentary  government  have 
checked  the  development  of  liberal  institutions.  But 
of  recent  years  the  indications  of  a  transition  to  a 

132 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

new  phase  of  government  have  become  increasingly 
numerous  and  remarkable.  These  signs  of  change 
may  be  grouped  into  three  general  classes:  first,  the 
tremendous  upheaval  of  discontent  at  what  is  called 
the  "personal  regime"  in  the  Empire;  second,  the 
widespread  demand  that  an  effective  ministerial  re- 
sponsibility to  the  Reichstag  be  imposed  upon  the 
Chancellor,  and  the  suggestions  of  such  a  change  ac- 
tually taking  place;  third,  the  democratization,  and 
agitation  for  democratization,  of  the  electorates  in 
the  several  states. 

Discontent  at  the  personal  rule  of  the  Kaiser  has 
been  occasioned  by  his  oft-repeated  assertions  of  di- 
vine right,  by  the  obtrusion  of  his  personality  into 
every  sphere  of  private  as  well  as  public  activity,  by 
his  direct  participation  in  elections  and  aggressive 
opposition  to  Social  Democracy,  by  his  flamboyant 
and  indiscreet  utterances  on  foreign  affairs,  and  final- 
ly by  the  lack  of  success  which  has  attended  his  ef- 
forts in  personally  directing  Germany's  foreign  pol- 
icy. There  is  no  doubt  that  the  feeling  of  dissatis- 
faction and  protest  at  the  personal  regime  is  almost 
universal.  No  party  or  section  of  political  opinion 
defends  the  Kaiser  against  the  chidings  of  the  na- 
tion.   But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  the  desire 

133 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

for  parliamentary  government  of  the  English  or 
French  type  is  equally  general.  Twenty  years  ago 
the  Kaiser  "dropped  the  pilot,"  and  has  insisted  ever 
since  on  steering  the  ship  of  state  himself.  His  chan- 
cellors have  been  mere  personal  secretaries  with  very 
little  power  of  initiative.  To  do  the  Kaiser's  bid- 
ding has  been  their  almost  sole  function.  Having 
taken  the  helm,  he  has  been  compelled  to  bear  the 
responsibility.  In  descending  into  the  arena  of  party 
contests,  he  has  forfeited  the  protection  which  the 
throne  affords.  The  mystical  doctrine  of  royal  irre- 
sponsibility cannot  be  pleaded  by  him  who  chooses  to 
be  his  own  first  minister.  William  I  more  wisely  ex- 
ercised his  autocratic  power  through  a  Grand  Vizier. 
Bismarck,  in  taking  over  the  effective  direction  of 
governmental  policy,  was  able  to  shield  his  "alter 
Herr"  from  the  popular  attacks  and  partisan  hostil- 
ity, to  which  William  II  has  subjected  himself  by 
undertaking  on  every  occasion  the  personal  direction 
of  government.  The  purely  formal  responsibility 
which  the  Chancellor  has  assumed  for  his  Imperial 
master's  acts  has  deceived  no  one.  The  reaction 
against  the  personal  regime  might  have  been  pre- 
dicted as  soon  as  the  principles  governing  the  new 
reign  were  discerned.    This  protest  and  discontent  at 

134 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

arbitrary  personal  government  does  not,  however,  im- 

pjJJJLi^^L^^-I^— iamentary  ministerial  responsi-     ) 

bility.     It  may  mean^jmd  among  large  sections  of  /  j  •■ 

the  people  does  mean,  nothing  more  than  a  demand  / 

for  a  return  to  Bismarckian  traditions, — a  restora-  \ 

tion  to  the  Chancellorship  of  the  functions  of  a  Grand 

Vizier. 

Thus  far  it  is  evident  that  the  national  revolt 
against  the  personal  regime  has  produced  no  percep- 
tible effect  upon  the  mind  of  the  Emperor.  His  latest 
appointment  to  the  Chancellorship  can  in  no  wise  be 
interpreted  as  indicating  a  willingness  to  return  to 
the  practice  and  methods  of  his  grandfather.  Whether 
we  view  Prince  von  Billow's  retirement  as  occasioned 
by  his  defeat  in  the  Reichstag  or  as  the  consequence 
of  the  withdrawal  of  Imperial  favor,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  occupies  no  essen- 
tially different  position  than  his  predecessor.  The 
Kaiser,  in  insisting  on  himself  playing  the  star  role 
in  every  act  of  the  political  drama,  condemns  the  rest 
of  the  caste  to  a  dead  level  of  mediocrity.  It  is  dif- 
ficult to  say  how  far  this  refusal  to  listen  to  the 
loud  expressions  of  popular  disapproval  may  go  with- 
out causing  a  decided  increase  in  the  demand  for 
a  more  radical  solution.    As  yet,  however,  the  most 

135 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

influential  section,  though  probably  not  the  numer- 
ical majority,  of  the  people  are  opposed  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  parliamentary  government. 

The  second  class  of  indications  of  impending 
change  more  definitely  point  in  the  direction  of  min- 
isterial responsibility.  Indeed  they  have  been  widely 
hailed  as  insuring  a  speedy  transition  to  parliamen- 
tary government.  Their  importance,  however,  we  are 
convinced  has  been  greatly  exaggerated.  Article  17 
of  the  Imperial  constitution,  it  must  be  remembered, 
provides  that  "The  ordinances  and  decrees  of  the 
Emperor  shall  be  issued  in  the  name  of  the  Empire, 
and  require  for  their  validity  the  countersignature 
of  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  who  thereby  undertakes 
the  responsibility  for  them."  This  article  was  not  in- 
cluded in  the  original  draft;  it  constituted  no  part 
of  the  constitution  of  the  North  German  Confedera- 
tion, out  of  which  the  Empire  grew.  It  was  incor- 
porated as  an  amendment,  on  the  motion  of  Bennig- 
sen,  and  is  copied  almost  literally  from  the  Prussian 
constitution.  It  has  no  essential  or  organic  relation 
to  the  rest  of  the  instrument.  Together  with  the 
similar  articles  in  the  constitutions  of  the  several 
states,  it  has  been  the  subject  of  a  vast  amount  of 
discussion.     A  veritable  flood  of  academic  literature 

136 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

has  dealt  with  the  nature  of  the  ministerial  responsi- 
bility which  the  various  constitutions  prescribe.  Is 
it  a  civil,  a  criminal,  a  disciplinary,  a  constitutional, 
a  political,  or  a  moral  responsibility  ?  In  character- 
istic German  fashion  the  war  of  the  monographs  has 
been  waged. 

Especially  futile  is  the  discussion  over  the  respon- 
sibility of  the  Chancellor,  inasmuch  as  the  article  of 
the  Imperial  constitution  embodies  inherent  incon- 
sistencies, which  do  not  exist  in  the  case  of  the 
States.  To  whom,  in  the  first  place,  is  the  Chancelloi 
responsible  ?  It  cannot  be  the  Kaiser^  for  the_inten- 
tion  of  the  article  is  manifestly  to  relieve  the  Em- 
peror  of  a  responsibility  which  the  Chancellor  un- 
dertakes. It  migh1^erhaps_bjejnterpreted  as  a  re- 
sponsibility to  the  Bundesrath.  But  since  this  body 
is  representative  of  the  confederated  governments, 
and  the  Prussian  government  possesses  the  hegemony 
to  such  an  extent  that  it  practically  controls  its  de- 
cisions, this  resolves  itself  into  a  responsibility  to 
the  Prussian  government,  or,  in  other  words,  to  the 
King  of  Prussia.  Moreover,  the  constitution  makes 
the  Chancellor  the  presiding  officer  of  the  Bundes- 
rath, though  not,  as  Chancellor,  a  member  of  the 
body.     Can  it  be  supposed  that  it  was  the  intention 

137 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

to  require  the  Chancellor  to  moderate  the  proceedings 
of  the  Bundesrath,  and  at  the  same  time  to  be  ready 
on  every  occasion  to  defend  his  acts,  and  those  of 
his  master,  against  attack  on  the  floor  of  that  cham- 
ber ?  Furthermore  the  language  of  the  article  would 
imply,  copied  as  it  is  directly  from  Article  44  of 
the  Prussian  constitution,  that  the  responsibility  of 
the  Chancellor  is  owed  to  the  Reichstag,  the  repre- 
sentative body  of  the  nation.  But  the  difficulty  here 
is  that  the  Chancellor,  as  Chancellor,  does  not  even 
have  the  entree  to  the  Reichstag.  His  presence  there 
is  as  Prussian  Plenipotentiary  to  the  Bundesrath. 
There  has  grown  up,  it  is  true,  a  practice  of  inter- 
pellating the  Chancellor  upon  every  line  of  govern- 
mental policy,  and  he  feels  impelled  to  defend  his 
own  and  the  Emperor's  acts  before  the  bar  of  the 
people's  representatives.  But  this  is  an  entirely  extra- 
legal development,  and  rests  upon  the  fact  that  .he. 
combines  in  his  person  the  several  offices  of  Chan- 
/  cellor,  Minister  President  of  Prussia,  and  Prussian 
\    Plenipotentiary  to  the  Bundesrath. 

A  close  consideration  of  the  constitutional  func- 
tions of  Kaiser  and  Chancellor  will  reveal  the  diffi- 
culty in  all  the  proposals  in  Social  Democratic  and 
Radical  resolutions  which  look  toward  making  this 

138 


/ 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

formal  constitutional  responsibility  a  reality.  The 
Kaiser  does  not  occupy  the  same  relative  position  in 
the  Reich  that  the  several  monarchs  do  in  the  mem- 
ber-states. The  title  which  he  at  first  held,  "Bundes- 
praesidium,"  better  describes  his  functions  and  pow- 
ers than  that  of  Kaiser.  He  is  invested  with  the  full 
command  of  the  army,  the  appointment  of  Imperial 
officers,  and  the  duty  of  promulgating  the  laws.  Far- 
ther than  this  his  powers  are  confined  to  executing 
the  laws,  and  the  ordinances  which  the  Bundesrath 
decrees.  As  Kaiser  he  has  no  share  in  the  initiation 
of  legislation.  The  great  mass  of  William  IPs  power,N 
even  in  Imperial  affairs,  comes  from  his  being  King  ^ 
ofPrussia,  and  as  such  controlling  the  Prussian  dele-  / 
gation  in  the  Bundesrath.  Likewise  the  Chancel- 
lor's office  is  always  attached  to  that  of  Minister- 
President  of  Prussia  and  head  of  the  Prussian  de- 
partment of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  he  is  also  always 
a  member  of  the  Prussian  delegation  in  the  Bundes- 
rath. Over  the  Prussian  government  the  Reich-  ; 
stag  has  no  control,  and  the  full  realization  of  the 
responsibility  enjoined  in  Article  17  would  result 
in  the  severance  of  the  Chancellorship  from  the  Prus- 
sian offices.  Were  the  Reichstag  able  to  enforce  a 
responsibility  upon  the  Chancellor  for  all  the  ordi- 

139 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

nances  and  decrees  of  the  Kaiser,  or  even  for  all  the 
acts  of  the  Kaiser,  as  Kaiser,  it  would  amount  to 
very  little.  The  King  of  Prussia  would  appoint 
some  one  else  Minister-President  of  Prussia,  through 
whom  he  would  continue  to  control  the  Prussian 
delegation  in  the  Bundesrath  and  thereby  exercise  a 
determining  voice  in  most  of  the  decisions  of  that 
body.  The  Reichstag  possesses_yery  little  positive 
power;  its  importance  is  chiefly  negative.  It  may 
block  legislation ;  discuss  at  length  governmental  pol- 
icy; and  affords  an  excellent,  because  unrestricted, 
S.  opportunity  to  air  radical  and  socialistic  opinions. 
But  it  is  not  by  the  constitution  vested  with  suffi-^ 
cient  power  to  make  it  an  effective  instrument  of 
^control.  This  is  especially  true  since  the  Reichstag's 
control  over  the  budget,  the  power  over  supply,  rwhich 
has  been  in  England  the  most  important  instrumen- 
tality for  establishing  parliamentary  domination)  can- 
not be  used  as  a  sanction  for  enforcing  ministerial 
responsibility.  The  experience  of  the  "conflict  pe- 
riod" in  Prussia  is  determining  in  this  respect.  The 
consensus  of  German  juristic  opinion  denies  to  any 
legislative  body  the  right  to  deadlock  the  wheels,  of 
government  in  order  to  enforce  its  control  over  the 
Executive,  and  would  justify  the  latter,  should  such 

140 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

an  attempt  be  made,  in  carrying  on  the  government 
without  the  warrant  of  legislative  enactment.  It  is 
clear  that  the  obstacles  to  an  effective  enforcement 
of  a  responsibility  by  the  Reichstag  upon  the  Chan- 
cellor are  well-nigh  insuperable;  and  were  he  to  be- 
come thoroughly  responsible,  his  importance  would 
immediately  dwindle  to  insignificance. 

It  may  be  suggested  that  an  amendment  to  the  con- 
stitution   would    easily    remove    these    difficulties. 
Might  not  the  fundamental  law  be  revised  to  con- 
form to  the  requirements  of  true  parliamentary  gov- 
ernment ?    Just  here  we  encdunter  one  of  those  f un^ 
damental  social  facts  which  determine  the  special 
direction  which  constitutional  evolution  shall  take  in 
any  country.     The  federalism  in  the  government  is, 
merely  the  political  aspect  of  a  particularism  in-j 
grained  in  the  social  structure  of  Germany,  which  re- 
sults from  the  imperfect  achievement  of  the  work  of 
absolutism.    In  Bavaria,  in  Wurtemburg,  in  Baden, 
in  Posen,  in  Hanover,  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  there  exist 
local  sentiments  of  nationality  which  would  even  now  I 
balk  any  attempt  to  establish  for  the  whole  of  Ger-  \ 


many  an  effective  ministerial_system,  responsible  to 
the  Reichstag.  The  people  in  each  of  the  smaller 
states^  look  with  alarm  at  any  proposal  to  enhance 

141 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  alreadypredominant  position  of  Prussia.  The 
BtincTesrat^is  the  last  bulwark  of  particularism,  and 
thaa  nrnat  needa  be  swept  away  before  a  true  parlia- 
mentary system  can  be  established.  In  time  this 
may  be  possible,  but  at. present,  the  centrifugal  ten- 
\  dency  seems  if  any  thing  on  the  increase. 

It  is,  moreover,  not  merely  a  territorial  particular- 
ism, but  also  a  heterogeneity  of  classes  and  social 
3trata  which  must  be  overcome.  ThajL-homoggneity 
frf  citizenship,  which  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  any  truly 
efficient  system  of  parliamentary  government  is  .still 
VC/  Jacking.  Political  party  lines  in  Germany  coincide 
\  altogether  too  closely  with  the  social,  religious  and 

elass  lines  of  cleavage  to  permit  the  normal  func- 
tioningof_the_ministerial  system,  involving  as  it 
does  the  alternation  of  parties  in  power.  Not  only 
does  ministerial  responsibility  require  for  its  proper 
working  the  bi-party  system ;  it  is  even  more  impor- 
tant that  the  parties  be  constructed  on  vertical  lines 
which  cut  across  the  social  and  class  lines  of  sepa- 
ration. /It  is  not  merely  the  group  system  that  offers 
a  serious  impediment  to  the  establishment  of  govern- 
ment by  ministries  responsible  to  the  Reichstag;  that 
exists  in  France,  and  constitutes,  it  is  true,  an  ob- 
stacle, but  not  an  insuperable  obstacles  It  is  rather 

142 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

the  fact  that-party  lines  coincide  with  the  lines  of 
social  cleavage  that  offers  the  chief  difficulty.  This 
.niakea-jparly  lines- extremely  rigid.  That  passing  / 
of  voters  to  and  fro  from  one  party  to  the  other, 
which  secures  the  healthy  alternation  of  parties  in 
power,  would  be  impossible  at  present  in  Germany. 
Once  in  power  a  party  would  retain  control  until 
gradually  the  economic  development  might  produce  a 
change. 

The  truth  is  that  the  constitution  of  the  Empire 
is  as  truthful  an  expression,  as  is  possible,  of  the 
actual  forces  which  underlie  the  government./  The 
Kaiser  represents  the  principle  of  unity.    He  i&_the  I 
incarnation  of  the  sentiment  which,  springing  up  in 
the  War  of  Liberation,  grew_in_strength  andjpower 
until  it  reached  fruition  in  the  memorable  scene  at 
Versailles  in  1871.  YThe  Bundesrath  is  the  represent- 
ative  of  the  sentiment  of  particularism,  which  hith- 
erto has  successfully  checked  the  farther,  growth  of  2^x 
the  sentiment  of  consolidated  nationality.]  (Both  _ of 
these  institutions,  moreover,  embody  the  '"principle  of    , 
the  hegemony  of  the  Prussian  Government.     The  ^ 
Reichstag  alone  represents  the  German  people]  the 
popular  element  in  the  State.    The  clamor  for  a  more 
definite  responsibility  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Reich- 

143 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

<  stag  does  not  take  account  of  the  fact  that  to  effect 
this  it  would  be  necessary  to  seriously  disturb  the 
balance  of  forces  which  the  Constitution  now  safe- 
guards, and  would  arouse  opposition  from  altogether 
unexpected  quarters. 

The  third,  and  in  many  respects  the  most  signifi- 
cant, class  of  signs  of  the  times  in  Germany  relate 
to  the  democratization  of  the  basis  of  representative 
jgbvernment.     The  ^agitation  for  ministerial  responsi- 
bility to  the  Reichstag  is  due  to  the  fact  that_£his 
S    jbody  is  elected  by  direct  elections,  universal  suffrage 
^  andjeocet  ballot.    Wgre  it  not  for  the  gross  inequali- 
)ties_in_ the  distribution  of  seats,  the  Reichstag  would 
Lfee  a  model  of  a  popular,  representative  body.     Its 
competence  is,  however,  too  limited  to  make  it  an 
effective  organ  of  government  control.    Is  it  not  rea- 
sonable to  expect  that,  as  soon  as  the  same  liberal 
principles  are  applied  to  the  electorates  of  the  mem- 
ber-states, the  demand  for  ministerial  responsibility 
will  there  also  become  urgent  ?    It  is,  therefore,  high- 
ly interesting  that  a  general  movement  for  electoral 
reform  in  the  member-states  of  the  Empire  is  under 
way.     In  the  smaller  German  states  important  re- 
forms have  already  been  accomplished.     In  Baden, 
the  most  liberal  of  the  South  German  states,  uni- 

144 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

versal  manhood  suffrage  for  the  lower  chamber  of  the 
Landtag  has  existed  since  18G9,  but  the  elections 
were  indirect.  In  1904,  direct  elections  were  intro- 
duced. At  the  same  time  the  upper  chamber  was 
liberalized  by  the  inclusion  of  representatives  of 
Chambers  of  Commerce  and  the  municipalities. 
Wiirtemburg,  in  1906,  reformed  her  lower  chamber 
by  eliminating  the  privileged  members,  "knights" 
and  "clergymen,"  and  substituting  members  chosen 
by  proportional  representation.  In  the  same  year, 
Bavaria  passed  from  indirect  to  direct  elections.  Sax- 
ony, in  1909,  repealed  the  three-class  electoral  sys- 
tem, which  since  1896  had  disgraced  her  Constitu- 
tion, and  introduced  in  its  place  a  system  of  plural 
voting.  Every  man  is  given  a  direct  secret  vote,  but 
a  second  and  a  third  vote  are  given  those  who  possess 
special  property,  educational,  or  professional  quali- 
fications. Far  from  ideal  as  this  system  appears,  it 
is  a  great  improvement.  Oldenburg,  in  the  same 
year,  substituted  universal  manhood  suffrage  and  di- 
rect elections  for  a  suffrage  based  on  tax-paying  and 
indirect  elections;  and  Saxe-Weimar  substituted  di- 
rect for  indirect  elections.  Finally  in  the  draft  of  a 
constitution  for  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  the  Bundes- 
rath  has  adopted  within  the  past  few  weeks,  provi- 

145 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

sion  is  made  for  a  bicameral  legislature,  of  which  the 
lower  house  is  to  be  elected  by  universal  suffrage. 

<The_r^OTmiiJJi0_antic[uated  ami  ridiculous  tlyres- 
class  electoral  system  in  Prussia  has  long  been  vigor- 
ously agitated.  In  1914  the  German  Government 
was  finally  brought  to  the  point  of  introducing  a 
measure  which  looked  to  its  modification.  So  com- 
pletely unsatisfactory  was  it,  retaining  as  it  did  most 
of  the  objectionable  features  of  the  old  system,  that 
Social  Democracy  was  at  once  thrown  into  a  fever 
of  such  colossal  demonstrations  as  Germany  had 
never  before  witnessed.  Cut  to  pieces  by  the  lower 
chamber  of  the  Landtag,  and  certain  of  rejection  in 
the  upper  house,  the  Government  was  forced  to 
withdraw  it  to  avoid  a  more  crushing  defeat.  The 
results  of  this  experiment  in  giving  a  stone  when  the 
people  have  demanded  bread  are  really  startling,  and 
ought  to  cause  deep  heart  searchings  in  high  quar- 
ters. Whether  the  entrenched  powers  of  autocracy 
and  bureaucracy  can  be  compelled  to  g^nt  the  popu- 


lar demands  is,  of  course,  a  question.     The  three- 
clags  system~Ts  the  citadel  of  their  powers ;  its  aban- 
donment would  give  the  enemy  possession  of  the  en- 
\<Ls/  tire  fortress.    A  voluntary  abnegation  of  the  adaran- 
r  N#ges  which  Junkerthum  and  Beaurokratie  now__§n- 

146 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

iSXJsjcarcely  to  be  looked  for.  The  application  of 
some  kind  of  compulsion  will  probably  be  necessary. 
The  Social  Democrats  would,  of  course,  profit  mosfl 
largely  by  a  thorough-going  reform  of  thp>  pW.r>raf> 
_law ;  indeed,  it  is  doubtful  if  any  of  the  other  parties) 
would^gain  much.  Even  the  Radicals  cannot  be  ex- 
pected, therefore,  to  view  with  the  same  eagerness  a 
regime  in  which  property  is  given  no  recognition! 
whatever.  The  Clericals  desire  the  secret_ballot ;  the( 
Liberals  and  Radicals  would  gainmuoh  from  a.  redis-( 
tribution  of  seats ;  but  the  ^o^iaIisia_alon©  sincerely, 
and  without  reservation,  wish  to  abolish  th«  flacpnfl. 
ancy  of  property.  Whether  they  can  recruit  allies 
from  the  Radicals  depends  upon  how  amenable  they 
prove  themselves,  in  the  immediate  future,  to  the 
influences  which  are  working  toward  a  revision  of 
their  intransigeant  program.    So  long  as  BebeldomA 

inatfifl  8or;ift|  T)p>m,o<»rttr'yJ  and  insists  upon  the  nrlbpr-l 
ence  to,.the_  uncompromising  ^^jnfrirjjailig™   hith-  V 

erto  enforced,  there  is  little  chance  of  gaining  assist- \ 
&nce-from~the_  bourgeoisie.    But  the  signs  of  greatly^ 
increased  strength  in  the  Revisionist  wing  of  the 
party,  and  the  faltering  admission  by  the  old  leaders 
that  in  certain  circumstances  a  practical  attitude  may 
be  justifiable,  afford  ground  for  hope.    Unless  a  really 

147 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

effective  alliance  can  be  secured  with  the  Radicals 
there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  a  peaceful  solution 
of  the  question  is  possible.  Even  with  the  entire 
Left  united  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  forces  of 
reaction  can  be  dislodged  without  a  resort  to  force, 
he  indications  from  all  by-elections  to  the  Reich- 
stag point  to  a  greatly  increased  Socialist  poll.  How 
long  can  this  tremendous  human  flood  be  restrained 
within  the  barriers  of  the  Prussian  Electoral  Law? 
When  it  bursts  its  bonds  will  it  not  carry  all  before 
it?  Already  some  of  the  Socialist  leaders  are  will- 
ing to  resort  to  that  recently  invented,  and  most  dan- 
gerous, weapon,  the  general  strike.  The  thorough 
discipline,  which  the  demonstrations  showed  the  So- 
cialists to  possess,  gives  good  promise  of  their  being 
able  to  use  this  instrument  effectively.  Were  it  once 
employed,  the  end  might  come  quickly. 

The  Prussian  electoral  question  is  not,  as  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  wishes  to  make  it,  a  purely  Prus- 
sian matter.  Because  of  the  predominance  of  the 
Prussian  Government  in  the  Bundesrath,  through 
which  it  can  practically  nullify  anything  the  Reich- 
stag undertakes,  any  measure  which  tends  toward 
liberalizing  the  Prussian  Government  must  have  a 
vital  interest  for  the  whole  of  Germany.    The  democ- 

148 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

ratization  of  Prussia  would  bring  about  the  democ- 
ratization of  the  Empire.  Everything  would  be 
thrown  into  the  melting-pot.  The  agrarian  tariff 
would  go;  the  naval  act  would  be  seriously  cut 
down ;  even  the  army  might  not  be  beyond  the  reach 
of  the  party  which  is  avowedly  anti-militarist.  It 
is  in  its  connection  with  the  Empire  that  this  ques- 
tion of  Prussian  electoral  reform  is  of  particular  in- 
terest to  us,  for  in  the  democratization  of  the  Prus- 
sian Government  probably  is  also  to  be  found  the  key 
to  the  problem  of  ministerial  responsibility  in  Ger- 
many. 

Lot  us  consider  what  the  results  of  universal  suf- 
frage, direct  elections,  and  the  secret  ballot  in  Prus- 
sia would  be.  The  upper  chamber  of  the  Prussian 
Landtag  does  not  possess  the  peculiar  powers,  nor 
occupy  the  same  relative  position  of  importance  in 
the  Prussian  Government,  as  the  Bundesrath.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Prussian  House  of  Represent- 
atives is  relatively  a  more  powerful  body  than  the 
Reichstag.  Unembarrassed  by  the  principle  of  fed- 
eralism, and  less  subject  to  the  evils  of  fractional 
parties,  it  is  more  than  probable  that  a  thoroughly 
popular  chamber  would  be  able  to  institute  an  effec- 
tive control  over  the  Prussian  ministers.     The  Prus- 

149 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

sian  constitution  already  prescribes  such  a  minis- 
terial responsibility,  and  it  would  only  be  necessary 
to  enforce  it,  perhaps,  if  resistance  were  attempted, 
by  means  of  an  impeachment-process,  which  the  con- 
stitution also  provides  for,  but  which  would  require 
an  Ausfuhrungsgesetz.  The  same  course  of  develop- 
ment will  doubtless  take  place  in  the  smaller  German 
states.  It  may  even  be  expected  that  some  of  them 
will  anticipate  Prussia  in  this  respect.  But  the  in- 
troduction of  ministerial  responsibility  in  Prussia 
would  transfer  the  ultimate  control  over  the  Prus- 
sian delegation  in  the  Bundesrath  from  King  to 
Landtag,  as  ministerial  responsibility  in  the  smaller 
states  would  result  in  popular  control  of  their  dele- 
gations. And,  since  the  principal  power  of  the  Em- 
peror springs  from  his  being  King  of  Prussia  and 
thus  being  able  to  control  that  state's  delegation,  this 
change  would  very  seriously  reduce  his  power  in 
Imperial  affairs.  In  like  manner,  the  Chancellor 
would  no  longer  be  Minister-President  of  Prussia, 
or  charged  with  the  administration  of  the  Prussian 
Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  whence  issue  instruc- 
tions to  the  Prussian  delegation  in  the  Bundesrath. 
His  powers  would  immediately  shrivel  up,  and  he 
would  become  merely  the  Kaiser's  personal  agent, 

150 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

and  the  moderator  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Bundes- 
rath. 

If  we  may  suppose  the  existence  of  a  thoroughly 
responsible  and  powerful  Minister-President  in  Prus- 
sia, supported  by  an  able  ministry,  and  possessed  of 
the  full  confidence  of  the  Prussian  Landtag,  it  is 
evident  that  he  would  be  in  the  position,  which  the 
King  now  occupies,  to  control  the  Prussian  delega- 
tion in  the  Bundesrath;  and,  while  that  delegation 
does  not  constitute  a  majority  of  the  entire  body, 
such  a  Minister-President  would  probably  be  able, 
as  the  Prussian  Government  is  at  present  able,  to 
secure  sufficient  support  from  some  of  the  other  states 
to  afford  him  a  majority  on  nearly  all  questions. 
This  would  be  especially  true  if  the  same  popular 
control  had  been  established  over  the  delegations  of 
the  other  states  in  the  Bundesrath.  What  would  be 
the  result  under  such  circumstances  ?  The  Bundes- 
rath would  become  the  responsible  agent  of  the 
Prussian  Ministry,  which,  in  turn,  would  be  respon- 
sible to  the  Prussian  Landtag.  The  Kaiser,  and  his 
personal  agent,  the  Chancellor,  would  still  be  nomi- 
nally vested  with  the  control  over  the  army,  the  ap- 
pointment to  Imperial  offices,  and  the  execution  of 

151 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  laws  of  the  Empire.  But  with  the  Bundesrath, 
the  Reichstag  and  the  Prussian  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives all  combined  in  their  attack  upon  autoc- 
racy, it  could  not  be  long  before  even  this  sphere  of 
governmental  activity  would  be  brought  under  some 
kind  of  parliamentary  control.  Curiously  enough, 
the  Prussian  Landtag,  and  not  the  Reichstag,  in 
such  a  case  would  become  the  ultimate  controlling 
power  in  the  Empire.  And,  so  long  as  the  principles 
of  federalism  and  Prussian  hegemony  are  retained  in 
the  German  Empire,  no  other  result  may  be  expected. 
The  natural  and  logical  order  of  evolution  would 
seem  to  be  the  historical  order,  from  individual  state 
upward  and  not  from  Empire  downward. 

It  is  not  easy  to  say  just  what  progress,  if  any, 
towards  responsible  parliamentary  government  has 
been  made  in  Germany  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
war.  There  seems  to  be  some  tendency  towards  the 
development  of  a  two-party  system  in  the  Reichstag, 
the  one  party  advocating  radical  Pan-Germanistic 
policies,  and  the  other  more  moderate  anti-annexa- 
tionist  doctrines.  This  line  of  cleavage,  however, 
furnishes  little  assurance  of  a  permanent  grouping 
into  two  instead  of  a  large  number  of  parties.     Of 

152 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

greater  significance  is  the  fact  that  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war,  the  government  has  been  willing  to 
enter  into  working  relations  with  the  Social  Demo- 
crats, and  they,  or  the  large  majority  of  them,  in 
turn,  have  abandoned  in  considerable  measure  their 
"irreconcilable"  attitude  and  adopted  reformatory 
instead  of  revolutionary  methods. 

Of  more  significance,  however,  is  the  faet  that 
the  opposition  of  the  Reichstag  to  Bethmann-Hollweg 
forced  his  retirement  from  the  Chancellorship.  His 
successor,  Dr.  liichaelis,  however,  was  appointed  by 
the  Kaiser  without  consulting  in  any  way  the  Reich- 
stag, but  he  was  able  to  remain  in  office  but  a  short 
time,  being  followed  by  Count  Hertling  who,  it  is 
known,  did  not  accept  the  appointment  until  he  had 
made  sure  that  he  could  obtain  the  backing  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  Reichstag  members.  This  assurance  he 
obtained  by  conferring  with  the  party  leaders  and 
making  certain  pledges,  one  of  which  was  that  two 
of  his  ministers  would  be  selected  from  parliamentary 
ranks. 

At  the  time  this  occurred,  a  number  of  the  Ger- 
man newspapers  de«lared  that  an  epoch-making  event 
had  taken  place — the  Junkers  especially  asserting  a 

153 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

step  fatal  to  the  old  constitutional  regime  had  been 
taken.  The  permanent  significance,  however,  of  the 
circumstances  attending  the  taking  of  office  by  Count 
Hertling  remains  yet  to  be  seen.  Subsequent  months 
have  shown  no  marked  increase  in  the  authority  and 
influence  of  the  Reichstag,  and,  for  reasons  which 
have  been  set  forth  above,  before  any  really  respon- 
sible parliamentary  government  is  established  in  the 
Empire,  radical  changes  must  take  place  in  the 
status  of  the  Bundesrath,  in  the  relation  of  the  con- 
stituent states  to  the  Empire,  and  in  the  parlia- 
mentary situation  within  those  states.  Especially 
must  the  people,  through  their  elected  representa- 
tives, be  given  a  far  greater  control  in  the  Prus- 
sian Government,  and  this  it  is  that  gives  especial 
significance  to  the  pending  proposals  to  liberalize  the 
composition  of  the  upper  chamber  of  the  Prussian 
Landtag,  and  to  reform  the  existing  vicious  system  of 
electing  the  members  of  the  lower  house.  When  this 
lower  Prussian  chamber  becomes  a  body  of  repre- 
sentatives chosen  directly  by  a  secret  ballot  cast  by 
voters  no  longer  grouped  in  classes  according  to 
amounts  of  taxes  paid,  and  with  voting  districts  rep- 
resented according  to  their  respective  populations, 

154 


MINISTERIAL  RESPONSIBILITY 

the  voice  of  the  people  will  undoubtedly  have  a 
force  it  now  lacks  to  compel  executive  responsibility 
to  itself  and  amenability  to  its  wishes. 

POSTSCRIPT 

Since  the  foregoing  was  written,  and  while  this  book 
was  in  process  of  printing,  the  Imperial  Decree  of  Sep- 
tember 30  and  the  notable  address  to  the  Reichstag  of 
the  new  Chancellor,  Prince  Maximilian,  on  October  5, 
1918,  having  for  their  purport  to  make  known  that  the 
government  had  decided  to  adopt  the  principle  of  respon- 
sible government  appeared.  This  address  undoubtedly 
constitutes  what  will  always  be  one  of  the  great  political 
documents  of  Germany.*  It  is  impossible  to  over-empha- 
size its  importance.  On  the  face  of  it,  it  represents  a 
complete  acquiescence  in  the  position  that  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  and  other  ministers  shall  hereafter  be  respon- 
sible to  the  people  as  represented  in  the  Reichstag  instead 
of  to  the  Kaiser.  It  means,  if  its  full  implications  are 
carried  out,  that  the  government  of  Germany  shall  be 
transformed  from  an  autocracy  to  a  popular  government 
of  the  representative  type.  Due  to  its  importance  we 
have  felt  justified  in  reproducing  in  an  appendix  that 
part  of  the  address  of  the  Chancellor  dealing  with  this 
political  change. 

Though  the  delivery  of  this  address  puts  the  entire 
problem  of  the  achievement  of  responsible  government  in 

*  See  Appendix. 

155 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Germany  in  a  new  light,  we  have  nevertheless  thought  it 
desirable  to  leave  unchanged  what  has  been  written  on 
this  subject,  since  the  consideration  of  the  subject  there 
given  shows  the  tremendous  difficulties  that  confront 
Germany  in  making  the  change  without  almost  completely 
altering  the  form  of  government  now  in  existence. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


PROPAGANDA 


The  foregoing  pages  have  failed  of  their  purpose 
if  they  have  not  shown  that  there  is  a  distinctively 
Prussian  political  philosophy  which  has  spread 
throughout  Germany,  which  is  used  to  defend  the 
denial  to  the  people  of  a  right  to  control  their  own/ 
government,  which  calls  upon  them^Jn  matters  p< 
litical,  to  subordinate  their  individual  judgments  andN 
consciences  to  the  pronouncements  of  their  rulers, 
which  has  dictated,  in  large  measure,  the  aggressive 
policies  of  the  Empire,  and  which^as^been,  and  con- 
tinues to  be,  employed  to  justify,  in  the  forum  of 
morals,  the  atrocities  that  have  been  committed  with 
official  sanction  by  the  soldiers,  sailors  and  airmen 
of  Germany  and  her  allies. 

It  will  have  been  seen  that  the  doctrines  which 
have  been  declared  and  vigorously  applied  can  be 
truly  said  to  constitute  a  philosophy  since  they  are 
logically  related  to  one  another  and  together  consti- 
tute a  systematic  whole.    If,  as  Lincoln  said  in  one 

157 


/rsks 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

of  his  speeches,  we  find  a  number  of  timbers  of  dif- 
ferent sizes  and  shapes  which,  when  brought  together, 
fit  into  one  another  and  form  a  symmetrical  struc- 
ture, we  are  justified  in  believing  that  these  parts 
have  been  deliberately  prepared  with  a  view  to  the  use 
to  which  they  are  finally  put.  And  so  it  is  with  re- 
gard to  the  logical  parts  of  Prussia's  political  theory 
and  constitutional  practice. 

f  Throughout  this  carefully  constructed  system  of 
political  thought  there  plainjy_appears  (Jm§|  element 
which  gives  a  special  character  to  it,  and  which  is 
largely  responsible  for  the  malign  influences  the  sys- 
tem has  exerted.  This  is  the  divine  or  myat.mal.,  or 
A  providential  element — call  it  what  you  like — which, 
being  granted,  removes  the  Prussian  3tat©-an4  its 
policies  from  the^jrealm-^of— practical  reason  and 
exempts  them  from  the  restraining  control  of  the 
rules  of  morality_ghkh--apply  in-all  other  fields  of 
humajLJionduct. 

Thus,  by  the  following  logical  steps,  the  argument 
advances: 

There  is  to  be  discerned  in  human  history  the 
Working  _out  of  a  divine  or  providential  plan,  or,  in 

\  Hegelian  language,  the  progressive  realization  of 
reason,  the  ideal  tending  constantly  to  become  the 

158 


L 


PROPAGANDA 

real.     In  this  process  of  human  development,  dif-v^ 
ferent  peoples  by  reason  of  their  inherent  qualities,    7 
are  called  upon,  in  turn,  to  take  the  leadership.     At  / 
the  present  time  the  Teutons  possess  those  special 
racial  endowments;  their  Civilization  or  Kultur  ex- 
hibits  the  characteristics  which  are  needed  for  ad- 
vancing  the  human  race  still  further  along  its  ap- 
pointed path ;  and  to  lead  the  Teutons  the  Prussians 
have  been  providentially  called.     T^is_they  can  do 
only  in  and  through  their  State,  which  thus  appears 
as  an  agency  of  the  divine  or  providential  will,  or  as 
a  product  of  the  absolute  Reason.    As  related  to  the' 
world  purpose  the  Prussian  State  may  thus  appear  as 
a  means;  but  as  related  to  the  individuals  subject 
to  its  control,  ita  maintenance  is  an  end  in  itself,  its 
origin  inscrutable,  its  authority  not  subject  to  ques- 
tion.   TJijjfotaite-Ben^,  as  thus  mystically  conceived, 
demands  for  its  effective  operation  a  monarchical  \ 
form  of  governmental   organization_injwhich1  not 
simply  as  a  legal  proposition,  but  in  practice,  the 
personal  will  of  the  ruler  shall  be  supreme.     S_uch 
a  ruler  is  supplied  by  the  Hohenzollern  family,  whose  V       ^ 
head  is  by  divine  right  entitled  to  the  Prussian 
throne. 

The  existence  of  the  foregoing  philosophy  cannot 

159 


? 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

be  doubted.  If  we  did  not  find  it  explicitly  avowed 
by  Germany's  publicists,  historians,  moralists,  theo- 
logues,  scientists,  and  statesmen,  the  authorized  acts 
of  her  governments  and  her  peoples  would  necessarily 
imply  it.  And  yet,  fcfififfliafl  of  its  mystical  and  flb- 
/  stract_character,  and  because  of  its  atrocious  implicaJ 
tions,  it  is  not  strange  that  we  should  hesitate  to 
believe  that  an  intellectually, enlightened  people  gpuld 
jossiblv  have  become  innWtrinfltad  with  it.  and  their 
views  regarding  political  matters  perverted  by  it. 
BxffiL-iLhas  been  possible  to  accomplish^  this  result, 
in  appearance  so  difficult,  it-willjiiojE  be  shown. 

The  fir^t  propositi nn  from  which  we  must  start  is 
khat  thia_pnilosophy -which  has  made  Germany  a  pa- 
)  riah  among  nations  is  jaot^ojly^political^ .in-  nature, 
Umt  political  in  its  origin  and  propagation. 
/'  It  is  not  a.  matter  for  surprise  that  there  should 
be    differenceS-JiL.^natioTia.1    ideals    when    different 
States  are  in  different  stages  of  social  and-industrial 
\       j  development,  or  when^their  peoples  give  assent  to 
v   different  religions,  or  for  one  reason  or  another -have 
j  adopted  different  interpretations  of  the  nature  -and 
meaning  of  human  existence.     The  writer  has  re- 
cently had  the  opportunity  in  China  of  studying  and 
observing  the  ideals  and  practices  of  a  people  who 

160 


cv> 


PROPAGANDA 

are  still  in  the  agricultural  as  distinguished  from  the 
industrial  and  commercial  stage  of  economic  life, 
and  who  accept  a  religious  and  ethical  philosophy 
fundamentally  different  from  our  own;  and,  exam- 
ined in  the  light  of  these  determining  facts,  it  has 
not  seemed  strange  that  certain  standards  of  per- 
sonal conduct  in  China,  should  not  be  the  same  as 
those  of  the  Christianized  and  industrialized  western 
world,  and  that  the  hierarchical  arrangement  of  the 
virtues  should  be  different  from  that  with  which  we 
are  familiar.  But  whejQ_w£_find_a_people  of  a  country 
like  Prussia,  and  the  other  middle  European  peoples 
so  far  as  they  have  submitted  to  Prussian  influence, 
avowing  belief  in,  and  practicing  doctrines  which 
shock  the  consciences  of  all  the  other  peoples  of  the 
civilized  world  who  are  in  substantially  the  same 
stage_of_industrial  and  commercial  development,  and 
who  accept  the  same  religion,  and  in  private  life 
are  guided  by  the  same  rules  of  morality,  we  are 
confronted  with  a  situation  that  demands  an  explana- 
tion. Explanation  there  must  be,  for  it  is  scarcely 
conceivable  that  such  a  remarkable  condition  of  af- 
fairs could  have  come  into  existence  in  a  purely  for- 
tuitous manner. 

Inasmuch,  now,  as  we  are.  unaul£_lo_£nd -this  ex- 

161 


C 


$ 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

planation_in_ jijiiliug_metaphysics,  or  a  xU.stinctive 

religion,  or  a  system  of  personal  morals,  or  a_social 

order,  or  a  stage_ojLej20jiomLc.Jife  which  is  peculiar 

and  distinguishing,  but  do  find  in  operation_ja£sy£" 

tern  of  government  founded  upon  constitutional  and 

political   principles   ^dically   different  frorn^ .those 

which  find  acceptance  and  application  in  England, 

France,  Belgium,  Italy  and  the  United  States,  then 

a  strong  presumption  is  necessarily  raised  tha1<liere 

is  to  be  found  the  explanation  which  we  seek.     And 

this  presumption  is  still  further  strengthened  when 

WftJlad  that.  theJigrJUg", Governments  deny  to  .their 

peoples  the  right  to  determine  their  own  political 

/destinies ;  that  theyjassert,  as  a  practical  proposition, 

(  that  it  is  not  within  the  competence  of  the  popular 

Will  of  even  an_intellectually  enlightenexLpeaple  to 

/form  intelligent  judgments regarding  matters  of  pub- 

1  lie  policy  unless  guided  and  controlled,  by  those  in 
political  authority;  and  that  the  machinery  of  .these 
;  governments  is  so  organized  and  orjeratedjthat  it  has 
the  organs  or  instrnmFmtfllitifta  through  which  it  is 

^able  to  create  and  mold  public  opinion;  when,  in 
other  words,  we  find  the  clergy  subjected  to  strong 
\   governmental  influence,  education  from  the  primary 
school  to  the  university  practically  monopolized  by 

162 


PROPAGANDA 

3Tvir»P  maintftiTifvl 


the  State,  and  a .system  of  military  service  maintained 
that  brings  almost  the  entire  body  of  youths  of  the 
country  under  complete  and  rigid  governmental  con-    / 
trol  at  the  very  period  of  their  lives  when  their  ideals 
are  most  susceptible  to  outside  formative  influences; 
and,  4nal$>  when  we  find  it  frankly  avowed  that  it\         ^ 
is  within  the  legitimate  sphere  of  public  authority     \ 
that  the  press  should  be  controlled  and  employed  as      / 
an  agency  for  spreading  doctrines  favored  by  those     / 
in  political  authority  and  for  discrediting  doctrines 
which  are  not  favored — when,  I  say,  wfi^no!_all_these     \ 
political  conditions  it  no  longer  appears  strange  that 
those  in  control  of  the  machinery  of  government 
should  have  been  able,  by  reiterated  action  extending 
oy^_several^enerations_i)f  time,  to  spread  among  a 
people  and  secure  the  acceptance  of  doctrines  which, 
however  false,  are  surfaced  over  with  a  transcenden- 
tal  and  pseudo-philosophical  character  which  appeal 
to  patrjotjsm  upon  the  emotional  side,  and  which 
furthermore  makg  a  direct  hid^to  sordid  and  selfish 
interests  by  justifying  every  action  which  will  tend 
to  increase  the  political  ^power-and  material  pros- 
perity of  the  community. 

Professor  Dewey  in  his  recent  volume,   German 
Philosophy  and  Politics,  is  thus  justified  when  he 

163 


L 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

says  that  "Germany  is  the  modern  State  which  pro- 
vides the  greatest  facilities  for  general  ideas  to  take 
effect." 
iSV^y        Of  primary  im porta nopi  as  a  means_pf  spreading 
^      ideas  among_the  people,  are  the  educational  institu- 

\    tirvnfi  nf  t.hft  Gprman   States. 

As  is  well  known,  these,  from  the  primary  school 
\)  to  the_  university,  are  state  agencies  and,  in  fact, 
treated  as  being  as  much  governmental  organs  as  are 
the  other  branches  of  the  public  service.  The  Prus- 
sian constitution  itself  provides  that  "All  public 
and  private  educational  institutions  shall  be  under 
the  supervision  of  authorities  appointed  by  the 
State"  and  the  "Teachers  in  public  schools  shall 
have  the  rights  and  duties  of  public  officials"  (Article 
23).  And,  in  this  connection,  it  may  be  noted  that 
in  all  the  German  States  private  schools  are  few  in 
number  and  of  negligible  influence. 

What  gives  further  significance  to  this  state  mo- 
nopoly of  education  is  the  fact  that  one  of  the_chief 
functions  of  the  higher  institutions  of  learning's  to 
prepare  for  entrance  to  the  civil  service j)f jtheJState 
and  to__cmalify  the  students  for  appointment  as  of- 
ficers in  the  army.    Only  through  the  universities  can 

164 


PROPAGANDA 

enrollment  in  the-pawerful  bureaucracies  of  the  Ger- 
man States  be_secured. 

That  the  Governments  of  the  German  States  have 
employed  their  control  of  education  in  order  to  in- 
culcate in  their  subjects  the  political  views  which 
their  rulers  have  desired  them  to  hold,  is  beyond 
doubt.  This  is  shown  not  only  in  the  teaching  that 
has  been  prescribed,  but  in  the  manner  in  which 
their  popular  schools  have  been  organized.  This 
latter  point  is  one  that,  perhaps,  has  not  been  suf- 
ficiently appreciated  in  America  and  therefore  needs 
some  emphasis. 

Care  hasj3een_taken-by-  the  governments  se4e  exer- 
cise their  powersof  organization_aiid  supervision  of 
the  schools  that  the  so-called  lower  or  working 
classes  (in  which  democratic  idea&Jiiay  be  expected 
to  be  the  most  prevalent)  shall  not  have  a  reasonable 
chance  to  lift  themselves  into  the  upper  classes,  and 
especially  that  they  shall  not  have  the  opportunity 
to  obtain  that  amount  and  kind  of  education  which 
will  qualify  them  for  entrance,  into  the  civil  service 
of  the  State. 

The  educatjon_qbtained  by  probably  ninety-five 
per  cent  of  the  children  js_limited  _to  that  obtained 
in^the  elementary  schools,  the  Volksschulen  as  they 

165 


\ 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

are  called.  The  best  as  well  as  the  latest  descrip- 
tion which  we  have  in  English  of  these  schools  is 
that  given  by  Professor  Alexander  in  his  volume 
entitled  The  Prussian  Elementary  Schools,  published 
in  1918;  and  we  can  therefore  do  no  better  than 
quote  what  he  has  said  there.  Before  doing  so, 
however,  it  should  be  said  that  this  volume  was  pre- 
pared with  no  polemical  purpose.  It  finds  a  place  in 
the  well  known  series  of  educational  text-books  edited 
by  Professor  Paul  Monroe,  and,  as  its  preface  tells 
us,  was  prepared  before  the  outbreak  of  the  present 
war. 

For  our  purpose  the  most  interesting  chapter  of 
the  volume  is  the  third  entitled  "General  Relation- 
ships of  School  Systems."  * 

"The  aim  of  the  elementary  school,"  says  Profes- 
sor Alexander,  "is  to  develop  efficient  German  citi- 
zens— to  give  boys  and  girls  moral  and  religious  train- 
ing, to  furnish  them  with  that  general  fund  of 
knowledge  every  intelligent,  independent  citizen  must 
have,  and,  above  all,  to  make  them  patriotic  mem- 
bers of  society.  The  V olhsschulen,  as  well  as  the 
middle  and  higher  schools,  are  institutions  of  gen- 

1It  ia  pointed  out  that  though  there  are  of  course  minor 
differences,  the  Prussian  educational  system  is  typical  of  the 
systems  found  throughout  Germany. 

166 


PROPAGANDA 

eral  training,  and  in  themselves  do  not  aim  to  pre- 
pare for  any  definite  career;  that  is,  they  do  not 
prepare  boys  and  girls  for  a  special  trade  or  call- 
ing. .  .  .  For  example,  it  would  be  impossible  for 
a  boy  who  had  gone  through  the  VolJcsschule  to  study 
law,  because  he  has  had  no  Latin,  which  the  study 
of  law  presupposes. 

"The  pupils  of  the  VolJcsscliulen  are  children  of 
day  laborers,  peasants,  small  farmers,  waiters,  clerks, 
porters,  truck  drivers,  janitors,  lower  railway  em- 
ployees, blacksmiths,  locksmiths,  and  other  workers 
of  this  order. 

"The  child  remains  eight  years  in  the  Volksschule 
and  his  training  is  altogether  general.  At  the  end 
he  has  learned  to  read,  write,  count,  and  sing;  he 
has  gathered  something  concerning  nature  and  the 
daily  life  about  him ;  and  has  been  taught  his  duties 
towards  God  and  his  fellow  men.  When  this  is  done, 
he  is  free  to  choose  his  work  within  certain  fields. 
As  a  rule  he  selects  some  trade  or  calling  and  be- 
comes an  apprentice,  at  the  same  time  completing 
his  education  in  a  continuation  school,  or  in  some 
kind  of  a  trade  school." 

All  this,  so  far  as  it  goes,  is  excellent  in  scope,  and, 
be  it  said,  especially  excellent  in  execution.     The 

167 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

feature  that  is  offensive  to  true  democratic  ideals 
enters  when  we  find  that  the  system  is  so  arranged 
that  after  the  age  of  nine  there  is  practically  no 
chance  for  the  pupil  to  transfer  to  those  schools 
which  prepare  for  the  Gymnasium,  or  University, 
and  thus  to  qualify  for  one  of  the  learned  profes- 
sions or  for  appointment  to  any  of  the  higher 
branches  of  the  State's  civil  service,  or  as  an  officer 
in  the  army.  The  courses  of  study  are  arranged  so 
that  it  becomes  practically  impossible  to  make  this 
transfer.  In  addition,  the  tuition  fees  charged  in 
the  Gymnasium  are  made  so  large  that  they  cannot 
be  met  by  the  ordinary  working  man's  family.  The 
result  is,  as  it  is  intended  to  be,  that,  for  the  ffreat 
mass  of  the  people,  no  real  opportunity_egists,  for 
the  childrento  j"ise  out  of  the  class  into  which  they 
are  born.  The  ruling  class,  civil  and  military,  is  an 
aristocracy  almost  as  tightly  closed  to  outsiders  as 
if  absolute  legal  barriers  were  erected. 

In  result,  Professor  Alexander  declares,  "a  care- 
ful study  of  the  Prussian  school  system  will  con- 
vince any  unbiased  reader  that  the  Prussian  citizen 
cannot  be  free  to  do  or  act  for  himself;  that  the 
Prussian  is  to  a  large  measure  enslaved  through  the 
medium  of  his  school;  that  his  learning  instead  of 

168 


PROPAGANDA 

making  him  his  own  master,  forges  the  chain  by 
which  he  is  held  in  servitude ;  that  ifee,  whole  scheme 
of  Prussian  elementary  education  is  shaped  with  thev 
express  purpose  of  making jninety-five  out  of  every  ^ 
hundred  citizens  subservient  to  the  ruling  house  and 
toJhaJState."  "The  elementary  schools  of  Prussia 
have  been  fashioned  so  as  to  make  spiritual  and  in- 
tellectual slaves  of  the  lower  classes.  The  schools 
have  been  used  almost  exclusively  to  establish  more 
firmly  the  Hohenzollern  upon  his  throne." 

The  next  year  after  his  accession  to  the  throne  the 
present  Kaiser  issued  an  order  in  which  he  said:  "The 
schools  must  create  in  tEe  youth  the  conviction  that 
the  doctrines  of  socialism  are  contrary  not  only  to 
God's  decrees  and  Christian  moral  teaching,  but  in 
reality  incapable  of  application  and  destructive  both 
to  the  individual  and  the  State.     Thef_achools  .  .  ?s. 
must  show  that  thejpower  of  the  State  alone  can  as-     \ 
sure  the  individual  his  freedom  and  his  rights,  and     / 
impress  on  the  youth  how  Prussian  Kings  have  con-  / 
tinually  given  themselves  pains  to  better  the_opndi-  / 
tions  of  the  working  classes  from  the  time  of  the  legal    v 
reforms  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  the  abolishment 
of  serfdom  until  to-day.     Further,  the  schools  must 
prove  by  means  of  statistical  facts  how  materially 

169 


rfC 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

and  how  constantly  during  this  century  the  condi- 
tions of  living  and  the  wages  among  the  working- 
classes  have  improved  under  our  royal  protection." 

It  is  thus  seen,  that  with  deliberate  intention  in- 
struction in  history  has  been  employed  to  support  the 
monarchy.  In  fact,  however,  it  has  been  still  fur- 
ther employed  to  teach  a  narrow  rationalism. 

This  is  a  point  which  has  been  excellently  brought 
out  by  Professor  E.  B.  Greene.1  He  calls  attention 
to  the  increased  emphasis  that  has  been  laid  upon 
Prussian  history  in  the  schools  since  the  Revised 
Program  of  1902,  and  quotes  the  statement  of  Neu- 
bauer,  a  leading  educational  expert,  contained  in  a 
volume  dedicated  to  William  II,  that  "Since  we 
have  become  a  Nation  the  dream  of  an  education 
from  the  standpoint  of  universal  history  has  van- 
ished." 2    And  Neubauer  himself  says : 

The  national  function  of  historical  instruction  can  be 
no  other  than  to  demonstrate  the  moral  authority  of  the 
State ;  to  impress  on  the  heart  of  the  people  what  the  State 
and  Nation  mean  for  him;  to  awaken  the  sense  of  profound 
obligation  of  unconditional  dependence  on  his  people. 

1  "Eight  and  Wrong  Uses  of  History  in  a  Scheme  of  Civic 
Education."    School  and  Home  Education,  April,  1918. 

3  Seit  wir  eine  Nation  geworden  sind,  ist  der  Traum  einea 
universalgeschichtlichen  Unterrichts  geschwunden.  In  Lexis, 
Reform  des  hoheren  Schuhoesens  in  Preussen.  Halle.  1902, 
p.  229. 

170 


PROPAGANDA 

Furthermore,  as  Professor  Greene  says  in  the 
paper  to  which  we  have  referred :  "The  teaching  of 
history  in  Prussia  is  not  only  aggressively  rational- 
istic, it  is  also  meant  to  establish  the  monarchical 
tradition.  Tor  us  Germans,'  we  are  told,  'national 
feeling  takes  on  a  special  coloring;  loyalty  to  our 
people  and  devotion  (Anhanglichkeit)  to  the  mon- 
archy are  inseparable.'  T^p,  jnspire  the  people  withV 
'an  indestructible  feeling  for  the  State'  (Staatsge- 
fiihl)  and  a  spirit  of  loyalty  to  the  inherited  mon- 
archical constitution  is  held  to  be  one  of Jthejfairest 
fruits'  of  historical  teaching.1  The  child  in  the 
Volksschule  is  to  be  shown  the  ^beneficent  strivings 
and  success  of  our  noble  princely  family'  as  well  as 
'the  great  deeds  of  our  people,'  in  order  to  plant  in 
his  heart  'love  and  holy  enthusiasm  for  Emperor, 
King,  people,  and  Fatherland.'  2  The  o%ial_regula-V 
tions  forjthe  normal  schwl^r^quire_^at_the. future 
teachers  shall  be  'qualified  to  arouse  and  to  nourish 
in  their  pupils  love  for  the  Fatherland  and  for  th6 
ruling  dynasty.'  "  8 

*Cf.  Neubauer,  op.  tit. 

*  Quoting  from  Nadler's  Rathgeber  fur  VoUcsschullehrer. 

'  Professor  Greene  contrasts  these  doctrines  with  that  of  the 
eminent  French  historian  Lavisse,  who  says:  "The  cultivation 
of  national  spirit  is  a  delicate  affair.    It  is  necessary  above  all 

171 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

How  carefully  the  ruling  authorities  are  to  lose 
no  opportunity  of  spreading  the  doctrines  they  de- 
sire to  be  held  by  the  people,  even  though  the  distor- 
tion or  suppression  of  facts  is  involved,  is  shown  in 
the  incident  which  H.  H.  Boyesen  told  to  his  Ameri- 
can friend,  Talcott  Williams,  who  describes  it  as  fol- 
lows: 

Hjalmar  Hjorth  Boyesen  issued  thirty  years  ago  a  life 
of  Goethe,  of  which  I  wrote  a  review  which  brought  us  in 
close  touch.  It  had  been  published  in  German,  and  I 
asked  him  as  to  its  success.  He  told  me  that  when  he 
went  to  Germany  he  received  a  polite  invitation  to  come 
to  see  the  Minister  of  Instruction  (also  of  ecclesiastical 
affairs)  in  Prussia  and  found  the  minister  at  his  desk  with 
a  copy  of  the  volume  in  his  hand.  "This,"  said  the  min- 
ister, "we  feel  is  the  best  life  of  Goethe  that  has  been 
written,  but  there  are  two  chapters  in  it  which  dwell  upon 
the  liberal  views  of  Goethe,  which  we  all  regret,  which  he 
would  never  hold  to-day,  which  have  no  real  part  in  his 
life  as  a  whole.  If  you  will  take  this  volume,  leave  out 
these  chapters,  or  rewrite  them  so  they  are  not  a  repub- 
lican propaganda,  I  will  put  it  into  our  schools  wherever 
there  is  a  course  in  literature.  All  the  other  units  of  the 
Empire  will  follow  and  Austria  will  probably  do  the 
same."  Boyesen  said  to  me:  "I  looked  at  him  as  he  sat 
there  in  his  undress  uniform  and  I  realized  I  was  face  to 

to  strengthen  the  national  love  of  native  land,  to  make  this 
instinct  intelligent  and  to  illumine  it,  but,  in  France,  we  must 
never  forget  the  man  in  the  Frenchman  nor  belittle  for  the 
apparent  profit  of  our  own  country  the  work  of  mankind." 

172 


PROPAGANDA 

face  with  the  military  power  of  a  great  country  stifling 
freedom,  and  I  told  him  as  politely  as  I  could  that  nothing 
would  induce  me  to  change  those  chapters.  As  it  was 
copyrighted  in  Germany  and  by  other  countries  of  the 
Geneva  Convention,  I  knew  that  the  minister  could  not 
alter  it;  but  the  dream  of  royalties  which  would  have 
meant  to  me  a  competence  for  life,  if  this  book  were  once 
made  a  text-book,  which  came  before  me  when  I  saw  the 
volume  in  his  hand,  vanished."  * 

That  the  political  pressure  which  is  exerted  from 
above  to  control  the  results  of  teaching  is  not  limited    S 
to  the  lower  schools  but  extends  through  the_  Gym-    / 
nasia  and  the  Universities  is  certain.     There  are  no 
higher  institutions  of  learning  in  the  world  where, 
in  general,  freedom  of  teaching  is  more  fully  recog- 
nized than  in  Germany,  but  from  this  freedom  to 
speculate  and  write  and  teach,  matters  of  political 
policy  are  excepted.     Every  professor  j^nows  that  "y 
his  advancement,  or  even  his  very  tenure  oiLpmce,     \ 
will  be  endangered  if  he  gives  expression  Jxl views     / 
that  are  in  opposition  to  those  of  the  Government 
And,  in  fact,  no  person  known  to  have  such  views 
has  any  chance  whatever  to  obtain  an  original  teach- 
ing appointment. 

In  another  chapter  reference  is  made  to  the  warn- 

1  Talcott  Williams,  How  the  German  Empire  has  Menaced 
Democracy.     Published  by  the  National  Security  League. 

173 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ing  served  by  the  Government  upon  the  eminent  uni- 
versity professor,  Walther  Schiicking,  simply  because 
in  one  of  his  lectures  he  said  that  he  would  not  dis- 
cuss the  divine  right  of  rulership  since  he  did  not 
consider  that  it  had  juristic  significance.  This  ex- 
pression of  opinion  showing  as  it  did  certainly  no 
radical  independence  of  thought  nevertheless  was 
in  contrast  to  what  those  in  authority  expect  from 
its  state-appointed  professors. 

In  truth,  however,  so  successfully  has  the  ruling 
political  philosophy  of  the  State  been  spread,  that 
it  appears  that  German  university  professors  as  a 
class,  scientifically  trained  though  they  are,  are  con- 
tent to  look  to  those  in  authority  over  them  as  the 
source  whence  political  truth  is  to  be  obtained.     To 


those  in  control  of  the  State  they  turn  as  do  devout 
Roman  Catholics  to  the  ex  cathedral  utterance  of 
the  head  of  their  Church.  Thus  we  have  the  state- 
ment of  one  of  the  most  eminent  of  their  own  num- 
ber, Professor  Otto  Harnack,  that  intelligent  and 
highly  educated  men  in  Germany  are  constantly 
found  expressing  opinions  on  political  questions 
"which  betray  no  trace  of  convicted  political  thought, 
but  merely  rest  on  belief  in  authority,  or  on  purely 

174 


PROPAGANDA 

personal  inclinations  and  caprice."  *    In  other  wordsv 
thus  scientific  methods  and  standards  are  abandoned    ? 
when  the  political  field  is  entered.     In  truth,  how-/ 
ever,  no  further  demonstration  is  needed  that,  as  a 
body,  the  intellectual  leaders  of  Germany  are  willing 
to  accept  the  mere  ipse  dixit  of  their  government 
with  reference  to  matters  political,  than  the  famous 
declaration  of  "truths"  which  nearly  one  hundred 
of  them  signed  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

As  regards  History  in-  particular,  it  has  been 
known  thatJPrussian  Histm-iang  fnrL_a.-ggrip.rati(-m  or 
more  have  constituted  a  distinct  "school,"  charac- 
terized by  the  doctrine  that  historical  facts  should 
be  so  presented  as  to  ^iye  support  to  nationalistic  pol- 
icies. In  this  respect  the  historian  Ireitschke  repre- 
sents onlyj.njm  extreme  form  a  purpose  and  method 
which  has  been  characteristic  of  modern  Prussian 
historical  writings.2 

But  not  only  by  means  of  History  is  political 
philosophy  taught  in  Germany.  The  sajB&as  true 
of  metaphysics,  law  and  theology.    As  is  well  known, 

Quoted  by  Dawson.    What  is  Wrong  with  Oermanyf  p.  60. 

'  See  the  very  valuable  chapter  on  the  Prussian  School  of 
Historians  in  Gooch's  Historians  of  the  Nineteenth  Century, 
a  work  published  several  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
present  war. 

175 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Taw  is  taught  in  the  Universities  not  so  much  with  a 
view  to  preparing  the  students  to  become  practicing 
lawyers  or  judges,  as  to  give  to  them  a  knowledge  of 
the  law  as  an  historical  science_and  a  philosophy  of 
right.  Certain  it  is,  at  any  rate,  that  in  all  the  uni- 
versities  philosophies  of  jurisprudence  constitute  an 
important  part  of  the  legal  instruction  that  is  given. 
The  same  is  true  of  theology,  that  subject  being  kept 
in  the  closest  possible  relation  to  metaphysical  and 
ethical  speculations.  And,  as  for  the  metaphysicians 
themselves,  we  know  how  many  of  them  since  the 
time  of  Kant  have  not  been  content  until  they  have 
applied  their  premises  to  matters  political — but  never 
so  as  to  antagonize  the  Prussian  doctrines  of  State 
and  monarchy. 

The  Psychology  of  the  Situation. — One  further 
phase  of  our  inquiry  into  the  Prussian  political  mind 
remains  to  be  considered. 

We  have  shown  the  instrumentalities  available  to 
the  Prussian  Government  for  inculcating  in  its  peo- 
ple whatever  political  philosophy  it  is  desired  they 
should  hold.  We  have  shown  what  that  philosophy  is 
and  what  its  logical  implications  are.  But  it  remains 
to  be  shown  how  those  in  authority  have  come  sin- 
cerely to  hold  these  extraordinaryJ)eliefs,_and  why  it 

176 


PROPAGANDA 

is  that  the  minds  of  those^over  whom  they  have  rule 
have  been  so  receptive  to  them;  for,  notwithstanding 
the  agencies  which  existed  for  the  dissemination  of 
these  views,  it  is  incredible  that  they  should  have 
been  so  universally  accepted,  if  f or  ^oj2ie_x£asmL-or  V 
other,    t.hftir   minds   had    not,   ^"    ^Q^T   *"  receive     / 
them.    Thus  we  are Jbjpu^hJLto-tM^^cJtiok^y  of  the  ( 
situation. 

At  this  point  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  statement 
which  may  at  first  seem  paradoxical,  but  which,  in 
reality,  is  not.     This  is,  that  though  there is_every 
reason  to  believe  that  the  rulers  and  ruled  alike  sin- 
cerely believe  in  the  philosophy which  has  been  out- 
lined in  the  earlier  chapters  of  this  volume,  its  pre- 
mises and  the  principles  logically  deduced  from  them 
have  not  furnished  jth&-real  reasons- for  the  aggres- 
sive and  ruthless  policies  of  the  Prussian  State  and 
its  people.    (The  real  reason  has  been  nothings  nobler/ 
than  a  sordid  and  selfish  desire  forJlie-prestig&^and  V   '^'^ 
material    advanta£e^__whiciL_paraniQUJit-  political/ 
power,  if  reaUzed^would  be  able  to  secure.)  The  ex-^ 
istence   of   this   contradiction  between  the  motives 
which  have  been  sincerely  avowed,  and  the  motives 
which  have  been  actually  operative,  needs  to  be  ex- 

177 


V 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

plained.  This  explanation  the  modern  science  of 
psychology  supplies. 

The  fact  is  now  well  established  that,  as  a_nniversal 
rule,  men,  because  they  deem  themselves  to  be  ra- 
tional beings,  are  led  to  formulate  rational^grounds 
or  justifications  for  the  acts  which  they  have  done 
or  intend  to  do.  Not  to  do  this,  is,  of  course,  to  con- 
fess to  themselves  that  they  have  acted  or  intend  to 
act  in  an  irrational  or  ethically  unjustifiable  man- 
ner. The  desire,  or  libido  as  it  is  called,  is  the  real 
reason  for  their  acts;  the  theories  or  philosophies 
which  they  constructare  but  the  means  whereby  .they 
"2^  are  enabled  to  save  their  jeljhrespect,  and,  if_they  are 

able  to  convince  others  of  the  truth  of  themotives 
and_principles  which  they  draw,  to  preserve  their 
respect  in  the  eyes  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 

This  explanation  of  the  origin  of  philosophies  of 
conduct  holds  as  true  when  the  real  desires  are  such 
as  may  be  satisfied  without  a  violation  of  accepted 
ethical  standards  of  conduct  as  when  they  do  involve 
such  a  violation.  The  only  difference  is,  and  this  is 
the  point  that  modern  psychology  has  made  especially 
plain,  that  when  the  motives  are  such  as  are  not 
ethically  defensible  when  judged  by  ordinary  stand- 
ards of  conduct,  the  individual,  so  long  as  he  retains 

178 


PROPAGANDA 

any  self-respect  or  desire  for  the  respect  of  others, 
will  not  admit  even  to  himself  that  these  motives  are 
operative,  but  will  affirm  the  existence  of  certain 
special  facts,  or  postulate  certain  abstract  principles 
from  which  as  premises  he  may,  by  logical  deduction, 
justify  his  conduct.  Thus  by  a  veritable  instinct, 
rather  than  by  cunning  or  ^Hbej*aJ;e.Jrypocrisy,  he  \ 
forces  the  real  motive  out  of  his  active  consciousness,  \  <> 
and  comes  really  to  believe  that  he  is  actuatedjby  the 
motives  which  are  made  rational  and  ethical  bx  the 
premises  which  he  has  been  led  to  adopt. 

This  is  not  an  illustration  of  what  has  been  termed 
"the  will  to  believe."  The  process  is  more  subtle  and 
unconscious  than  what  is  thus  indicated.  The  agent 
is  thoroughly  self-deceived.  He  is  convinced  that 
his  motives  are  those  which  he  avows.  He  may  be 
aware  that  what  he  thus  feels  justified  in  doing  will 
redound  to  his  own  advantage  and  satisfy  desires  of 
which  he  is  aware.  But  none  the  less  he  believes 
that,  as  a  purely  rational  proposition,  he  has  justifi- 
cation for  what  he  does. 

To  use  a  modern  psychological  term,  a  suppressed 
desire  constitutes  a  "complex"  located  outside  of  the 
active  consciousness,  but  nevertheless  able  to  influ- 
ence it     It  operates  in  a  manner  not  dissimilar  to 

179 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  predispositions  which  every  individual  has,  by 
reason  of  interest,  personal  experience,  or  general 
mental  make-up  to  give  credence  to  certain  state- 
ments of  facts  and  reject  others,  or  to  find  certain 
arguments  convincing  and  others  without  probative 
value. 

Dr.  Bernard  Hart,  lecturer  in  psychiatry  in  the 
University  Hospital  at  London,  in  a  little  book  of 
exceptional  interest,  entitled  The  Psychology  of  In- 
sanity, discusses  irrationality  in  the  sane  as  well  as  in 
the  mentally  defective,  and  upon  the  point  which  we 
are  discussing,  has  the  following  to  say: 

A  complex  may  exert  a  pronounced  effect  upon  con- 
sciousness, although  the  individual  himself  may  be  un- 
aware of  its  action — that  is  to  say,  he  may  be  altogether 
ignorant  of  the  causes  which  are  really  determining  his 
own  mental  processes.  An  example  will  make  this  state- 
ment intelligible.  When  a  party  politician  is  called  upon 
to  consider  a  new  measure,  his  verdict  is  largely  deter- 
mined by  certain  constant  systems  of  ideas  and  trends 
of  thought,  constituting  what  is  generally  known  as 
"party  bias."  We  should  describe  these  systems  in  our 
newly  acquired  terminology  as  his  "political  complex." 
The  complex  causes  him  to  take  up  an  attitude  towards 
the  proposed  measure  which  is  quite  independent  of  any 
absolute  merits  that  the  latter  may  possess.  If  we  argue 
with  our  politician,  we  shall  find  that  the  complex  will 
reinforce  in  his  mind  those  arguments  which  support  the 

180 


PROPAGANDA 

view  of  his  party,  while  it  will  infallibly  prevent  him  from 
realizing  the  force  of  the  arguments  propounded  by  the 
opposite  side.  Now  it  should  be  observed  that  the  indi- 
vidual himself  is  probably  quite  unaware  of  this  mechan- 
ism in  his  hand.  He  fondly  imagines  that  his  opinion  is 
formed  solely  by  the  logical  pros  and  cons  of  the  measure 
before  him.  We  see,  in  fact,  that  not  only  is  his  thinking 
determined  by  a  complex  of  whose  action  he  is  uncon- 
scious, but  that  he  believes  his  thoughts  to  be  the  result 
of  other  causes  which  are  in  reality  insufficient  and  il- 
lusory. This  latter  process  of  self-deception,  in  which  the 
individual  conceals  the  real  foundation  of  his  thought  by 
a  series  of  adventitious  props,  is  termed  "rationalization." 


The  application  of  these  psychological,  principles' 
to  the  Prussian  or  Teutonic,  mind  is  clear  enough.    \ 
The  real  cause  of  the  acts  of  the  Germa_n_State  has  y 

been  the  desire,  by  any  means  possible,  to  obtain  / 

greater  and  still  greater  power  so  that  it  may  stand 
paramount  among  the  nations  of  the  world.  This  de- 
sire has  involved  motives  and  actions  that  stand  in 
manifest  opposition  to  the  ordinary  standards  of  con- 
duct, whether  of  individuals  or  peoples  in  their  deal- 
ings with  one  another.  Driven  therefore  by  a  desire 
to  ratjLonalize_their  actions  to  themselves,  and  to  y  5~~ 
defend  themselves  in  the  forum  of  the  world's  con- 
science, the  Prussians  have  developed  a  justifying  / 
political  philosophy  which,  though  resting  upon  prem- 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ises  which  to  others  are  demonstrably  false,  and 
leading  to  acts  which  have  horrified  all  the  rest  of  the 
world,  is  nevertheless  believed  in  as  true. 

Dr.  Hart,  in  the  volume  to  which  reference  has 
been  made,  makes  no  attempt,  as  we  have  done,  to 
apply  principles  of  psycho]pgy  to  the  Teutonic  mind 
as  it  has  been  revealed  in  the  present  war.  In  an- 
other recent  psychological  study,  however,  this  at- 
tempt has  been  made.  This  volume,  by  Mr.  W. 
Trotter,  bears  the  title  Instincts  of  the  Herd  in 
Peace  and  War,  and  so  illuminating  is  his  analysis 
that,  though  at  the  risk  of  remaining  too  long  in  the 
psychological  field,  the  author  feels  justified  in  sum- 
marizing his  conclusions. 

Mr.   Trotter's  chief  concern,  as  the  title  of  his 
study  indicates,   is  with  the  instincts  of  the  herd 
whether  as  applied  to  animals  or  to  man.    He  points 
out  various  types  of  gregariousness  which  are  mani- 
fested by  different  species  of  the  biological  world, 
and  finds  substantially  the  same  instincts  exhibited 
in  different  societies  of  men.     The_Germa^s^unfor-  V 
tunately  for  themselves  as  well  as  for  the  rest  of  ] 
the  world,  while  seeing  more  clearly  than  possibly    > 
any  other  race  the  value_of  a  conscious  ancLdeliberate  f 
direction_from  above  _of  the  thoughts  of  the  people,   ) 

182 


PROPAGANDA 

have,  for  reasons  which  the  accidents  of  their  history  |4  < 
largely  explain,  heen  led  to  develop  to  its  highest 
pitch  what  Mr.  Trotter  terms  the  "lupine"  type  of 
gregariousness — a  type  which  other  civilized  nations 
have  sought,  and  with  gradual  success,  to  eliminate 
and  replace  with  a  socialized  jype  according  to  which 
the  welfare  of  the  group  is,  secured  without  the  sac- 
rifice of  the  freedom  and  variety  of  the  individual. 
Describing  this  lupine  type,  Mr.  Trotter  says : 

The  functional  value  of  the<Kerd  instinctlfc.  the  wolf  is 
to  make  the  pack  irresistible  in  attacking  and  perpetually 
aggressive  in  spirit.  The  individual  must,  therefore,  be 
especially  sensitive  to  the  leadership  of  the  herd.  The 
herd  must  be  to  him,  not  merely  as  it  is  to  the  protectively 
gregarious  animal,  a  source  of  comfort,  and  stimulus,  and 
general  guidance,  but  must  be  able  to  make  him  do  things 
however  difficult,  however  dangerous,  even  however  sense- 
less, and  must  make  him  yield  an  absolute,  immediate, 
and  slavish  obedience.  The  carrying  out  of  the  com- 
mands of  the  herd  must  be  in  itself  an  absolute  satisfac- 
tion in  which  there  can  be  no  consideration  of  self. 
Towards  everything  outside  the  herd  he  will  necessarily 
be  arrogant,  confident,  and  inaccessible  to  the  appeals  of 
reason  or  feeling.  This  tense  bond  of  instinct,  constantly 
keyed  up  to  the  pitch  of  action,  will  give  him  a  certain 
simplicity  of  character  and  even  ingenuousness,  a  coarse- 
ness and  brutality  in  his  dealings  with  others,  and  a  com- 
plete failure  to  understand  any  motive  unsanctioned  by 
the  pack.  He  will  believe  the  pack  to  be  impregnable  and 
irresistible,  just,  and  good,  and  will  readily  ascribe  to 

183 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

it  any  other  attribute  which  may  take  his  fancy,  however 
ludicrously  inappropriate. 

Even  if  we  accept  this  analysis  of  the  lupine  herd 
instance  only  for  illustrative  purposes — to  Mr.  Trot 
ter,  however,  it  has  a  direct  and  real  application — 
it  certainly  serves  in  a  remarkable  manner,  to  de- 
scribe the  Teutonic  mind  as  it  has  found  expression 
in  word  and  deed,  especially  since  the  outbreak  of 
the  present  war.  This  mind  has  shown  itself  "at 
times  as  simplicity  or  even  childishness,  as  a  boorish 
cunning,  as  an  incredible  ant-like  activity,  a  reckless 
savagery  of  gloating  in  blood,  a  simple-minded  sen- 
timentality, as  outbursts  of  idolatry,  not  of  the  pallid, 
metaphorical  modern  type,  but  the  full-blooded  Afri- 
can kind,  with  all  the  apparatus  of  idol,  and  fetish 
and  tom-tom,  and,  with  it  all,  a  steady  confidence 
that  these  are  the  principles  of  civilization,  of  truth, 
of  justice,  and  of  Christ  .  .  .  This  disbelief  in 
altruism,  and  over-valuation  of  fear  and  self-interest, 
seem  to  be  regarded  by  her  as  evidence  of  a  fearless 
and  thorough  grasp  of  biological  truth,  and  are  often 
referred  to  as  'true  German  objectivity,  or  the  Ger- 
man "sense  of  reality."  '  " 

Mr.  Trotter's  conclusion  from  this  analysis  is  that, 
because  of  its  very  nature,  nothing  but  a  thorough 

184 


PROPAGANDA 

defeat  for  Germany  can  destroy  this  psychological 
condition. 

If  she  is  allowed  to  escape  under  conditions  which  in 
any  way  can  be  sophisticated  into  a  victory,  or,  at  any 
rate,  not  a  defeat,  she  will  continue  to  hate  us  as  she  con- 
tinued to  hate  her  victim  France.  .  .  .  The  susceptibility 
of  the  individual  German  to  a  harsh  and  even  brutally 
enforced  discipline  is  well  known.  The  common  soldier 
submits  to  be  beaten  by  his  sergeant,  and  is  the  better  sol- 
dier for  it;  both  submit  to  the  bullying  of  their  officer, 
apparently  also  with  profit;  the  common  student  is 
scarcely  less  completely  subject  to  his  professor,  and  be- 
comes thereby  a  model  of  scientific  excellence;  the  com- 
mon citizen  submits  to  the  commands  of  his  superiors, 
however  unreasonably  conceived  and  insultingly  conveyed, 
and  becomes  a  model  of  disciplined  behavior;  finally,  the 
heads  of  the  State,  combining  the  most  drastic  methods 
of  the  sergeant,  the  professor  and  the  official,  wins  not 
merely  a  slavish  respect,  but  a  veritable  apotheosis.  Ger- 
many has  shown  unmistakably  the  way  to  her  heart;  it  is 
for  Europe  [and  America]  to  take  it. 


CHAPTER  IX 


CONCLUSION 


Under  any  form  of  government,   however  auto- 
cratic, be  it  a  czardom  or  a  royal  absolutism,  the  de- 
terminations of  the  sovereign  are  necessarily  dic- 
tated in  very  large  measure  by  the  opinions  of  the 
advisers  by  whom  he  is  surrounded.     In  some  cases 
the  conditions  are  such  that  ecclesiastical  influences 
are  dominant  and  the  government  becomes  a  practical 
theocracy.     In  other  cases,  there  are  noble  or  other 
privileged  classes  whose  will  cannot  be  resisted.    In 
still  other  cases,  plutocratic  forces  may  in  fact  be 
all  controlling,  and  there  have  been  not  a  few  his- 
torical instances  when  feminine  influence,  of  the  wife 
or  of  the  mistress,  has  been  dominant.    In  the  case 
/  of  Prussia,  it  would  appeai^^a^jlurmg^recent  years 
/  at  least,  the  military  leaders,   speaking  their  will 
through  the  Great  General_Staff,  has  been  able^to 
\.      dictate^tne^policles  of  the^^e_no^onlyjmth  jref- 
\  erence  to  matters  military_but  of  foreign  affairs.    In 
an  often  quoted  statement,  Clausewitz  declared  that 

186 


CONCLUSION 

war  is  but  a  continuation  of  the  policy  which  pre- 
ceeds  its  declaration,  but  it  is  the  proper  province  of 
the  civil  government  and  especially  of  the  depart- 
ment of  foreign  affairs  to  determine  what  that  policy 
should  be.  But  in  Prussia,  it  seems  to  be  demon- 
strated that  the  military  arm  of  the  government 
whose  only  legitimate  function  is  to  carry  out  the 
state  policies  formulated  and  adopted  by  the  civil 
branches  of  government,  has,  like  a  Frankenstein,  be- 
come stronger  than  its  creator  and  principal,  and  . 
itself  has  exercised  a  determining  voice  as  to  the7 
policies  to  be  pursued.  Mr.  Gerard,  late  Ambassador 
of  the  United  States  to  the  German  Empire,  in  his 
recent  volume,1  discusses  this  question.  "Where,"  he 
asks,  "does  the  ultimate  power  reside  in  Germany? 
Where  is  the  force  which  controls  the  country  ?  What 
was  the  mysterious  power  which  changed,  for  in- 
stance, the  policy  of  the  German  Empire  towards 
America,  and  ordered  unrestricted  submarine  war 
at  the  risk  of  bringing  against  the  Empire  a  rich 
and  powerful  nation  of  over  a  hundred  million  pop- 
ulation ?" 

Of  the  answers  to  these  questions  Mr.  Gerard,  with 
his  four  years  of  direct  dealing  with  the  government 

1  Face  to  Face  with  Kaiserism,  Chapter  II. 

187 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

at  Berlin,  has  no  doubt  whatever.  The  Foreign  Of- 
fice, he  says,  did  not  have  the  decision.  The  Reich- 
stag, of  course,  played  no  influential  part.    Not  even 

a 

the  voice  of  the  Bundesrath  was,  or  is,  decisive.  "The 
one  force  in  Germany,"  says  Mr.  Gerard,  "which 
ultimately  decides  every  great  question,  except  the 
fate  of  its  own  head,  is  the  Great  General  Staff.'/ 
"On  one  side  of  the  Konigs-Platz  in  Berlin,"  he  con- 
tinues, "stands  the  great  building  of  the  Reichstag, 
floridly  decorated,  glittering  with  gold,  surrounded 
by  statues  and  filled,  during  the  sessions  of  the 
Reichstag,  with  a  crowd  of  representatives  who  (Jo 
not  represent,  and  who,  like  monkeys  in  a  cage,  jib- 
ber and  debate  questions  which  they  have  no  power 
to  decide.  Across  the  square  and  covering  the  entire 
block  in  a  building  that  resembles  in  external  ap- 
pearance a  jail,  built  of  dark  red  brick,  without  orna- 
ment or  display,  is  the  home  of  the  Great  General 
Staff.  This  institution  has  its  own  spies,  its  own 
secret  service,  its  own  newspaper  censors.  Here  the 
picked  officers  of  the  German  army,  the  inheritors 
of  the  power  of  von  Moltke,  work  industriously. 
Apartjrom  the  people  of  Germany,  they  wield  the 
supreme  power  of  the  State,  and  when  the  Staff  de- 
cides a  matter  of  foreign  policy  or  even  an  internal 

188 


CONCLUSION 

measure,  that  decision  is  final.  ...  I  do  not  think 
the  Emperor  himself,  unless  backed  by  the  whole 
public  opinion  of  Germany,  would  dare  to  withstand 
the  Great  General  Staff  which  he  himself  creates." 

This  analysis  of  the  situation  agrees  exactly  with 
the  revelations  made  in  the  recently  published  memo- 
randum of  Count  Lichnowsky,  Germany's  Ambas- 
sador at  the  Court  of  St.  James,  and  with  the  letter 
of  Herr  Miihlon,  a  former  director  of  the  great 
Krupp  concern,  with  regard  to  the  deliberate  decision 
made  by  Germany  to  hazard  a  European  war. 

When  we  say,  however,  that  a  man,  be  he  a  mon- 
arch or  a  private  citizen,  is  controlled  by  the  judg- 
ment of  his  advisers,  we  do  not  thereby  lessen  the 
responsibility  for  the  decisions  which  he  makes.  The 
Kaiser  thus  remains  personally  responsible  for  the  ,,  ( r  ^  ^* 
calamitous  war  that  for  over  four  years  has  deso- 
lated the  world.  During  the  nearly  thirty  years  of  I 
his  reign,  he  has  sought  every  possible  occasion  to 
exalt  the  military  power  of  his  country — not  simply 
to  increase  its  size  and  perfect  its  organization  and 
equipment,  but  to  stimulate  the  militaristic  spirit, 
to  prefer  military  prestige  above  any  other  form  of 
social  distinction,  and  to  reiterate  that  to  his  army 
and  navy  the  safety  and  continued  development  of 

189 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

his  people  are  entrusted.  If,  then,  he  finally  suc- 
ceeded in  creating  an  agency  whose  influence  he  him- 
self could  not  successfully  resist,  his  was  the  fault — 
sua  culpa,  sua  maxima  culpa. 

In  fact,  however,  all  the  evidence  which  we  now 
have  goes  to  show  that,  since  1911  at  least,  the  Kai- 
ser has  been  personally  convinced  that  it  would  be 
necessary  for  Germany  to  fight  for  the  increased 
political  power  which  he  believed  it  to  be  her  right 
to  obtain,  and  that  the  most  favorable  moment  should 
be  seized  for  employing  this  means.  It  may  be  that 
before  1911  he  had  hoped  that  the  mere  threat  of 
the  armed  force  possessed  by  the  Empire  would  be 
sufficient  to  enable  Germany  to  realize  her  aggres- 
sive aims ;  but,  after  the  outcome  of  the  Agadir  inci- 
dent, he  apparently  decided  that  this  could  not  be 
done.  We  know  that  he  felt  keenly  the  criticism 
in  his  own  country  that  Germany  had  met  a  diplo- 
matic defeat  in  Morocco  when,  having  made  what 
had  amounted  to  an  open  threat  he  had  been  obliged 
to  content  himself  with  concessions  of  very  slight 
value.  And  this  chagrin  and  sensitiveness  to  criti- 
cism at  home  is  seen  reflected  in  his  conversation  with 
Herr  Krupp  von  Bohlen,  reported  by  Herr  Miihlon, 

190 


CONCLUSION 

when,  says  Herr  Bohlen,  "the  Kaiser  told  him  that 
he  would  declare  war  immediately  if  Russia  mobil- 
ized, and  that  this  time  people  would  see  that  he  did 
not  turn  about.  The  Kaiser's  repeated  insistence 
that  this  time  nobody  would  be  able  to  accuse  him 
of  indecision  had,  he  said,  been  almost  comic  in  its 
effect."  Likewise  in  his  conversation  with  Dr.  Helf- 
ferich,  the  Kaiser  is  reported  as  having  said  that 
"this  time  there  would  be  no  oscillation." 

It  is  a  general  principle  of  international  law  that 
each  nation  should  be  left  free  from  outside  pressure 
to  adopt  and  maintain  such  form  of  government  as 
it  will,  provided  it  be  one  that  is  able  to  maintain 
effective  control  over  its  own  territory,  and,  in  gen- 
eral, fulfill  the  international  obligations  laid  upon  it 
by  international  law  or  by  the  special  agreements 
it  has  entered  into.  This  principle  of  international 
intercourse  is  founded  not  so  much  upon  the  idea 
that  each  nation  has  an  inherent  moral  right  to  de- 
termine the  kind  of  political  rule  under  which  it  is 
to  live,  as  it  is  upon  the  practical  proposition  that 
thus  peace  will  be  promoted  by  diminishing  the  op- 
portunities, or  rather  the  excuses,  for  interference 

191 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

and  intervention  by  one  or  more  States  with  the 
domestic  affairs  of  another  State. 

In  view  of  this  general  principle  it  may  be  asked 
with  what  right  or  justice  are  the  Entente  Powers 
now  demanding,  as  a  condition  of  permanent  peace, 
that  Prussia  shall  effect  a  radical  change  in  her 
scheme  of  political  rule,  or  at  least  in  the  principles 
upon  which  it  is  founded,  and  upon  which,  in  the 
past,  it  has  been  operated? 

The  answer  to  this  question,  shortly  stated,  is  this : 
As  regards  the  particular  monarch  now  reigning,  it 
has  appeared  that  he  and  the  advisers  by  whom  he 
has  seen  fit  to  surround  himself  have  no  respect  for 
their  own  covenanted  word  and  no  regard  for  the 
rights  of  other  peoples  as  sanctioned  by  long-estab- 
lished rules  of  international  law.  For  the  sake  of 
securing  his  own  end,  he  has  shown  no  compunction 
in  visiting  upon  wholly  innocent  persons — the  Bel- 
gians, for  example — immeasurable  and  irremediable 
injuries.  This  he  has  justified  to  himself  as  an  agent 
of  the  Almighty,  and,  acquiescing  in  this  claim,  the 
people  of  Germany  have  been  led  to  support  him. 
Giving  motive  force  to  his  acts  has,  of  course,  been 
the  assumption  that  he  is  the  legislative  mouthpiece 
and  the  executive  arm  of  a  transcendent  being,  the 

192 


CONCLUSION 

National  State  of  Germany,  which  has  for  its  aim 
and  mission  to  spread  throughout  the  world  that 
Kultur  which  it  has  itself  created.  When  thus  con- 
ceived it  is  clear  that  the  Prussian  conception  of 
monarchy  assumes  a  significance  which  leaves  it  no 
longer  a  matter  with  which  only  the  Germans  them- 
selves are  concerned.  Until  this  doctrine  is  discred- 
ited, there  can  be  no  possible  security  to  other  peo- 
ples. It  is,  therefore,  a  matter  of  the  merest  precau- 
tion and  self-defense  that  the  Entente  Powers  and 
the  United  States  should  demand  of  the  German 
people  that,  if  they  wish  to  continue  to  be  monarch- 
ically  governed,  they  should  eliminate  from  their 
political  philosophy  and  from  their  constitutional 
practice  the  features  which  have  made  possible  the 
policies  which  their  government  has  adopted. 

The  demand,  therefore,  of  the  Allied  Powers  that 
Prussian  autocracy  be  overthrown  is  not  based  upon 
a  claim  upon  their  part  that  they  have  a  right  to 
impose  their  own  political  ideas  upon  the  Germans, 
for  if  this  were  so  they  would  subject  themselves  to 
one  of  the  chief  indictments  which  they  have  brought 
against  the  Prussians.  Eather,  their  contention  is 
compacted  of  two  convictions:  That  only  thus  can 
they  obtain  treaty  agreements  the  binding  force  of 

193 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

which  they  can  have  an  assurance  will  be  respected; 
and  that  only  thus  will  it  be  possible  to  prevent  a 
continued  acceptance  by  the  German  people  of  po- 
litical principles  and  of  national  policies  which  not 
only  furnish  a  constant  menace  to  international  peace 
and  comity,  but  threaten  to  destroy  civilization  it- 
self. As  it  now  appears  to  the  United  States  and 
to  the  Entente  Powers,  but  two  alternatives  appear 
tolerable.  Either  the  political  power  of  Germany 
must  be  so  weakened  that  it  can  no  longer  endanger 
the  world,  or  it  must  be  taken  out  of  the  autocratic 
control  of  those  who  have  so  misused  it. 

Stated  in  other  words,  the  conviction  of  the  En- 
tente Powers  is  that  this  much  at  least  may  be  said 
of  democracy :  That  released  from  false  teaching  im- 
posed upon  them  from  above,  and  left  free  to  form 
and  express  their  own  judgments  regarding  matters 
of  public  policy  and  of  public  morality,  no  intel- 
lectually enlightened  people  would  adopt  or  support 
such  policies  as  have  been  framed  by  the  autocratic 
rulers  of  Germany  and  sought  to  be  executed  as  di- 
vine commands.  This,  then,  is  the  real  meaning  of 
the  demand  that  the  world  must  be  made  safe  for 
democracy.  Never  again  must  it  be  possible  for  a 
few  men  intoxicated  with  their  own  power  and  de- 

194 


CONCLUSION 

mented  by  a  belief  in  the  divine  origin  of  their  own 
authority  to  plunge  a  whole  world  into  an  abyss  of 
horror  and  suffering. 

The  last  question  to  be  considered  is  whether  it 
is  right  or  endurable  that  the  other  nations  of  the 
world  should  tolerate  or  enter  into  even  formal  in- 
ternational relations  of  comity  with  a  people  holding 
such  a  doctrine  of  the  State  as  I  have  described.  To 
this  the  answer  must  be  no  ! 

The  rightful  scope  of  tolerance  in  matters  of  deed 
as  well  as  of  thought  should  be  broadly  defined  and 
observed,  especially  by  those  peoples  who  have  placed 
liberty  of  nations  as  well  as  liberty  of  individuals 
high  among  their  ideals.  And  were  the  influence 
and  attempted  application  of  the  perverted  political 
principles  which  we  have  been  considering  confined 
within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  State  whose  ruler 
and  subjects  accepted  them,  it  might  be  possible  for 
the  peoples  of  the  rest  of  the  world  to  maintain  a 
position,  not  of  indifference,  or  of  intellectual  neu- 
trality, but  of  non-interference,  confining  their  ac- 
tion to  quarantine  precautions  against  infection. 
But  when,  as  is  the  present  case,  the  world  finds  it- 

195 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

self  confronted  with  a  powerful  people  not  only  pos- 
sessing all  the  means  for  offensive  war,  but  obsessed 
with  a  paranoic  persuasion  of  their  own  superexcel- 
lence,  and  convinced,  as  declared  by  thousands  of 
voices,  that  to  them  has  been  given  by  divine  provi- 
dence the  task  and  duty  of  spreading  their  distinc- 
tive Kultur  throughout  the  world,  and  asserting  that 
the  national  State  which  they  have  created,  and  which 
may  select  its  own  means,  is  the  instrumentality  for 
realizing  this  end — when  this  is  the  condition  which 
confronts  the  world,  no  opportunity  for  the  practice 
of  tolerance  is  preserved.  The  Teutons  have  them- 
selves denied  the  principle  of  toleration  and  asserted 
that  nations  weaker  than  themselves  have  no  righta 
that  need  be  respected.  Homo  Jiomini  lupus,  man 
the  wolf  of  man,  is  the  proposition  to  which  they 
have  committed  themselves.  The  victory  is  to  the 
nation  of  the  greatest  organized  military  might,  and 
woe  to  the  conquered  is  their  only  reply  to  those  who 
are  thus  overcome.  Let  those  who  would  continue  to 
resist  the  operation  of  nature's  law,  they  have  said, 
be  left  only  their  eyes  with  which  to  weep. 

When,  then,  we  find  these  Prussian  doctrines  of 
political  power  given  a  militant  phase,  and  backed 
by  an  enormous  military  establishment,  no  alterna- 

196 


CONCLUSION 

tive  is  given  to  the  rest  of  the  world  but  to  meet  and, 
if  possible,  to  stamp  them  out  of  existence.  As  Ver- 
non Kellogg  has  said,  "There  can  be  but  one  answer 
to  a  people  that  insists  on  success  in  war  as  the  cri- 
terion of  racial  advancement,  and  as  the  most  impor- 
tant factor  in  human  evolution.  We  have  to  accept, 
for  the  moment,  the  challenge  to  bloody  debate.  But 
when  we  have  debated  the  matter  in  this  horrible  way, 
and  have  won,  let  us  see  to  it  that  the  winning  is 
the  last  of  its  kind  necessary." 

The  end  for  which  the  war  is  carried  on  need  not 
be  a  punitive  one.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  war 
should  be  given  a  punitive  purpose.  The  purely 
vindictive  or  retributive  infliction  of  suffering  or 
of  injury  in  any  form  cannot  be  ethically  defended, 
although  Germany's  leading  philosopher,  Kant, 
taught  the  doctrine  in  its  baldest  form.  But  force 
applied  for  the  purpose  of  prevention  or  deterrence, 
or  the  securing  of  justice,  is  not  only  ethically  al- 
lowed but  imperatively  demanded.  Leaving  aside, 
then,  all  questions  of  territorial  boundaries,  or  other 
material  national  interests,  the  world  will  receive  no 
adequate  compensation  for  the  enormous  sacrifices 
it  has  made,  unless  the  final  terms  of  peace  are  such 
that,  so  far  as  is  humanly  possible,  the  claims  of 

197 


PRUSSIAN  POLITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

justice  are  satisfied  by  the  payment  of  indemnities 
to  those  who  have  been  wronged,  and  by  the  imposi- 
tion upon  the  Germans  of  conditions  which  will 
demonstrate  to  them  that  theirs  is  a  system  of  po- 
litical morality  which  the  civilized  world  will  not 
tolerate. 

Of  this  much  Americans  are  convinced:     That, 
despite  the  increase  of  political  power  the  Prussian 
State  has  obtained,  despite  the  material  prosperity 
its  people  may  have  secured,  theirs  is  a  political 
system  which  is  false  in  its  premises  and  maleficent 
is  its  operation.    The  education  of  the  Prussian  peo* 
pie  in  the  art  of  self-government  has  been  neglected ;  / 
their  capacity  to  form  an  intelligent  public  opinion  Cff 
with  regard  to  matters  political  has  remained  unde\ 
veloped;  military  authority  has  been  exalted  until' 
it  has  taken  control  of  the  policies  of  the  State;  ad- 
ministrative efficiency  has  been  obtained  by  the  main- 
tenance of  an  autocracy  which  has  deprived  the  gov- 
erned  of  a   political  responsibility  which,    if  pos- 
sessed,   would    have    increased    their    appreciation 
of    the    ethical    obligations    imposed    by    national 
and    international    life,    and    thus    made    possible, 
if,  indeed,  it  has  not  actively  stimulated,  the  de- 
velopment of  an  ideal  of  national  greatness  which 

198 


CONCLUSION 

is  inconsistent  with  a  true  conception  of  civil- 
ization. Right  has  been  sacrificed  to  might,  political 
liberty  to  state  authority,  and  individual  spontaneity 
and  freedom  to  organized  efficiency ;  with  the  result, 
that  state  action  has  freed  itself  from  the  limitations 
which  ordinary  morality  imposes,  and  the  entire  mind 
of  the  people  has  been  corrupted ;  and  that,  with  their 
pride  swollen  with  a  contemplation  of  the  material 
success  they  have  gained,  the  Germans  have  lost  re- 
spect for,  and  appreciation  of,  the  value  of  a  civiliza- 
tion and  political  ideals  which  differ  from  their  own. 
Misled  by  this  distorted  perspective,  the  Germans 
have  adopted  a  Weltpolitik  which  has  brought  them 
into  conflict  with  other  nations  and  made  inevitable 
the  terrible  conflict  which  is  now  devastating  almost 
all  Europe  and  has,  indeed,  kindled  the  flames  of  war 
in  the  four  quarters  of  the  globe. 


APPENDIX 

PAKT  OF  THE  ADDRESS  OF  THE  GERMAN  CHANCELLOR 
OF  OCT.  5,  1918,  DEALING  WITH  THE  POLITICAL 
CHANGES  TO  BE  PUT  INTO  EFFECT 

<r[n  accordance  with  the  imperial  decree  of  September 
30,  the  German  empire  has  undergone  a  basic  alteration 
of  its  political  leadership. 

"As  successor  to  Count  George  F.  von  Hertling,  whose 
services  in  behalf  of  the  fatherland  deserve  the  highest 
acknowledgment,  I  have  been  summoned  by  the  emperor 
to  lead  the  new  government. 

"In  accordance  with  the  governmental  method  now 
introduced,  I  submit  to  the  Reichstag,  publicly  and  with- 
out delay,  the  principles  upon  which  I  propose  to  conduct 
the  grave  responsibilities  of  the  office. 

"These  principles  were  firmly  establisLed  by  the  agree- 
ment of  the  federated  governments  and  the  leaders  of  the 
majority  parties  in  this  honorable  house  before  I  decided 
to  assume  the  duties  of  chancellor.  They  contain,  there- 
fore, not  only  my  own  confession  of  political  faith,  but 
that  of  an  overwhelming  portion  of  the  German  people's 
representatives,  that  is  of  the  German  nation  which  has 
constituted  the  Reichstag  on  the  basis  of  a  general,  equal 
and  secret  franchise,  and  according  to  their  will.  Only 
the  fact  that  I  know  the  conviction  and  will  of  the  major- 
ity of  the  people  are  back  of  me  has  given  me  strength  to 
take  upon  myself  conduct  of  the  empire's  affairs  in  this 
hard  and  earnest  time  in  which  we  are  living. 

201 


APPENDIX 

"One  man's  shoulders  would  be  too  weak  to  carry  alone 
the  tremendous  responsibility  which  falls  upon  the  gov- 
ernment at  present.  Only  if  the  people  take  active  part, 
in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  word,  in  deciding  their  des- 
tinies; in  other  words,  if  responsibility  also  extends  to 
the  majority  of  their  freely  elected  political  leaders,  can 
the  leading  statesman  confidently  assume  his  part  of  the 
responsibility  in  the  service  of  folk  and  fatherland. 

"My  resolve  to  do  this  has  been  especially  lightened 
for  me  by  the  fact  that  prominent  leaders  of  the  laboring 
class  have  found  a  way  in  the  new  government  to  the 
highest  offices  of  the  empire.  I  see  therein  a  sure  guar- 
antee that  the  new  government  will  be  supported  by  the 
firm  confidence  of  the  broad  masses  of  the  people,  without 
whose  true  support  the  whole  undertaking  would  be  con- 
demned to  failure  in  advance.  Hence,  what  I  say  to-day 
I  say  is  not  only  in  my  own  name  and  those  of  my 
official  helpers,  but  in  the  name  of  the  German  people.  .  .  . 

"I  am  convinced  that  the  manner  in  which  imperial 
leadership  is  now  constituted  with  cooperation  of  the 
Reichstag  is  not  something  ephemeral,  and  that  when 
peace  comes  a  government  cannot  again  be  formed  which 
does  not  find  support  in  the  Reichstag  and  does  not  draw 
its  leaders  therafrom. 

"The  war  has  conducted  us  beyond  the  old  multifarious 
and  disrupted  party  life  which  made  it  so  difficult  to  put 
into  execution  a  uniform  and  decisive  political  wish.  The 
formation  of  a  majority  means  the  formation  of  a  political 
will,  and  an  indisputable  result  of  the  war  has  been  that 
in  Germany  for  the  first  time  great  parties  have  joined 
together  in  a  firm,  harmonious  program  and  have  thus 
come  into  position  to  determine  for  themselves  the  fate 
of  the  people. 

202 


APPENDIX 

"This  thought  will  never  die.  This  development  will 
never  be  retracted  (applause),  and  I  trust  that  so  long 
as  Germany's  fate  is  ringed  about  by  dangers  those  sec- 
tions of  the  people  outside  the  majority  parties  and  whose 
representatives  do  not  belong  to  the  government  will  put 
aside  all  that  separates  us  and  will  give  the  fatherland 
what  is  the  fatherland's. 

"This  development  necessitates  an  alteration  of  our 
constitution's  provisions  along  the  lines  of  the  imperial 
decree  of  September  30,  which  shall  make  it  possible  that 
those  members  of  the  Reichstag  who  entered  the  govern- 
ment will  retain  their  seats  in  the  Reichstag.  A  bill  to 
this  end  has  been  submitted  to  the  federal  states  and  will 
immediately  be  made  the  object  of  their  consideration  and 
decision. 


This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 

OCT  2  7  1931 


JAW 


; 


DEC  l  4  1944 


WAR  io  1952 


•/  181953' 

,t>EC  3     19W 

Oct    8    '58 

Form  L-9-10m-5,'28 


Main   U«b 


APR     7  t959f 

WAY  4      1959 


fey 


A.M 


|3'£#AIN 


C  E  r  V  E  D 


3»59CCT  1G  19S4 


Mr  5 1 

Jun  14    61 

APR  1  p  1963 


P.M. 
110111112]  1  '  213I415IC 


k 

*  1968 


It  91967, 


.JJC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY 


FACILITY 


AA    000  570  943    1 


